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Article 1

ARTICLES

RULES AND STANDARDS FOR CYBERSPACE
Edward Lee*
INTRODUCTION

The Internet has confronted courts with numerous complex issues, none perhaps more confounding than how to deal with the Internet's rapidly changing nature. The problem is that the Internet
presents a constantly moving (or morphing) target. A court can never
be certain that the underlying facts about the Internet upon which the
court bases its decision are not changing, and changing in a material
way. During the course of the Microsoft trial,1 Netscape was acquired
by America Online, Inc. (AOL) (which, in turn, announced a merger
with Time-Warner), thus potentially bolstering Netscape's position
against Microsoft in the browser market. 2 By the time the case
reached the D.C. Circuit on appeal, some three years after the inception of the case and some six years after the first alleged anticompetitive conduct by Microsoft, the court of appeals had to struggle with
the possibility that the marketplace had "dramatically changed" and
* Instructor in Law, Stanford Law School. I am grateful to John Barton, Julie
Cohen, Dick Crasvell, Don Falk, Paul Goldstein, Bob Kim, Eric Lai, Larry Lessig,
Jeanne Merino, Reggie Oh, Tamara Piety, Margaret Jane Radin, Ming Shao, Lee
Thompson, and Lloyd Weinreb for their helpful comments. A special word of thanks
goes to Mark Davies, who provided extensive and always insightful comments on
nearly every draft of this Article. I also ish to thank the wonderful staff of the
Stanford Law Library, especially Paul Lomio, Erika Wayne, and Alicia Cuellar, for
their invaluable assistance. This article is dedicated to my parents, Drs. Douglas and
Catalina Lee.
1 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999), affd in part,
reo'd in par4 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001).
2 See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Microsoft Vulnerable, Witness Says; Acknowledgement
Could Aid Software Finn's Case, WASH. PosT, June 3, 1999, at E2; Ianthe J. Dugan &
Ariana E. Cha, AOL To Acquire Time Warner in Record $183 Billion Merger, WASH. PosT,
Jan. 11, 2000, atAl; David Segal & Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Justice'sPlan: Cut Microsoft in
Three, WASH. Posr, Jan. 13, 2000, at Al.
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was still "constantly changing. '3 During Napster's appeal, Napster
agreed to start charging a subscription fee to its users in an agreement
with music giant Bertelsmann. 4 During the Name.Space case, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) was
formed to consider adding more top-level domain names-the very
relief sought by the plaintiff.5 Each development had the potential to
alter, or undermine, the court's decision in the respective case. Far
from being exceptional, these kind of rapid changes appear standard
fare for the Internet.
To deal with the speed of cyberspace, courts often face two conflicting impulses: the first, to proceed cautiously so that they can better understand the complexities of cyberspace before subjecting it to
comprehensive regulation; the second, to proceed definitively so that
the law can establish order and not lag behind the technology. These
conflicting impulses, though lurking in nearly every case involving
cyberspace, have thus far received little attention in scholarship or
elsewhere. Cases are decided for cyberspace by courts favoring one or
the other impulse without much-or, at times, any--attempt to provide a principled explanation of the reasons for adopting one approach over the other. Sometimes courts take a narrow, fact-specific
approach to cyberspace, perhaps out of recognition that the rapidly
developing nature of the Internet warrants greater caution. Consider,
for example, the Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. ACLU in which
the Court invalidated two provisions of the Communications Decency
Act (CDA) that attempted to regulate indecent online material. 6 The
opinion-written by Justice Stevens-is narrow and fact-specific, and
allows much room for Congress (and the Court) to maneuver. 7 So
too is the D.C. Circuit's en banc opinion in Microsoft, which narrowed
in several ways the broad ruling of the district court.8 Sometimes,
however, courts take a broad, categorical approach to cyberspace.
The Fourth Circuit's categorical reading of the federal immunity for
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.9 and
the Second Circuit's broad interpretation of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) in the digital versatile disc (DVD) case
3 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).
4 See William Drozdiak, Bertelsmann, EM! Hold Talks on Merging Music Businesses,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 11, 2000, at El.
5 See Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 576-79 (2d Cir.
2000).
6 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864-85 (1997).
7 See infra notes 273-84 and accompanying text.
8 See infta notes 305-13 and accompanying text.
9 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
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(12c] Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley1° ) provide two such examples.
The opinions set forth rules that apply broadly to cyberspace and
countenance few, if any, exceptions. 1 '
Although the substantive law in these cases is different, they all
raise a common question about the manner in which the court decided the case. Why take a narrow, fact-specific approach in one case,
but a broad, categorical approach in another case? The reason cannot depend simply on differences in the underlying statutes, for all of
the cases involved statutes that contained prohibitions whose language could be read broadly. Nor can it depend on the presence of a
constitutional challenge, for both Reno and the DVD case involved
substantial constitutional challenges, including issues of first impression. But then is there any principled reason for the varying approaches to laws for cyberspace, or is it just attributable to the
particular preference of each court? And if the latter is the case,
should we not be more systematic in determining the manner of
cyber-related decisions?
This Article attempts to answer these questions both in the context of these four cases and more generally. Too much rides on these
questions to leave their resolution to ad hoc determination. The manner of decision-whether broad or narrow, definitive or tentative, categorical or open-ended-affects how well the decision fits within the
existing body of law and whether it is tailored to achieve the purposes
for which it was intended. The competing approaches are in some
sense nothing new. They correspond with the longstanding debate
between the use of rules and standards in legal decisionmaking. Standards represent the cautious approach, deciding things narrowly and
one case at a time. Rules represent the definitive approach, deciding
things broadly and for a wide range of cases. By drawing upon the
rules/standards debate, as well as the related concepts of decisional
minimalism and maximalism, I attempt to provide a framework by
which courts can better evaluate whether to adopt a narrow/tentative
approach or a broad/definitive approach for cases involving
cyberspace.
Part I discusses the importance of developing a more systematic
framework for courts to evaluate the appropriate manner of decision
in cases involving cyberspace. Part II provides a brief background to
the rules/standards debate and the concepts of decisional minimalism
and maximalism, and incorporates both sets of concepts to describe
two general approaches: (1) a narrow/tentative approach (embracing
10
11

273 F.d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
See infra notes 329-42, 360-69 and accompanying text.
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standards, minimalism, and case-by-case decisionmaking), and (2) a
broad/definitive approach (embracing rules, maximalism, and categorical decisionmaking). Applying these concepts to cyberspace, Part
III proposes a framework for courts to consider when analyzing
whether a narrow/tentative approach or a broad/definitive approach
is appropriate for cyberspace. Specifically, this Article proposes that
courts entertain a modest presumption in favor of the narrow/tentative approach and the use of standards, minimalism, and case-by-case
decisionmaking. The presumption can be rebutted by factors that indicate that rules and a broad/definitive approach are appropriate.
The framework identifies five factors to assist courts in this inquiry.
Part IV applies the framework to the four cases mentioned above:
Reno, Microsoft, Zeran, and Corley. The framework, I argue, reveals that
the courts in Reno, Microsoft, and Zeran got the manner question right,
but the Corley court got it wrong. Part of the problem with the Corley
decision is that it decides too much, too soon, in a way that is difficult
to fit within the existing body of copyright law.
I.

THE CHALLENGES POSED BY CYBERSPACE FOR COURTS

Courts continue to face numerous difficult questions about how
to apply law to cyberspace. Not a day seems to go by without mention
in the news of a high-profile lawsuit dealing with a complex legal issue
involving cyberspace-Microsoft,A&MRecords, Inc. v. Napster,1 2 the Yahoo! case in France,1 3 the list could go on. As the Internet continues
to grow, we can only expect these legal questions to multiply, and to
do so at a fairly dramatic clip. While these cases undoubtedly raise
many different legal issues on the merits, they all share one recurring
question: in what manner-broad or narrow, categorical or fact-specific-ought the court to formulate its decision?
Although this question-which I will call the "manner question"-is perhaps just as important as the substantive issues, too often
courts ignore the question or "answer" it without any real discussion
or consideration of the complexities that the question poses. At best,
the competing approaches taken by courts can be characterized as ad
hoc, if not unprincipled. In this Part, I examine why courts should be
more systematic about the manner in which they apply law to cyberspace by discussing three recurring challenges presented by
cyberspace.
12 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
13 La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisdmitisme v. La Soci& Yahoo! Inc.,
T.G.I. [App. Ct.] Paris, Nov. 20, 2000.
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Internet Speed

One of the biggest challenges that courts face in dealing with the
Internet is the speed at which it is developing. Not only is the Internet
a nascent technology, it is a technology and medium that changes so
rapidly that a single year can make one's understanding of the Internet obsolete. While the law has lagged behind technological developments in the past, the Internet seems to present challenges of an
entirely different order. 14 Put simply, the Internet travels-and
changes-at an amazing speed. Nearly everything about the Internet-the content, the bandwidth, the number of users, the amount
of e-commerce, the business models of the dot coms (at least those
that are still around), etc.-has changed dramatically in the last few
years. And that change is only likely to continue, and perhaps
accelerate.
The problem for the law is rather simple: keeping up. We have
barely had time to think about, much less decide, how the law ought
to apply to early cyberspace. Now, we are light years beyond early
cyberspace, and the challenges to the law seem even greater.' 5 The
problem is somewhat akin to the classic tortoise-and-hare race, only
this time the hare has the ability to "beam" itself wherever and however far it wants. In such a race, the tortoise may never6 catch up, no
matter how stubbornly and persistently it plods along.'
We need not look very far or wide to find examples of this onesided race. In the first case involving the Internet considered by the
Supreme Court, Reno v. ACLU,17 the rapidly changing nature of cyberspace led Justice Scalia to muse during oral argument:
This is an area where change is enormously rapid. Is it possible that
this statute is unconstitutional today, or was unconstitutional two
years ago when it was examined on the basis of a record done about
14 See Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication,and the FirstAmendment: The Dangers
of FirstAmendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1003, 1004 (2000) ("Doctrinal analysis often requires us to reconcile traditional legal principle with modern technological
innovation. Nowhere is this task of reconciliation more daunting than with cyberspace, where the speed and spread of information has been ratcheted up to levels that
were unimaginable even a generation ago.").
15 See Lawrence Lessig, Forewordto Symposium, Cyberspace and Privacy:A New Legal
Paradigm2,52 STAN. L. REV. 987, 989 (2000).
16 See id. ("There is an urgency now to get others to see how this ecology, this
space, the life this space enables, is changing. The feeling of a race-a race run
against time, against changes that are happening faster than time, and against an
attitude that makes these changes invisible.").
17 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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two years ago, but will be constitutional next week? ...Or next year
8
or in two years?'
Although perhaps partly tongue-in-cheek, Justice Scalia's sentiments
convey the problems, not to mention the perplexity, of dealing with
rapid technological change. Cyberspace would be difficult enough to
understand if it presented a relatively stable target. That cyberspace
constantly changes makes matters even worse.
Justice Scalia's sentiments are by no means unique. Rapid technological change confounds courts at all levels. Just listen to the
Ninth Circuit bemoan,
The history of the Internet is a chronicle of innovation by improvisation, from its genesis as a national defense research network, to a
medium of academic exchange, to a hacker cyber-subculture, to the
commercial engine for the so-called "New Economy." Like Heraclitus at the river, we address the Internet aware that courts are illsuited to fix its flow ....1
Or the Second Circuit: "Mindful of the often unforeseeable impact of rapid technological change, we are wary of making legal pronouncements based on highly fluid circumstances, which almost
'20
certainly will give way to tomorrow's new realities.
The rapid change of the Internet figured prominently in perhaps
the most important case dealing with the Internet thus far, United
States v. Microsoft.2 1 The D.C. Circuit was acutely aware of the difficulties of rendering a decision for an area that was constantly changing.
Indeed, the court of appeals reversed the district court's remedy ordering a divestiture of Microsoft for antitrust violations largely because the district court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing "to
update and flesh out the available information before seriously entertaining the possibility of dramatic structural relief."22 The court of
appeals described the problem posed by the Internet's rapidly changing nature as follows:
18

Transcript of Oral Argument, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (No. 96-

511), 1997 WL 136253, at *49 (Mar. 19, 1997).
19

AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,

121 S. Ct. 1247 (2001).
20 Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 584 (2d Cir. 2000);
see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
207, 208 ("I don't know much about cyberspace; what I do know will be outdated in
five years (if not five months!); and my predictions about the direction of change are
worthless, making any effort to tailor the law to the subject futile.").
21 84F. Supp. 2d9 (D.D.C. 1999), affdinpart,rev'd in part, 253F.3d34 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (en banc).
22 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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What is somewhat problematic... is that just over six years have
passed since Microsoft engaged in the first conduct plaintiffs allege
to be anticompetitive. As the record in this case indicates, six years
seems like an eternity in the computer industry. By the time a court
can assess liability, firms, products, and the marketplace are likely to
have changed dramatically. This, in turn, threatens enormous practical difficulties for courts considering the appropriate measure of
relief in equitable enforcement actions, both in crafting injunctive
remedies in the first instance and reviewing those remedies in the
second. Conduct remedies may be unavailing in such cases, because innovation to a large degree has already rendered the anticompetitive conduct obsolete (although by no means harmless).
And broader structural remedies present their own set of problems,
including how a court goes about restoringcompetition 23to a dramatically changed, and constantly changing, marketplace.
The challenge faced in Microsoft is the same type of challenge
faced by numerous other courts in dealing with cyberspace. While it
may be too much to expect that the law will keep pace with the technology stride-for-stride, we can do a betterjob of making sure that the
law at least remains in the race. This is one of the reasons why the
manner question is so important. How broadly or narrowly a court
rules affects how the law deals with changing technology.
B.

Old Law, New Technology

Another basic challenge created by cyberspace is how to apply old
law to new technology. By "old law," I mean statutes or doctrines that
were created before the Internet even existed and, therefore, could
not possibly have anticipated application to the Internet. The advent
of the Internet in 1995 made every case involving cyberspace since
then potentially a case of first impression. Even though numerous
laws have now been enacted to regulate different aspects of cyberspace, courts still face cases in which they must apply old law to
24
cyberspace.
The Microsoft case is perhaps the most famous example. The U.S.
government (along with several states) brought suit against software
giant Microsoft for allegedly engaging in unlawful exclusionary conduct to preserve its monopoly over Windows and to extend it to the
Web browser market against Netscape. 25 At the heart of the case was
23 Id.
24 Of course, over time, we should expect that this problem will dissipate with the
creation of Internet-specific laws, although the Internet may keep changing to make
such laws obsolete.
25 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 9.
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the application of the Sherman Act, 26 which was enacted in 1890 and
developed in the days of the railroad and oil barons.27 How this century-old statute should apply to regulate conduct in the Internet age is
28
certainly open to debate.
According to the government and its amici supporters, the case
involved the application of "familiar and fundamental tenets of antitrust law" 29 and Microsoft's conduct was clearly unlawful under those
well-established principles.30 According to Microsoft, however, its
conduct could only be understood in the unique context of the computer software industry-which is characterized by "rapid technological change" and "paradigm shifts" that make the "computer industry
inherently unpredictable." 3 1 Microsoft asserted that, in light of this
dynamic environment, its conduct was both pro-competitive and beneficial to consumers. 32 The competing views evince a basic disagreement over how the court should apply old law to new technology. As
one news report aptly summed up the case: "The government said
Microsoft was an old-fashioned monopolist in high-technology
clothes. Microsoft responded that computer software-a fast-changing, dynamic, fiercely competitive industry-did indeed have distinctive characteristics, and the courts should tread carefully."3 3 The
debate over applying old law to new technology was significant
enough for the D.C. Circuit to devote several paragraphs to it at the

26

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).

27 For an early application of the Sherman Act against a large oil company, see
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
28 See, e.g., David S. Evans, Antitrust and the New Economy, printed in ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY: ANTITRUST LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY, Sept. 14-15, 2000, at 41;
Mark Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet StandardizationProblem, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1041
(1996) (arguing that current antitrust law is unable to cope with a standardizationdriven industry).
29 Brief for Appellees United States and the State Plaintiffs at 47, United States v.
Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 00-5212) [hereinafter Appellees'
Microsoft Brief]; see also Brief of Amici Curiae America Online, Inc., at 1, United States
v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 00-5212) [hereinafter AOL's Microsoft
Brief] ("This case involves long-standing and well-settled principles of the Sherman
Act condemning monopolization and attempted monopolization.").
30 See Appellees' Microsoft Brief, supra note 29, at 47; see also AOL's Microsoft Brief,
supra note 29, at 2-3.
31 Brief for Appellant Microsoft Corp. at 15, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 00-5212).
32 Id. at 2.
33 Joel Brinkley & Steve Lohr, Microsoft Chided as Antitrust Trial Draws to a Close,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2000, at Al.
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outset of its opinion.3 4 In the end, the court acknowledged that
"there is no consensus among commentators on the question of
whether, and to what extent, current monopolization doctrine should
be amended to account for competition in technologically dynamic
35
markets characterized by network effects."
We do not need a case of the magnitude of Microsoft to see the
old law/new technology problem. My favorite example of this problem is the application of the old tort of trespass to chattel to cyberspace. The tort of trespass to chattel has had a long, if at times
sketchy, development. According to Prosser, "Trespass to chattels survives today.., largely as a little brother of conversion."3 6 However, it
seems as though little brother is trying to make a name for himself.
The doctrine made a recent rebirth in Thrifty-Tel v. Bezenek, in which a
California court applied the trespass to chattel theory-while openly
acknowledging that it had been "seldom employed as a tort theory"to computer hacking outside of the Internet context. 37 From there,
the doctrine has taken on a life of its own-prohibiting a host of conduct on the Net, including spamming,38 the use of recursive search
programs,3 9 and even the sending of emails that discuss issues of pub40
lic concern.
One danger of the old law/new technology problem is applying
old law in a way that is difficult to fit within the existing body of law.
In the trespass to chattel cases, a doctrine was applied to an extreme
case, but it was later extended to cases where it is not necessarily clear
that the doctrine should apply. 41 Given the low threshold of harm
34 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("We
decide this case against a backdrop of significant debate amongst academics and practitioners over the extent to which 'old economy' § 2 monopolization doctrines should
apply to firms competing in dynamic technological markets characterized by network
effects.").
35 Id. at 50.
36 PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 14, at 86 (W. Page Keeton ed.,
5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEErON].
37 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1560 (1996).
38 See, e.g., Compuserve, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D.
Ohio 1997).
39 See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069-72 (N.D.
Cal. 2000).
40 See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, No. 98AS05067, 1999 WL 450944, at *3 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 1999), affd, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (Ct. App. 2001),
petitionfor review granted, No. 5103781, 2002 WL 554737 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 27, 2002).
41 Richard Warner argues in favor of applying the doctrine of trespass to chattel
to the Internet based on the law-and-economics view that extending property rights to
cyberspace will facilitate bargaining. See Richard Warner, Border Disputes: Trespass to
Chattels on the Internet, 47 VA.L. L. REv. 117, 120 (2002). Warner proposes recognizing
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required, the doctrine seems to have no limit: anything that is sent
over the Internet that occupies any storage space on another person's
server can be considered a trespass to chattel. Mark Lemley calls this
process of expansion "doctrinal creep," 42 which is as negative sounding as it should be. Courts must be careful in applying old law to new
technology, so as not to stretch immoderately existing doctrines. The
old law/new technology problem further complicates the challenges
for courts when dealing with the, rapidly changing nature of
cyberspace.
C. Doctrinal Convergence
The manner question is also important in addressing doctrinal
convergence. "Convergence," which today has become a buzzword
among tech-types, basically means the blurring of lines between the
Internet and other technologies and media, such as cable, broadcast
TV, radio, wireless, and the telephone. 43 Because of convergence,
one day (maybe soon), we can expect the Internet to be our entre
property rights "when granting the right will promote desirable license agreements."
Id. He envisions the balancing of interests making that determination. Apparently,
he believes that when a website has obtained a network-effect relationship, it should
be allowed to control access to the website. Id. at 135-36. But when there is no
network-effect relationship, the website has no claim to a property right to control
access. Id. at 139. While Warner's theory has the benefit of providing at least some
limit to the currently unbounded doctrine, his theory may not work as a universal
principle. It is not clear to me why the presence of a network-effect relationship
should automatically tip the balance of interests in favor of a right to exclude others
from access to information or a website. There may be circumstances in which the
need for open access is weighty enough to justify the denial of any right to exclude
others from access. That is the debate with both broadband and instant messaging,
notwithstanding the potential argument by broadband or instant-messaging providers
(such as AOL Time Warner) that because they have created a network-effect relationship with their customers, allowing open access to other providers would be a trespass
to their chattel. See infra note 59. For further discussion of the law-and-economics
position, see infra notes 180-90 and accompanying text.
42 See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE LJ. 1687, 1698 (1999).
43 See Frank P. Darr, Converging Media Technologies and Standing at the Federal Communications Commission, 7 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1 passim (1993) (discussing administrative standing in terms of the evolving communications marketplace); Baoding Hsieh
Fan, When Channel Surfers Flip to the Web: Copyright Liabilityfor Internet Broadcasting,52
FED. COMM. L.J. 619, 620 (2000); John T. Soma & Eric K. Weingarten, Multinational
Economic Network Effects and the Need for an InternationalAntitrust Responsefrom the World
Trade Organization:A Case Study in Broadcast-Mediaand News Corporation,21 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 41, 63 (2000).
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into all of our communication, computing, and video/entertainment
needs.
This convergence of different technologies and media is being
accompanied by doctrinal convergence, meaning the intersection of
different areas of law, as well as the laws of different countries, to govern cyberspace. I do not mean to suggest that doctrinal convergence
is unique to cyberspace; courts confront legal issues implicating multiple laws or doctrines all the time. Indeed, any complex case is likely
to involve a legal issue that implicates competing doctrines or laws.
Cyberspace, however, is particularly conducive to doctrinal convergence because it brings together vast amounts of content, speech,
technologies, and kinds of communication as well as numerous people and countries. Put those all together, and you get a network that
implicates numerous different laws and doctrines, potentially for the
same conduct.
As a point of contrast, we might consider the old-fashioned telephone. 44 We rarely had many different areas of law colliding to regulate the telephone; most of the work was done by telecommunications
law45 and, sometimes, antitrust law.46 Once in a blue moon, First
Amendment issues were raised. 4 7 The Internet, however, raises all of
these issues, and more. Digital telephony is part of the Internet, but
so are news, intellectual property, e-commerce, online auctions, video
streaming, peer-to-peer file sharing, the posting of and linking to information and software, etc. The multiplicity of media and content
on the Net makes even greater the potential for multiple laws to apply
to the same conduct.
I would like to distinguish between two types of doctrinal convergence. The first involves different doctrines or laws within a single
jurisdiction or country converging; the second involves the laws of dif44 I do not want to give the impression that telephony can be considered separate
from the Internet. Indeed, because much of the Internet runs over telephone lines,
the Internet may be seen in some sense as an outgrowth of the telephone-or, to
borrow Lessig's description, a "souped-up telephone." See Lawrence Lessig, The Law
of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HAuv. L. REv. 501, 501 (1999). My comparison focuses on how the law has regulated the telephone in the past, primarily
before the advent of the Internet.
45 See Telecommunications Act of 1934, amended by Telecommunications Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15, 18, and 47 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1999)); FCC, 47 G.F.R. §§ 1-69 (2001).
46 See, e.g., United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), afJ'd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (approving an antitrust consent decree, contingent upon prior modification of decree).
47 See Sable Communs. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (invalidating a
restriction on "dial-a-porn").
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ferent countries converging. In some respects, both kinds of convergence raise the same problem: competing, if not conflicting, laws to
govern the same conduct. Yet, in another respect, the second type of
convergence may present greater difficulties given its international
dimensions-something to which courts may be less accustomed.
1. First-Order or National Doctrinal Convergence
The first type of doctrinal convergence involves the intersection
of different areas of law to govern cyberspace, such as intellectual
property, telecommunications, antitrust, contract, property, tort, privacy, and First Amendment law. In the United States, we are already
beginning to see this kind of convergence. Different areas of law are
colliding to govern cyberspace-sometimes coherently and comfortably, other times not. For example, click-wrap licensing (which purports to license software or other content on the Internet once a
person has "clicked on" an icon) may raise questions about validity
and enforceability under standard contract law and the (proposed)
Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act (UCITA),48 as well
50
as under the doctrine of copyright misuse 49 or federal preemption.
48 See Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND.
L.J. 1125, 1128-33, 1140-47 (2000) (originally presented as Addison C. Harris Lecture at the Indiana School of Law-Bloomington (Oct. 26, 1999)); J.H. Reichman &
Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated IntellectualPropertyRights: ReconcilingFreedom of
Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 886-914 (1999);
Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and Contract Law for the Information Age: The
Impact of Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Future of Information and Commerce, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1999); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of
CommercialExchange:A Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1609-10 (1995) (reviewing
PETER A. ALCES & HAROLD F. SEE, THE COMMERCIAL LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
(1994)). For a discussion of the related practice of "shrink-wrap" licensing and its
intersection with intellectual property law, see generallyJulie Cohen, Copyright and the
Jurisprudenceof Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J: 1089 (1998); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cop)right Policy and the Limits ofFreedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93 (1997); Mark
A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239 (1995);
Charles R. McManis, The Privatization(or "Shrink-Wrapping")of American Copyright Law,
87 CAL. L. REv. 173 (1999); and Raymond Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation
Between Contract and Intellectual Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827 (1998).
49 See Merges, supra note 48, at 1605-07 (arguing that the doctrines of copyright
and patent misuse are properly used "to nullify intellectual property licenses that contain terms that effectively extend intellectual property rights by contract"); see also
Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1997),
amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir.) (copyright misuse doctrine); DSC Communs.
Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996) (same); Lasercomb Am.,
Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990) (same); USM Corp. v. SPS Tech.,
Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510-12 (7th Cir. 1982) (patent misuse doctrine).
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Domain name disputes may raise issues under trademark law of different countries, 5 1 the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act in
the United States, 5 2 and ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (UDRP).53 Any restriction of content on the Netwhether under intellectual property law, indecency statutes, privacy
54
law, etc.-may implicate the First Amendment.
Sometimes different doctrines may develop in a way that embraces a common norm or principle. 55 For instance, facilitating interoperability is a norm or principle that now recurs in copyright law
under the doctrine of fair use,5 6 the DMCA's exemption for reverseengineering, 57 telecommunications law for telephony, 58 and the conditions imposed on the AOL-Time Warner merger by the Federal
59
Trade Commission and the Federal Communications Commission.
As courts decide more and more cases involving cyberspace, we
can expect doctrinal convergence to grow. Sometimes it will be easy
to harmonize the converging areas of law. Other times, it will not.
Unfortunately, doctrinal convergence does not imply coherence or
consistency. We can have two doctrines colliding-for example, the
50 See Lemley, supra note 48, at 1273-74; Merges, supranote 48, at 1611-13. See
generally David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contractand Public Policy:FederalPreemption
of Software License ProhibitionsAgainst Reverse Engineering 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 543 (1992)
(examining whether and to what extent federal law preempts enforcement of
software licenses that prohibit reverse engineering).
51 See, e.g., Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
52 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
53 ICANN, UNIFORM DomAn NAME DIsPtrrE REsoLUTIoN PoLicy, adopted Aug.
26, 1999, at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2002).
54 See, e.g., Epstein, supranote 14, at 1006-07 (discussing the intersection of common law with First Amendment in the issue of online privacy and attempting to develop a more systematic reconciliation of the two areas of law).
55 Mark Lemley, Address at the Association of American Law Schools Conference
(Jan. 4, 2001). I am indebted to Mark Lemley for the following examples and explanation of convergence on a common norm.
56 See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 1992).
57 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201(f) (West Supp. 2001).
58 See Lemley, supranote 28, at 1062 (noting that federal telecommunications law
requires "the interconnection of telecommunications devices on reasonable terms").
59 See Am. Online, Inc. & Time Warner, Inc., File No. 001 0105, Docket No. C3089 (FTC Dec. 14, 2000) (requiring AOL-Time Warner to allow other ISPs to use its
cable for broadband access), at http://wv.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aoldando.pdf (Dec.
14, 2000); Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and § 214
Authorizations by Time Warner, Inc. and Am. Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL-Time
Warner Inc., Transferee, No. 00-30 (FCCJan. 11, 2001) (requiring AOL-Time Warner
to allow competitors to connect to its instant-messaging services if AOL-Time Warner
offers advanced instant messaging to its users), at http://-v.fcc.gov/Bureaus/
Cable/Orders/2001/fcc01012.pdf (Jan. 11, 2001).
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fair use doctrine and the DMCA's anti-circumvention provision-and
courts will have to strike the right balance. That is why the manner
question is so important: how broadly or narrowly a law is interpreted
or a decision formulated affects how that law or decision fits within
the existing body of law, and whether the law is tailored to achieve the
purposes for which it was intended.
2.

Second-Order or International Doctrinal Convergence

We are also beginning to see second-order doctrinal convergence
with the intersection of laws of different countries. Because the Internet is international in scope and is, at least right now, a borderless
medium, any decision involving cyberspace may implicate the laws of
several (and possibly many) different countries. Take the Yahoo! case:
a French court applied French law to forbid Yahoo! from making
available for purchase Nazi paraphernalia in France. 60 This ruling
may end up diminishing the free speech interests of individuals in the
61
United States and other countries if Yahoo!I-as it has done removes such material from its website, thus making it unavailable
62
even to those outside of France.
Second-order doctrinal convergence need not be so stark as in
Yahoo!. In any intellectual property dispute over online content, the
law of several, if not many, different countries may be implicated. Because material posted online reaches everywhere on the Net, it is difficult to say where material on the Net is located. The Internet's
international character complicates seemingly basic questions of intellectual property, such as ownership and infringement. Is material
posted on the Net "created" in the place where the person posting it is
located? Or perhaps where the server on which the material is stored?
But what if the server's location is purely arbitrary or unknown to the
author? The same difficult questions can be posed for allegedly infringing material. Does an alleged infringer subject himself to the
laws of all nations across the world where the Internet reaches by posting infringing material on the Net? Legal scholars and commentators
have identified the difficulties in applying intellectual property laws
that are based on a principle of territoriality63 to a technology that
60 La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antis~mitisme v. La Socit6 Yahool Inc.,
T.G.I. [App. Ct.] Paris, Nov. 20, 2000.
61 SeeYahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antis~mitisme, 169 F. Supp.
2d 1181, 1192-93 (N.D. Cal. 2001); infra note 241 and accompanying text.
62 See infra notes 238-44 and accompanying text.
63 See, e.g., Curis A. Bradley, TerritorialIntellectualProperty Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 520-31 (1997).
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defies territorial borders. 64 Identifying possible -solutions, however,
has proved to be much more elusive.
In the future, we can only expect these challenges to multiply.
International doctrinal convergence will occur in numerous areas of
law-taxation, 65 privacy,6 6 cybercrime, 67 intellectual property, 68 antitrust,69 and jurisdiction" are already poised for such convergence.
There are several possible responses that we may see to international doctrinal convergence. First, we can proceed as we always have
and try to accommodate the convergence of laws of different countries by resort to traditional conflict of laws and comity principles.
Jack Goldsmith is a leading proponent of this view, which might be
characterized as a nothing-all-that-new view of cyberspace. 7 1 Alterna64 See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Without Borders? Choice of Forum and
Choice of Law for Copyright Infringement in Cyberspace, 15 CARDozo ARrs & ENT. L.J. 153
(1997); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Cyberian Captivity of Copyright: Territoriality and Author's
Rights in aNetworked World, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TEC-. LJ. 347 (1999);
Charles R. McManis, Taking TRIPs on the Information Superhighway: InternationalIntellectual Property Protection and Emerging Computer Technology, 41 ViLE. L. REv. 207 (1996).
65 See generally Arthur J. Cockfield, Balancing National Interests in the Taxation of
Electronic Commerce Business Profits,74 TUL. L. REv. 133 (1999) (proposing a framework
for taxation of e-commerce profits that would represent a balance between countries
that are either net importers or exporters of e-commerce goods and services).
66 See generallyJoel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting InternationalData Privacy
Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1315 (2000) (examining different international
approaches to data privacy and offering a conceptual framework for co-regulation of
information privacy).
67 See generally Michael A. Sussman, The Critical Challenges from InternationalHighTech and Computer-Related Crime at the Millennium, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 451,
483-91 (1999) (examining high-tech crime and assessing work being done to combat
such crime).
68 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
69 See Soma & Weingarten, supra note 43, at 42-45.
70 The proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters may lead to doctrinal convergence for questions of
jurisdiction and the recognition of judgments. Hague Conference on Private Int'l
Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Oct. 30, 1999, http://ivw.hcch.net/e/conventions/
draft36e.html. It is too early to tell, however, if the proposed convention will succeed
in garnering support. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, An Alert to the IntellectualProperty
Bar: The HagueJudgments Convention, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 421, 425 (describing how
negotiations "have apparently stalled").
71 See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHi. L. REv. 1199, 1201
(1998) ("Cyberspace transactions do not inherently warrant any more deference by
national regulators, and are not significantly less resistant to the tools of conflict of
laws, than other transnational transactions.") [hereinafter Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy];Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of TerritorialSovereignty, 5 IND.J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 475 (1998) (arguing that territorial regulation of the
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tively, we might strive to develop a uniform, coherent body of transnational law (or, at the very least, minimum standards) to govern the
Internet. 72 Most likely this approach would require agreement among
nations by international treaty. Finally, we might reject both the traditional conflict of laws approach and the transnational law approach in
favor of a sui generis Internet law developed outside the traditional
national lawmaking and law-deciding bodies. David Johnson and
David Post suggested this idea early on in the Internet's development73 and elicited numerous responses, many of them critical.7 4
This new type of lawmaking might be described as non-national, as
75
aptly suggested by Laurence Heifer and Graeme Dinwoodie.
My guess is that we may see a mixture of all three approaches to
lawmaking for the Internet (and possibly more)-just think of the approaches taken in the Yahoo! case (conflict of laws), 76 the European
Union Data Protection Directive (multilateral agreement), 77 and
78
ICANN's domain name creation (non-national norm creation).
But, even before we can begin to address doctrinal convergence on
Internet is as feasible and legitimate as other non-Internet transactions). Richard Epstein, Goldsmith's colleague at the University of Chicago, also shares this view of
cyberspace. See Epstein, supra note 14, at 1004 n.2.

72

See

LAWRENCE LEssiG, CODE[:] AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE

206 (1999)

("Just as there was a push toward convergence on a simple set of network protocols,
there will be a push toward convergence on a uniform set of rules to govern network
transactions.").
73 See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); see also I. Trotter Hardy, The ProperLegal Regime for
"Cyberspace", 55 U. PiTr. L. REV. 993 (1994) (arguing for a presumption of using "bottom up" private rules for cyberspace instead of statutes or judicial decisions).
74 See LESSIG, supra note 72, at 192-94; Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra
note 71, at 1199-202; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical
View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 402 & n.19 (2000).
75 Laurence R. Heifer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems:
The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
141, 148 (2001).
76 See La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antis~mitisme v. La Socidt Yahoo! Inc.,
T.G.I. [App. Ct] Paris, Nov. 20, 2000 (finding that damage occurred in France by the
viewing of Nazi material on Yahoo!'s website, thus subjecting it to French law).
77 See Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281), http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/
lif/dat/1995/en_395L0046.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2002).
78 For a critical account of ICANN's role in Internet governance, see A. Michael
Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN To Route Around the APA and the
Constitution,50 DuKE L.J. 17 passim (2000). Heifer and Dinwoodie, however, provide
a compelling argument of the desirability and success of the UDRP in handling domain name disputes. Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 75, at 187-88. They even con-
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the international level, we need to think more about the manner
question. We need to consider how, for example, a decision might
affect other countries and examine the potential for excessive extraterritorial spillover. Ruling broadly and categorically may result in inconsistent obligations under the laws of different countries or
threaten to give the most restrictive laws de facto preeminence for
cyberspace. Ruling narrowly and on a case-by-case basis may reduce
the possibility of excessive spillover, but it may not be able in the long
run to yield doctrinal harmony or coherence. These are the possibilities; we need to be aware of them and learn how to evaluate them.
D.

Confrontingthe ChallengesPosed by Cyberspace

The speed of Internet development, the problem of old law/new
technology, and doctrinal convergence create formidable challenges
for courts. In any case involving the application of law to cyberspace,
there is a good chance that one, if not several, of these challenges will
79
be present.
To get a glimpse of these challenges in practice and how we
81
80
might respond to them, I will analyze four cases: Reno, Microsoft,
Zeran,8 2 and Corley. 83 I hope to use these cases as case studies to test

how we might more critically and systematically evaluate the manner
question. As a matter of substantive law, these cases share little in
common. Reno is about the application of the First Amendment to
the regulation of indecent online material; 84 Microsoft is about the application of federal antitrust law to Microsoft's anticompetitive conduct in the software industry; 85 Zeran is about federal immunity for
ISPs from certain tort liability;8 6 and Corley is about DVDs and the stat-

utory protection given to copyright holders for technological meatend that "the UDRP's non-national model can indeed flourish outside the domainname context." Id. at 240.
79 I make no claim that these challenges are entirely unique or devoid of any
historical antecedent. As I have already acknowledged, doctrinal convergence occurs
quite frequently in other contexts. The same could be said of the problem of old
law/new technology.
80 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
81 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.$d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).
82 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
83 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
84 Reno, 521 U.S. at 849.
85 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 45.
86 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328.
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sures designed to prevent copying of copyrighted works.8 7 But each of
these cases confronted at least one cyber-challenge. 8 8 I have selected
these cases not because they all are high-profile cases and important
as a matter of substantive law (which they are), but because they are
representative of both the challenges raised by cyberspace and the responses to them by courts.
Our response to these challenges, particularly the manner in
which we resolve them, can be either ad hoc or more systematic. In
this Article, I adopt the latter approach. The basic reason that I adopt
the systematic approach is that leaving the manner question to ad hoc
determination or the unexamined preference of the court increases
the risk of courts creating bad law or precedent. Bad, not so much
because the case is wrongly decided on the merits, but bad because it
is difficult to fit within the existing body of law or because it produces
consequences that were never intended or desired. Without a more
systematic approach, courts may not even recognize, let alone address,
the complexities these challenges raise. Given all the difficulties of
applying law to cyberspace, we should at least be aware of what we are
up against.
II.

ANALYZING THE MANNER QUESTION

The main challenge posed by the manner question is formulating
an analytical framework that can be applied to a wide range of cases
without blurring or over-simplifying distinctions in cases. On the one
hand, we would gain little in our analytical enterprise if all that we
could say about the manner of decision were that it depends on the
case or that it should be left to the preferences of the particularjudge.
On the other hand, it would be just as fruitless if we analyzed cases
with categories that did not match up well with reality or that grossly
over-simplified a case. By the same token, there may be something to
be said for simplicity: devising an elaborate taxonomy of terms to analyze decisions may prove to be too cumbersome and complicated for
the value it adds to our thinking aboutjudicial decisions. Striking the
right balance requires that we identify analytical terms that can de-

87 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 213 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), affid sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir.
2001).
88 The speed of Internet development and the old law/new technology problem
were evident in Reno, Microsoft, and Corey, and doctrinal convergence played a part in
Reno, Zeran, and Corley. See infra notes 273-444 and accompanying text.
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scribe a welter of situations in a systematic, yet sensitive and somewhat
manageable way.8 9
With that in mind, I focus on two sets of concepts to analyze the
manner question: rules and standards, and decisional maximalism
and minimalism. Neither set of terms is new; in fact, the former has
been around for some time. However, I have chosen to rely on these
concepts in part because of their currency in legal scholarship and
judicial decisions. Of all the possible ways we can analyze the manner
in which a court decided a case, analyzing whether the decision is
categorical or fact-specific, and how broad or narrow it is, seem to me
to be good starting points for the analysis. In this Part, I explain these
concepts and how they can help to analyze the manner of a court's
decision. Combining the two sets of concepts, I define two general
approaches for judicial decisionmaking: (1) a broad/definitive approach (embodied in rules and maximalist decisions), and (2) a narrow/tentative approach (embodied in standards and minimalist
decisions). These two general approaches correspond with the aspiration that rules and maximalism, and standards and minimalism, share,
and they form the backbone of the analytical framework I outline in
Part III.

89 A useful model to emulate is the framework proposed in the classic article by
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972). The framework they pro-

pose based on the distinction between property and liability rules has generated
considerable thought and scholarship in analyzing legal issues. Yet Calabresi and Melamed were the first to concede the tradeoffs of framework-building:
Framework or model building has two shortcomings. The first is that models can be mistaken for the total view of phenomena, like legal relationships,
which are too complex to be painted in any one picture. The second is that
models generate boxes into which one then feels compelled to force situations which do not truly fit. There are, however, compensating advantages.
Legal scholars, precisely because they have tended to eschew model building, have often proceeded in an ad hoc way, looking at cases and seeing what
categories emerged. But this approach also affords only one view of the Cathedral. It may neglect some relationships among the problems involved in
the cases which model building can perceive, precisely because it does generate boxes, or categories. The framework we have employed may be applied in many different areas of the law. We think its application facilitated
perceiving and defining an additional resolution of the problem of pollution. As such we believe the painting to be well worth the oils.
Id. at 1127-28.
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Rules and Standards

The time-honored debate over rules and standards focuses on
how the law can best be formulated and decided. 90 Rules and standards can be viewed as a continuum on which the content of the law is
specified in advance of its application either to a greater (more "rulelike") extent or to a lesser (more "standard-like") extent. 9 1 This continuum represents how much discretion a court has in applying the
90 The literature on rules and standards is quite extensive and encompasses many
different areas of law. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
15-63 (1987) (discussing rules and standards based on critical legal studies critique);
Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A
Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217 (1982) (analyzing rules and standards in
commercial sales); Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standardsand Rules: A New Way
of Understandingthe Differences in the Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and
Foreign Lawyers, 32 VAND. J. TRASNAT'L L. 1117 (1999) (analyzing the rules and standards in legal codes of conduct); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis
of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974) (analyzing efficiency concerns in
using rules versus standards); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An EconomicAnalysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557 (1992) (analyzing rules and standards in terms of creation, interpretation, and application costs); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-713 (1976) (analyzing the problem of
choice between rules and standards as a choice between individualism (rules) and
altruism (standards)); Russell B. Korobkin, BehavioralAnalysis and Legal Form: Rules vs.
Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000) (analyzing the question of rules or standards from a behavioral science perspective); Frank I. Michelman, A Brief Anatomy of
Adjudicative Rule-Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 934, 936-37 (1999) (discussing two directives of adjudicative rule formalism which require judges to "make rules not standards" and to "treat the law as consisting only of express, positive legal norms"); Frank
I. Michelman, Foreword-The Supreme Court, 1985 Term: Traces of Self-Government, 100
HARV. L. REV. 4, 34-35 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Traces of Self-Government] (discussing the application of a balancing test between rules and standards); Eric A. Posner, Standards,Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 10 (1997) (arguing
that the economic approach to rules and standards, the economic approach to social
norms, and the rule of law are closely related); MargaretJane Radin, Reconsideringthe
Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REv. 781 (1989) (suggesting that the "Rule of Law" concept
should be reinterpreted); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1989) (exploring the dichotomy between the "general rule of law"
and the "personal discretion to do justice"); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33
UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985) (highlighting and criticizing the controversy between rules
and standards); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword-The Supreme Court, 1991 Term: The
Justices of Rules and Standards,106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 27-56 (1992) (analyzing Supreme
Court decisions in terms ofjudicial discretion); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules,
83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 956-57 (1995) (exploring popular rules and standards
arguments).
91 See Sullivan, supra note 90, at 61 ("These distinctions between rules and standards, categorization and balancing, mark a continuum, not a divide."); Sunstein,
supra note 90, at 961.
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law in a particular case. A rule is meant to cabin discretion, while a
standard is intended to furnish discretion. The continuum also measures how broad or narrow a decision is. Rules are broad insofar as
they attempt to apply the same legal decision to determine future
cases. Standards, by contrast, are narrower because they rely on caseby-case decisionmaking and render a decision that is ostensibly lim92
ited to the facts of the case.
The Internet Tax Freedom Act 93 is an example of a rule, since it
attempts to specify most, if not all, of the content of the law ex ante:
No state or political subdivision thereof shall impose any of the following taxes during the period beginning on October 1, 1998, and
ending 3 years after the date of the enactment of this Act-(1) taxes
on Internet access, unless such tax was generally imposed and actually enforced prior to October 1, 1998;94and (2) multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce.
By contrast, the fair use doctrine is an example of a standard,
since what constitutes a fair use-though broadly defined by a list 9of
5
purposes and factors-depends ultimately on case-by-case analysis.
In deciding whether to adopt a rule or standard, courts often
must interpret and apply an act of Congress. 9 6 The statute's texturehow much of its content is specified in advance by Congress-affects
the court's decision whether to adopt rules or standards. A statute
that has more of its content specified in advance by Congress, such as
the Internet Tax Freedom Act, channels the court to a more rule-like
approach. In contrast, a statute that is more open-ended, like § 1 of
the Sherman Act,97 channels the court to a more standard-like ap-

proach. This is not to say, however, that the statute itself is determinative of whether a court adopts a rule or standard. Courts can, and do,
fashion rules from even the most open-ended statutes and can, and
do, find exceptions to even the most rule-like statutes. Statutory interpretation affords courts their own opportunity to decide between
rules and standards, somewhat apart from the choice made by Con92
93

See Sunstein, supra note 90, at 961, 965.
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2719 (provided at 47 U.S.C. § 151 n.1

(Supp. V 1999)).
94 47 U.S.C. § 151 sec. 1101(a) (Supp. V 1999).
95 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); see infra note 223 and accompanying text.
96 Courts also may be called to interpret the Constitution or existing precedent.
97 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (prohibiting "every contract, combination... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce"); see Scalia, supra note 90, at 1183 ("One can
hardly imagine a prescription more vague than the Sherman Act's prohibition of contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, but we have not interpreted
it to require a totality of circumstances approach in every case.").
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gress. Whether a rule operates as a rule, or a standard as a standard,
all depends on the interpretive practices of the courts. 98
While some may question the usefulness of applying the "old"
rules/standards debate to the new technology of the Internet, the longevity of the debate argues in its favor. 99 The debate has elicited
much commentary and criticisms from a variety of prominent jurists
and legal scholars, and the concepts are, for better or worse, embedded in our legal culture.10 0 Even to doubters of the debate, the terms
rules and standards should at least have the advantage of familiaritywhich is an asset where our aim is to be practical and to assist courts in
how they decide cases.
The choice between rules and standards is often important to the
development of doctrine. For example, the rules/standards debate
played out in a prominent way in Denver Area EducationalTelecommunications Consortium v. FCC,10 1 a recent technology case decided by the
Supreme Court. Eschewing rules, Justice Breyer advised taking a narrow, fact-specific approach to determining whether recent federal
cable regulations violated the First Amendment: " [A]ware as we are of
the changes taking place in the law, the technology, and the industrial
structure related to telecommunications, we believe it unwise and unnecessary definitively to pick an analogy or one specific set of words
now." 10 2 Justice Souter supported this tentative approach, cautioning
that "we should be shy about saying the final word today about what
will be accepted as reasonable tomorrow," particularly "when we know
too little to risk the finality of precision."'10 Justice Breyer's narrow
98

As Sunstein has explained:
If we take a rule to be a provision that minimizes law-making power in particular cases, a lawmaker may intend to issue a rule, but the interpretive practices of the interpreting institution may turn the provision into something
very different. Whether a provision is a rule or not is a function of interpretive practices. The lawmaker has only limited power over those practices.
Sunstein, supra note 90, at 960 (citation omitted).
99 See id. at 957 ("It would be hard to overstate the importance of the controversy
between the two views.... In every area of regulation-the environment, occupational safety and health, energy policy, communications, control of monopoly
power-it is necessary to choose between general rules and case-by-case decisions.").
100 See supra note 90.

101

518 U.S. 727 (1996).

102 Id. at 742 (plurality opinion) (Breyer, J.) (citation omitted). For an analysis of
Denver Area as an example ofjudicial minimalism, see Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword-The
Supreme Court, 1995 Term: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HLv. L. REV. 6, 31-32 (1996).
For an analysis of the rules/standard debate in Denver Area, see Monroe E. Price &
John F. Duffy, Technological Change and DoctrinalPersistence: TelecommunicationsReform
in Congress and the Court, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 976, 997-1007 (1997).
103 Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 777-78 (Souter, J., concurring).
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approach, however, drew sharp disagreement from Justices Kennedy
and Thomas, who favored adopting a clear rule and extending the old
categories of First Amendment law.' 0 4 The disagreement in Denver
Area is hardly an idle one. The disagreement marks a clear division
over how the law should respond to developing technology.
B. DecisionalMinimalism and DecisionalMaximalism
Another useful (although more recent) way to think about legal
decisionmaking is assessing how "minimalist" or "maximalist" a decision or law is. These concepts owe their development to Cass Sunstein, who in a series of recent writings has made a compelling case for
the minimalist approach. 10 5 In fact, Sunstein has suggested-and at
least one federal court of appeals has agreed' 06-that minimalism
should apply to the emerging technologies of the Internet and
107
telecommunications.
Judicial minimalism describes when courts "say[ ] no more than
necessary tojustify an outcome, and leav[e] as much as possible unde104 Id. at 784-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part); id. at 817-19 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
105 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 3-72 (1999) [hereinafter SusTEN, ONE CASE AT A TIME]; Sunstein,
supranote 90, at 956-57; Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARv.
L. REv. 1733, 1743-45 (1995) [hereinafter Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized]; Sunstein,
supra note 102, at 6-10.
106 See Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 584 n.11 (2d
Cir. 2000) (quoting Sunstein, supra note 102, at 18). Two prominent jurists, former
ChiefJudge Abner MikVa and ChiefJudge Richard Posner, have expressed a predilection for the minimalist approach. See Abner J. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not Be Advicegivers: A Response to Professor Neal Katyal 50 STAN. L. REv. 1825 passim (1998);
Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theoy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 8-10 (1998).
Several legal scholars, however, have expressed criticism of the approach. See, e.g.,
Neal Devins, The Courts: The Democraty-ForcingConstitution,97 MICH. L. REv. 1971, 1990
(1999) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 105) (arguing that
minimalism undervalues the role the judiciary plays in speaking "about right and
wrong on highly contested divisive social issues"); Mark Tushnet, How To Deny a Constitutional Right: Reflections on the Assisted Suicide Cases, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 55, 59-60
(1997) (criticizing minimalism as "an unsuitable doctrinal criterion" because it assumes that maximalism terminates discussion about an issue and forces judges to
make "essentially political judgments" about whether an issue is the subject of ongoing discussion).
107 Sunstein, supra note 102, at 18 (suggesting "that any decision involving the
application of the First Amendment to new communication technologies, including
the Internet, should be narrow, because a broad decision rendered at this time would
be likely to go wrong" (citation omitted)).
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cided."' 0 8 According to Sunstein, it is all right, even desirable, for
courts to "leave things undecided" and decide cases very narrowly.
Minimalist judges "seek to avoid broad rules and abstract theories,
and attempt to focus their attention only on what is necessary to decide particular cases." 10 9 Minimalists tend not to view outcomes as
controlled by rules or theories set forth in advance. 1 10 Instead of
enunciating broad theory or first principles, minimalists attempt to
reach "incompletely theorized agreements"-relatively unambitious
decisions that can dispose of the case.'
Sunstein believes that, in
practice, courts tend to favor a rebuttable presumption in favor of
minimalism.a 12
By contrast, maximalist judges attempt "to decide cases in a way
that establishes broad rules for the future and that also gives deep
theoretical justifications for outcomes." 113 Sunstein believes that maximalism may be embraced when (1) courts "have considerable confidence in the merits of [the] solution," (2) the decision can
significantly decrease the amount of uncertainty for litigants, courts,
and others, (3) there is a particular need for advance planning, or (4)
when the democratic process is not functioning well. 114 But, particularly on divisive issues, maximalism must be supported by a societal
consensus.115
Like rules and standards, maximalism and minimalism can be
thought to represent a continuum of choices for a court to render its
decision."16 The range will vary depending on how broadly the court
attempts to rule and how much it has to say. A single decision could
contain elements of both minimalism and maximalism." 7 For example, a court might rule broadly but without saying much, or might rule
narrowly while saying a lot. And, of course, a case may involve several
different issues, which complicates the analysis even further.

108
109
110
111
112
claim,
113
114
115

Id. at 6.
Id. at 14 (citation omitted).
See id.
See id. at 20.
See id. at 33. From the response of several prominent jurists to Sunstein's
it may be fairly accurate. See supra note 106.
Sunstein, supra note 102, at 15.
Id. at 30, 33.
See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 105, at 15-16.

116 See Sunstein, supra note 102, at 14-15.
117 Id. at 25 ("Decisions are not usually minimalist or nonminimalist; they are minimalist along certain dimensions." (emphasis omitted)).
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The Two Approaches to the Manner Question: Narrow/Tentativeand
Broad/Definitive

Although rules and standards have yet to be considered in tandem with maximalism and minimalism in legal scholarship, the combination seems to be a natural one. Both sets of terms focus on the
manner of a court's decision and represent a continuum to explain a
wide range of possible decisions (going from a more categorical approach to a more fact-specific approach, or from a deeply theorized
and broad opinion to an incompletely theorized and narrow one).
Combining the rules/standards debate with the concepts of minimalism and maximalism is an acknowledgement that the rules/standards
debate is too limiting. Decisions may involve other dynamics that extend well beyond a simple choice between a rule or a standard. n 8
The concepts of minimalism and maximalism can add to our arsenal
of terms to analyze judicial decisions.
Although Sunstein recognizes the importance of considering how
minimalism and maximalism relate to the rules/standards debate, he
says very little about the issue. 1 9 It seems clear, however, that a minimalist would favor the application of standards because standards offer a way to avoid broad rules and abstract theories.' 20 Both standards
and minimalism share a basic philosophy that more harm than good
comes from applying legal regulations and deciding cases broadly.
Like standards,' 2 ' minimalism shares a special affinity for the common-law method and proceeding by analogical reasoning rather than
rule-bound judgment. 122 It seems equally clear that a judicial maximalist would tend to favor rules. By definition, maximalism seeks to
establish "broad rules for the future" with "deep theoretical justifica123
tions"-which is the quintessence of the rules position.
118 Sunstein, supra note 90, at 959 ("[T]he rules-versus-standards debate captures
only a part of what is at stake, and it is important to have a fuller sense of the repertoire of available devices."). We can have, foi example, decisions that involve presumptions, a list of non-exhaustive factors, a set of guidelines, use of analogies, or
general principles. See id. at 963-68.
119 Sunstein, supra note 102, at 42-43.
120 Id. at 15 ("Minimalists try to decide cases rather than to set down broad
rules .... They decide the case at hand; they do not decide other cases too unless
they are forced to do so (except to the extent that one decision necessarily bears on
other cases).").
121 Sunstein, supra note 90, at 968 ("Most of the time, an analogy will produce a
standard, one that makes sense of the outcomes in the case at hand and the case that
came before.").
122 Sunstein, supra note 102, at 18.
123 See id. at 15.
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The correlation between maximalism and rules, and minimalism
and standards, is not perfect, however. We can have both minimalist
rules (that are either narrow or incompletely theorized) and maximalist standards (that are deeply theorized). For example, the Supreme
Court could strike down a statute as unconstitutional, but say very little about what test it applied, instead choosing to rely on case analogy
or fact-specific analysis. In such case, the Court would be articulating
a rule (the statute is unconstitutional), but the opinion itself would be
minimalist. Another point of departure between the two sets of terms
is that minimalism and maximalism encompass a broader range of
concepts than just rules and standards. Mootness and denial of certiorari, for example, embody a minimalist approach. 124 Likewise, dicta
in opinions might be considered maximalist without necessarily articulating a rule (or a standard).
Despite the potential differences, I will group together standards
and minimalism as comprising one general approach, the narrow/
tentative approach, and rules and maximalism comprising another approach, the broad/definitive approach. These groupings are not
meant to indicate hard-and-fast categories, but rather, tendencies or
aspirations that the two sets of concepts share. Standards and
minimalism share a basic tendency or aspiration to limit the scope of
decisionmaking, whether by limiting the range of issues decided or
limiting the decision to the facts presented in the case. Standards and
minimalism can thus be characterized as embracing a narrow/tentative approach. By contrast, rules and maximalism aspire to decide issues firmly and for a broad range of cases and can thus be
characterized as embracing a broad/definitive approach.
Ultimately, we can view the two general approaches-narrow/
tentative and broad/definitive-along a continuum, going from minimalist standards on one end to maximalist rules on the other end. In
between would fall minimalist rules and maximalist standards, as well
as hybrid decisions that involve both rules and standards-the combi124 See id. at 43. Sunstein identifies a number of strategies that embrace minimalism that have little or nothing to do with standards:
[C]ourts should not decide issues unnecessary to the resolution of a case;
courts should deny certiorari in areas that are not "ripe" for decision; courts
should avoid deciding constitutional questions; courts should respect their
own precedents; courts should, in certain cases, investigate the actual rather
than hypothetical purpose of statutes; courts should not issue advisory opinions; courts should follow prior holdings but not necessarily prior dicta;
courts should exercise the passive virtues associated with doctrines involving
justiciability.
Id. at 7.
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nations could be infinite. The point of examining a particular decision under this framework would not be so much to place the decision
in the single right category, 125 but rather, to analyze the manner of
decision, describe the overall approach taken in terms of its narrowness/tentativeness or broadness/definitiveness, and consider the propriety of the approach taken.
D.

Caveats and Concerns

The approach I take in this Article is ultimately meant to be practical. My approach departs from the previous rules/standards literature that frames the debate either in the abstract (largely divorced
from cases),126 or in terms of an across-the-board proposition or preference (the rules camp versus the standards camp).127 It remains
somewhat of a mystery to me why legal scholars have talked about the
rules/standards debate at such a level of abstraction and with such an
expectation that courts need to choose between one approach over
the other for all time and all cases, even though nearly everyone ac28
knowledges that context matters.1
To deal with the problem of abstraction, I ground my discussion
in cases, a maneuver that should not be too controversial given the
pervasiveness of the case-study method in law schools. I believe we
can test-and refine-our framework only if we apply it to actual cases
and see whether it adds to our understanding of the cases. I do not
profess that my framework is the only way to evaluate the manner
question, merely that it is a better method that allows for further
refinement.
125 We could attempt to devise an elaborate taxonomy of concepts (e.g., factors,
presumptions, balancing tests) and doctrines (e.g., ripeness, nonjusticiability, constitutional doubt) within our framework. See Sunstein, supra note 90, at 960-68
(describing the different devices available to the law); id. at 961 ("There is a continuum from rules to untrammeled discretion, with factors, guidelines, and standards
falling in between."). Such an enterprise, however, seems to me too complicated for
our needs. I have attempted to keep the framework simple enough to apply in practice. Combining rules/standards with minimalism/maximalism seems to serve that
purpose well.
126 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 90, at 559-68.
127 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 90, at 1178.
128 See, e.g., id. at 1187 ("I have not even tried to address the hardest question,
which is: When is such a mode of analysis avoidable and when not?"); Sunstein, supra
note 90, at 959 ("Rules cannot be favored or disfavored in the abstract; everything
depends on whether, in context, rules are superior to the alternatives."); see also Sunstein, supra note 102, at 18 (acknowledging that the choice between minimalism and
maximalism depends ultimately on contextual considerations).
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I recognize, however, that the rules/standards debate is not without its limitations. There is good reason to question the very notion
that rules can define the content of the law ex ante. 129 Given the
limitations of language, rules will always have ambiguities and will always require interpretation. 130 In order to interpret a rule, we must
131
draw upon a welter of shared understandings and conventions.
Recognizing the contingent nature of rules-their dependency on
context-means that all rules, to a certain extent, must be decided at
the point of application.1 3 2 Even with the most clearly defined rule,
there may be an exception-say, to avoid absurd results-that
presents itself when applying the rule.13 3 Interpretive practices, in
other words, do matter.
Another important limitation to the rules/standards debate is the
false perception that rules and standards are stable, or completely separable. In fact, we often find hybrids of rules and standards in a particular area of law, or doctrine that is in greater flux. Critical legal
scholars contend that competing doctrines will develop both rules
and standards for deciding the same legal issue, and the law will forever oscillate between the competing poles.18 4 In Form and Substance
in PrivateLaw Adjudication, Duncan Kennedy attributes this tension to
the ambivalence we have over the ideals of individualism and altruism. 135 Given the oscillation, one may conclude that "there are no

clear reasons to prefer one formal resolution [a rule or a standard] to
u- 6
the other."'
While these concerns are legitimate, I do not believe they vitiate
the usefulness of the rules/standards debate. Many people (judges,
lawyers, and laypeople) act as though rules guide their conduct, despite the limitations of the language through which rules are communicated. This practice may depend on social agreement and
convention, but such dependence need not render the concept of
rules or standards meaningless. As long as people understand rules as
129

See KELMAN, supra note 90, at 46.

130
131

Sunstein, supra note 90, at 984-91.
See Radin, supra note 90, at 799-800 (arguing that rule-following is an "ir-

reducibly social" practice, in which "rules do not cause the agreement; rather the
agreement causes us to say there are rules").
132

See id. at 809 ("Whether an activity is seen as rule-like is contingent upon mate-

rial social context and agreement.").
133
134

See Sunstein, supra note 90, at 984-85.
See KELMAN, supra note 90, at 20; Kennedy, supra note 90, at 1685-701.

135

See Kennedy, supra note 90, at 1685. For a critique of Kennedy's claim, see

KELMAN,

136

supra note 90, at 54-59.
supra note 90, at 31.

KELMAN,
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guiding their conduct, the concept of a rule retains its vitality.1 3 7 Ample evidence demonstrates the existence of enough agreement in our
legal system about the use of the terms "rules" and "standards." Indeed, the rules/standards debate recurs in technology cases before
the Supreme Court, 13 8 in legal scholarship discussing cyberspace, 139
140
and in other areas of law.
Moreover, recognizing a perpetual oscillation between rules and
standards does not preclude one from identifying patterns that occur
within that oscillation. 14 1 At a particular time and place there often is
a controlling regulation or decision for an area of law. Each day,
courts and lawyers identify what law governs their case. Although
competing doctrines may exist across, and sometimes within, jurisdictions, more often than not a predominant approach can be identified.
Such regulations or decisions often (though not always) will have a
more rule-like or more standard-like texture. Accordingly, it would be
of huge practical importance if courts could determine what, if anything, makes a rule or standard more appropriate for that particular
area of regulation. 14 2
137 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in ConstitutionalDiscourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1997) ("As long as rules are experienced as effective in guiding conduct-as long as those at whom rules are directed generally concur
in their understandings-the central claims and aspirations of formalism remain relatively intact."); Kaplow, supra note 90, at 601 ("As long as the relevant audience took
this [language] to refer to a familiar set of acts, an ex ante specification would have
been made in the relevant sense."); Korobkin, supranote 90, at 30 (arguing that most
decisions can be classified as either rules or standards, despite the fluidity between the
terms); Sunstein, supra note 90, at 990 ("IT]he ex post substantive judgments that
underlie readings of rules are often widely shared, or at least supported by good reasons even if not widely shared."). Even the proponents of Critical Legal Studies
(CLS) do not dispute that "rules" may be set forth in practice. See KELMAN, supranote
90, at 46.
138 See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727
(1996) (involving three sections of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992).
139 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDozo L. REV. 121
(1999).
140 See supra note 90.
141 The CLS critique of rules and standards does not deny this possibility. See
K LumN, supra note 90, at 20 (suggesting that CLS adherents would acknowledge that
"[djay-to-day practice may well vary in a predictablefashion both over time and across
different actors with different political perspectives" (emphasis added)).
142 For examples of how the rules/standards debate may reveal insights for particular areas of regulation, see Al Katz & Lee E. Teitelbaum, PINSJurisdiction,the Vagueness Doctrine, and the Rule of Law, 53 IND. L.J. 1 (1977), and William H. Simon, Legality,
Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983).
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What we need is not to jettison the rules/standards debate, but to
adopt a more chastened view of it. My framework removes any expectation of an across-the-board answer or preference for the rules/standards debate. The approach is similar to what Sunstein calls an
incompletely theorized agreement, moving away from high theory
and over-arching principles to a more fact-specific inquiry-and, ultimately, a less ambitious answer. 143 Although I do start out with a general presumption (in favor of standards and minimalism, as we shall
soon see), the presumption is not intended to displace careful analysis
of each case. Furthermore, the framework I sketch is not intended to
render conclusive determinacy on the manner question, but rather, to
illuminate its complexities and suggest ways for courts to evaluate the
question more critically. The framework is written in the spirit of
Socratic dialogue, not scientific proof, recognizing our limitations,
but nevertheless asking critical questions in search of better
understanding.
III.

A

PROPOSED FRAMEwORK FOR DECIDING BETWEEN RULES AND
STANDARDS FOR CYBERSPACE

In this section, I sketch out an initial framework to assist courts in
deciding the manner question. My framework begins with a modest
presumption in favor of a narrow/tentative approach (including stan-

dards, case-by-case decisionmaking, and minimalist decisions) for
cyberspace. The presumption can be rebutted, however, by the presence of factors that demonstrate that a broad/definitive approach (including rules, categorical reasoning, and maximalist decisions) is
appropriate. I include five factors for non-constitutional 1 4 issues: (1)
whether the case involves Internet-specific legislation (as opposed to
old law or doctrines), (2) whether the case involves a recurring problem with common elements, (3) whether the contemplated rule is a
general prohibition or regulation of the Internet's architecture (that
is not tied to a regime of legal entitlements for which a balancing of
interests is often necessary), (4) whether the contemplated rule causes
interdoctrinal tension or extraterritorial spillover, and (5) whether
the Internet is changing in a way material to the contemplated rule.
143 See Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized, supra note 105, at 1735-36. This is not to
say that my framework abandons theory. It is important to attempt to justify (as I do
below) such a framework with a coherent theoretical explanation. However, the theory is at a lower level of generality and aims at a less sweeping or absolutist position or
explanation.

144 I revise the factors slightly for constitutional issues. See infra notes 251-68 and
accompanying text.
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Below I explain the framework and provide reasons for adopting this
45
approach.
A.

A Modest Presumptionfor Standards and Minimalist Decisions
for Cyberspace

Just as the Internet was on the cusp of experiencing its unprecedented growth, Lawrence Lessig wrote The Path of Cyberlaw, in which
he advocated that lower courts leave the regulation of cyberspace to
the common law and case-by-case adjudication, at least for the time
being. 14 6 Given the complexities of understanding the new space of
cyberspace, Lessig believed that it would be better to regulate cyberspace through the incremental process of the common law. 147 Although this process is slow and meandering, it is desirable as "a way to
pace any process of regulation-a way to let the experience catch up
48
with the technology.'
Although cyberspace has changed dramatically since the publication of Lessig's path-breaking article, the article still carries considerable force and wisdom. Lessig's article recognizes that the law must
develop ways to keep pace with and understand the emerging technology and medium of cyberspace. One strategy is to rely on the common-law method, which is predicated on an incremental, fact-specific
145 My framework has more of the feel of a standard than of a rule. While I rely
on a general presumption and a set of factors, I ultimately favor close analysis of each
case to determine the proper manner of decision. At the same time, however, the
framework is intended to channel the inquiry for courts in a manner that is less openended than the typical standard of what is "reasonable" or "appropriate." See Sunstein, supranote 90, at 965 ("Standards depart from factors in refusing to enumerate
considerations that are relevant in particular applications."); id. at 998-1003 (discussing the use of factors); cf Korobkin, supra note 90, at 42 (concluding that an economic analysis of the rules/standards debate leads not to a rule that can determine
the choice between rules and standards, but rather "a multi-factored standard.., in
which the relevant considerations are specified but their relative weights are left for
case-by-case balancing").
I also acknowledge that my framework focuses mainly on judicial decisions as
singular events. I do not discuss all the complexities raised when subsequent courts
interpret a decision in a manner that may have been different from what the deciding
court intended. See generally Sunstein, supra note 102, at 27 ("[C]ourts deciding cases
will have only limited authority over the subsequent reach of their opinions."). That
inquiry goes beyond the scope of this Article, but I would suggest here that my framework can help to illuminate the complexities as subsequent courts apply precedent
that is broad or narrow. At the very least, the framework should sensitize the court to
the manner of its and other courts' decisions.
146 Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE LJ. 1743 (1995).
147 Id. at 1744-45.
148 Id. at 1744.

13o6

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL- 77:5

approach that leaves much room for courts in future cases. 149 The
common law is, as Lessig puts it, a process that offers "partial answers,
to repeated if slightly varied questions, in a range of contexts." 150 Accordingly, in applying the common-law method, courts "should [not]
purport to decide . . . questions [about cyberspace] finally or even

firmly."151
Lessig's call for reliance on the common-law method marks a
preference for what I call the narrow/tentative approach-relying on
the use of standards and case-by-case, as opposed to categorical, determinations. Drawing upon Lessig's basic insight,1 52 I begin the pro149

See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION

RULE-BASED DECISION-MAXING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 178 (1991) ("The common law
appears consequently to be decision according to justification rather than decision
according to rule. It abounds with rules of thumb, but avoids the use of rules in a
strong and constraining sense."); Sunstein, supranote 102, at 35 ("The process of case
analysis also allows judges to proceed incrementally when appropriate."); see also
Carol M. Rose, Crystalsand Mud in PropertyLaw, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 604 (1988) ("We
are more likely to find thatjudicial decisions veer toward mud rules, while it is legislatures that are more apt to join with private parties as 'rulemakers' with a tilt towards
crystal."); Scalia, supra note 90, at 1177 (describing the common law system as one
that attempts to decides cases "case-by-case, deliberately, incrementally, one-step-at-atime").
This is not to suggest that rules cannot develop through the common law or that
such rules lack permanence. Undoubtedly, some common-law cases "take[ ] on a
canonical significance, being treated as itself a rule rather than merely the articulation of the reasons for creating one." SCHAUER, supra, at 180. But "[a]s a method,
[the common law] is most associated with comparatively or completely transparent
rules of thumb, seeking case-specific optimization rather than rule-based stability."
Id. at 181.
150 Lessig, supra note 146, at 1745.
151 Id. at 1753.
152 Other scholars have agreed with Lessig's basic insight. Mark Lemley, for example, has concluded:
We now have hundreds of reported decisions in various aspects of "Internet
law" ranging from jurisdiction to trademark law to the First Amendment. As
I look at these cases, it seems to me that Lessig's intuition was right.... [The
common law is] arguably doing a pretty good job of adapting existing law to
the new and uncertain circumstances of the Net.
Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KErr L. REV. 1257,
1294 (1998); see also William W. Fisher III, Propertyand Contracton the Internet, 73 CHI.KENTr L. REv. 1203, 1219 (1998) ("I agree wholeheartedly with those commentators
who urge lawmakers to be cautious and not try to impose a permanent, comprehensive regulatory regime on this protean medium."); Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 I-LAv.
L. REV. 1130, 1188 (2000) ("Cyberspace is too novel and dynamic a medium for anyone to be confident that she has gotten policy just right. We must therefore be careful to avoid irrevocable decisions."); Sunstein, supra note 90, at 992 ("Many observers
and participants think that it is premature for Congress to design rules for this activOF
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posed framework with a modest presumption (meaning one that is
rebuttable and weak) in favor of the use of standards and minimalist
decisions in cyberspace.' 5 3 All things being equal, I believe courts
should err on the side of the narrow/tentative approach when deciding cases involving cyberspace.
1. Standards and Minimalist Decisions Offer Greater Flexibility To
Handle Rapidly Changing Technology
The main reason for this presumption is that cyberspace is difficult for the law to keep pace with and comprehend. The speed at
which the Internet is developing presents significant difficulties to the
formulation of rules. Rapidly changing technology frustrates a
rulemaker's ability to gather sufficient information about that technology to fashion a rule that can produce accurate results. If the technology keeps changing, there is a high probability that the rule will
become obsolete or, even worse, will result in negative consequences
that courts did not foresee. "Often general rules will be poorly suited
to the new circumstances that will be turned up by unanticipated developments; often rulemakers cannot foresee the circumstances to
which their rules will be applied.' u5 4 For rules to be effective, there
should not be rapid changes in the content of the law. 155 The rapidly
changing nature of the Internet, however, makes changes in the law
both necessary and frequent, thereby undermining the effectiveness
56
and desirability of rules.'
ity, and that it would be far better to rely on common law methods of case-by-case
judgment and analogy.").
153 This dynamic suggests an interesting turn on one typical conception of the
rule of law, which contends that "rules are more likely than standards or other multivariable formulae to achieve the determinacy suggested by the ideal of being 'ruled'
by law." Fallon, supra note 137, at 48 (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, some would
argue that there is or should be a general presumption in favor of rules in our legal
system. See id.; see also KELMAN, supra note 90, at 20 (describing "how powerful the
urge is to privilege the rule pole"); Sunstein, supra note 90, at 957 (noting the "pervasive social phenomenon" of "extravagant enthusiasm for rules and an extravagantly
rule-bound conception of the rule of law"). In contrast, with respect to cyberspace, a
reasonably good case can be made for the opposite presumption in favor of
standards.
154 Sunstein, supra note 90, at 957.
155 See Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 584 (2000) ("A
law that changes every day is worse than no law at all." (quoting LON FULLER, THE
MORALrrv OF LA.w 79-81 (rev. ed. 1969))).
156 See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 90, at 277 ("An important cost of legal regulation by means of rules is ...the cost of altering rules to keep pace with economic and
technological change."). We could attempt to deal with changing circumstances by
recognizing only a few rules that are privately adaptable, meaning that people could
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Standards and minimalist decisions offer greater flexibility to accommodate changing circumstances. 157 Instead of wasting time and
resources on fashioning a rule based on limited information of an
ever-changing technology, courts can narrow their focus to fact-specific decisions.' 58 Standards compensate for the court's lack of information by making consideration of future applications unnecessary.
Just as importantly, standards allow courts to consider the state of the
technology as it exists at the time each case is decided. Standards thus
offer a way to deal with the problem of obsolescence, which occurs if
changed circumstances undermine the validity of a rule or law,' 5 9
such as when a court's decision was based on factual findings that are
no longer true today. With standards, the possibility of obsolescence
is diminished because legal decisions are more closely tied to the particular facts of the case.
contract around them. See Sunstein, supra note 90, at 994, 1016-20. Even then, the
rules may require a substantial amount of information to tailor and formulate for the
Internet context.
157 See RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 20.3, at 590-95 (5th ed.
1998) (describing the benefits of standards to adapt to changing times); id. § 20.4, at
595-96 (arguing that less rigid adherence to stare decisis is more efficient where
rapid changes make legal precedents erroneous or irrelevant); SCHAUER, supra note
149, at 140-42 (discussing the trade-off of adopting a rule and losing some ability to
adapt to changing circumstances); Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 90, at 277 (stating
that standards are relatively unaffected by changes over time in the circumstances in
which they are applied); Hardy, supra note 73, at 995 ("[T] he rapidly changing technology of computer communication implies a need for flexible legal regulation of
behavior ... "); Kaplow, supranote 90, at 616 (discussing how "standards are easier to
keep up-to-date"); Korobkin, supranote 90, at 34 (explaining how standards are more
efficient in dealing with "material temporal differences"); Sullivan, supra note 90, at
66 ("Rules tend toward obsolescence. Standards, by contrast, are flexible and permit
[courts] to adapt them to changing circumstances over time."); Sunstein, supra note
90, at 993-94 (describing how rules can be outrun by changing circumstances).
One historical example of the use of standards to deal with changing technology
is the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1102 (1927) (repealed 1934).
Congress enacted an open-ended standard for licensing the airwaves in the "public
interest," which courts interpreted and applied on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., NBC
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219-20 (1943) (explaining that because of what Congress had done in the past "in regulating a field of enterprise the dominant characteristic of which was the rapid pace of its unfolding," Congress "define[d] broad areas
for regulation and . .. establish[ed] standards for judgment adequately related in
their application to the problems to be solved"); FERC v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933) ("The requirement is to be interpreted by its
context, by the nature of radio transmission and reception, by the scope, character,
and quality of services.
). I wish to thank Mark Davies for pointing out this
example.
158 See Lessig, supra note 146, at 1744-45; Sunstein, supra note 90, at 992.
159 See Sullivan, supra note 90, at 66; Sunstein, supra note 102, at 17.
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Standards and Minimalist Decisions Can Minimize the Cost of
Bad Decisions

Standards and judicial minimalism can also reduce the costs of a
regulation or decision that turns out to be (perhaps in hindsight)
poorly devised. The fallout from a bad rule 160 can be quite large,
since a rule is meant to be applied repeatedly to like cases. In contrast, standards can minimize the cost of bad regulations and decisions by limiting the reach of the decision. Because standards and
minimalist decisions do not purport to decide future cases, any adverse consequences that may result from a particular decision or regulation may be localized. 16 1 In addition, standards can reduce the
number of errors in the first instance because standards take into
greater account the particular facts of the case and are better suited to
1 62
deal with changing circumstances.
The concern for bad rules should be heightened for the Internet,
which still is a developing technology that affects millions of people
across the world. Courts must be cautious in dealing with developing
technology because an ill-conceived ruling or regulation could retard
the Internet's growth. Justice Souter perhaps captured this sentiment
best when he warned of the danger of adopting a broad rule for
emerging technologies: "[As broadcast, cable, and the
cybertechnology of the Internet and the World Wide Web approach
the day of using a common receiver, we can hardly assume that standards for judging the regulation of one of them will not have im63
mense, but now unknown and unknowable, effects on the others.'
160 People may disagree over what constitutes a "bad" rule or regulation. The
term is value laden and can be evaluated from numerous possible vantage points,
such as how well the rule serves its intended purpose, whether the rule creates negative externalities or fails to produce a net social benefit, or whether the rule infringes
widely shared beliefs or goals. In this Article, I use the term "bad" generically. The
central point that I make should apply irrespective of one's conception of what constitutes "bad."
161 This is not to say that bad standards will never have substantial costs. A high
profile case whose resolution carries industry-wide implications could have substantial
costs regardless of whether it is decided by rule or standard. Yet, a standard can minimize the extent to which the decision is repeated in future cases.
162 See Sunstein, supra note 102, at 18 ("A more evolutionary approach, involving
the accretion of case-by-case judgments, could produce fewer mistakes on balance,
because each decision would be appropriately informed by an understanding of par-

ticular facts.").
163 Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 776-77
(1996) (Souter, J., concurring).
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In the end, Justice Souter was resigned to accept the "rule" (the Hippocratic Oath) of "do ling] no harm.

'164

Justice Souter's adopted maxim is a good example of the minimalist approach. Where changing technology is involved, a court is to
proceed cautiously and narrowly. Avoiding broad rules and maximalist decisions may be one way to avoid "doing harm" to the developing
technology. Although some may question the appropriateness of
adopting the Hippocratic Oath for law, the principle does perhaps
capture the kind of restraint that is necessary to deal with the complexities and challenges posed by cyberspace. It would be a tragic mistake if the Internet's rapid development and open nature were stifled
by ill-conceived decisions. By favoring standards and narrow decisions, courts may guard against unforeseen and deleterious consequences that could result from broad decisions.
Doing no harm is a credo that could also apply to the development of doctrine. A presumption for narrow, fact-specific decisions
may alleviate the pressures caused by doctrinal convergence. A court
could, for example, avoid ruling definitively about how two doctrines
intersect by taking a narrower way out of the case (assuming one is
available). That way the law can buy more time to understand the
doctrinal convergence before attempting to reconcile competing doctrines. Similarly, a court could attempt to avoid a broad decision if it
may result in excessive extraterritorial spillover. Although spillover
might result from a minimalist decision, the likelihood for spillover is
much greater with a decision that expressly attempts to apply to future
cases.
Thus, a presumption for the use of standards and minimalist decisions in cyberspace is founded on a healthy dose of circumspection
about a court's ability to keep pace with a nascent and fast-developing
technology. Courts should err on the side of standards and minimalist decisions if they are uncertain how cyberspace should be regulated.
A broad decision or rule has the potential to do far more damage to
the development of cyberspace (and of doctrine) than a narrow decision or standard has.
164 Id. at 778 (Souter, J., concurring); see also Lawrence Lessig, Copyrights Rule,
INDUSTRY STANDARD, Oct. 9, 2000, at 51, 51 ("[Clourts from the Supreme Court down

have demanded that the state first show that its regulation will 'do no harm' to cyberspace."); FCC Chairman William E. Kennard, The Unregulation of the Internet: Laying a Competitive Course for the Future, Remarks Before the Federal
Communications Bar Northern California Chapter (July 20, 1999), at http://
www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/spwek924.html ("In a market developing at these
speeds, the FCC must follow a piece of advice as old as Western Civilization itself. first,
do no harm. Call it a high-tech Hippocratic Oath.").
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Standards and Minimalist Decisions Can Promote Greater
Democratic Accountability

Finally, reliance on case-by-case and minimalist decisionmaking
may help to shunt broader issues about the Internet-that implicate a
diversity of views and values and that may affect the millions of people
who use the Internet each day-from courts to democratically accountable institutions. By proceeding narrowly, courts can leave the
primary responsibility of deciding how best, if at all, to regulate cyberspace to the legislature. If the democratic process is well-functioning,1 65 the courts' deferral of important Internet issues to Congress
can help to foster greater debate and accountability on how the Internet is regulated. 166 While courts can also play an important part in
facilitating public debate about contentious issues, courts are less
equipped as an institution to conduct the kind of public debate necessary to resolve more divisive issues, particularly in high-profile cases
that galvanize competing camps.
B.

The Need for Rules for Cyberspace

6 7 It
A world governed by standards has tradeoffs, however.'
would be foolish to think that our legal system could or should operate without rules or any decisions that adopt the broad/definitive approach. A legal regime composed of standards comes at a steep price:
legal doctrine is subject to instability; widely shared values may be left
unprotected; individuals may not be able to plan efficiently; and the
costs of judicial decisionmaking are increased. As in other areas of
168
law, there must be a place for at least some rules in cyberspace.

165 Of course, this assumption needs to be tested. There may be occasions (perhaps many) where Congress caters purely to special interests or enacts legislation that
can only be seen as rent seeking by a well-connected group. See infra notes 200-02
and accompanying text.
166 See generally Sunstein, supra note 102, at 19 (arguing that one of the major
advantages of minimalism is that it grants a certain latitude to other branches of
government).

167 See SCHAUER, supra note 149, at 143-44.
168 I do not include one of the common defenses of rules, namely, their ability to
reduce arbitrariness and to promote fairness in treating like cases alike. Although the
defense is often cited by proponents of rules, it remains a highly contested proposition. Instead of treating like cases alike, rules may end up treating relevantly different
cases similarly. See id. at 136-37. And, if the latter, rules have the same potential for
arbitrariness as commonly thought of standards. See id. at 137 ("Insofar as factors
screened from consideration by a rule might in a particular case turn out to be those
necessary to reach a just result, rules stand in the way of justice in those cases and
impede optimal justice in the long term.").
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1. Rules Reduce the Cost of Decisionmaking
For starters, constant changes in the law or complete reliance on
case-by-case decisionmaking may prove to be extremely taxing on
courts and our system of stare decisis. There would be a tremendous
waste of resources if courts treated every case and every legal issue as if
they were proceeding tabula rasa. And our notion of stare decisis
would become impoverished if every case were so minimalist as to pre169
clude divining a legal precedent that might apply to other cases.
Rules help to reduce the cost of decisionmaking by obviating the
need to reconsider a recurring issue over again. Although rules cost
more to formulate and promulgate, they can be offset by a substantial
savings in costs of applying the law, particularly for recurring fact scenarios. 170 For example, courts confronted with the recurring question
of what kind of Internet contacts are sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction over a defendant have developed a "sliding scale" test to
help analyze the issue.' 71 The test operates in some respects as a rule
and saves courts from expending judicial resources on determining
what the governing law is. Over time, with each application of the
test, we can expect the savings in decisional costs to be quite substantial. In some cases, the issue of personal jurisdiction will not even be
litigated, given the clarity of result under the test.
2.

Rules Promote Stability

Also, rules help to promote stability. Stability in the law helps to
safeguard our most widely shared values, interests, or goals. For example, we interpret the First Amendment to prohibit all or nearly all
169 See Sunstein, supranote 102, at 27 ("[A] strong theory of stare decisis is part of
a range of devices designed to create good incentives for democracy by providing a
clear background for Congress.").
170 See Kaplow, supra note 90, at 621; Korobkin, supra note 90, at 31-32; see also
SCHAUER, supra note 149, at 147 ("A rule-based system is . . . able to process more
cases, operate with less expenditure of human resources, and, insofar as rule-based
simplicity fosters greater predictability as well, keep a larger number of events from
being formally adjudicated at all.").
171 On one end of the scale, personal jurisdiction exists if the defendant transacts
business in that jurisdiction over the Internet. On the other end of the scale, personal jurisdiction cannot be exercised over a defendant whose only contact to the
jurisdiction is that he has posted information or an advertisement on the Internet
without any further communication with potential customers in the forum state. In
the middle are the more difficult cases in which the defendant operates an interactive
website that allows the defendant to communicate with potential customers in foreign
jurisdictions regarding defendant's goods or services. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v.
Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
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viewpoint-based discrimination of speech by the government. 172 Such
a rule has a stabilizing force for our society and deters the chilling of
free speech that would result if the law were less certain and encouraged people to engage in self-censorship out of fear of violating
the law. Likewise, we take a fairly categorical approach to the Double
Jeopardy bar (prohibiting multiple prosecutions and punishment of a
defendant for the same offense), even to the point of recognizing that
some who are guilty may escape conviction, because we fear what
might happen if we permit repeat prosecutions under a more openended standard. 173 Although open-ended standards may also instantiate some of our most widely shared values, a rule is often better able
to safeguard precisely what we hold dear. Thus, the Due Process
Clause captures a welter of fairness and justice concerns, both procedural and substantive. But the real bite of the open-ended notion of
"due process" often comes in the form of particular rules, say for instance, requiring notice and comment before the deprivation of certain entitlements by the government. 174
Although standards are more flexible, the price of flexibility is
fixity. It may be that we want the "rigidity" of a rule to help shape the
way the Internet develops, or even to slow down rapid changes of the
Internet in a way that is consistent with widely shared beliefs. Rules
can serve a useful purpose in establishing stability and basic "ground
rules"' 75 for the Internet. If a certain practice or use of the Internet is
harmful to others or the development of the Internet, then we should
consider adopting rules to prohibit such practices. Conversely, if a
certain practice is socially desirable and can facilitate the use or opera172

See R.AN. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).

173

See, e.g., Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) ("The applica-

ble rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct
statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not."); see also, e.g., United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996)
(holding that civil in rem forfeitures do not constitute "punishment" for purposes of
Double Jeopardy bar).

174 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (holding that due process "as
a general rule" requires that before a student is suspended from public schools, the
'student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies
the charges, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity
to present his side of the story"); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding
that welfare recipients have a due process right to a hearing before termination of
their benefits).
175 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy
Rules Through Technology, 76 TEx. L. REv. 553, 553-54 (1998) ("[D]efault ground rules
are just as essential for participants in the Information Society as Lex Mercatoria was

to merchants a hundred years ago.").
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tion of the Internet, then adopting rules to protect such a practice
may be desirable.
3.

Rules Facilitate Predictability and Private Planning

Rules are also important in facilitating predictability and private
planning.1 76 Because rules allow people to predict the content of the
law ahead of time, rules can encourage greater private planning and
ordering. 17 7 To the proponents of rules, even a bad rule may be more
desirable than having no rule at all, given the predictability that it can
achieve. 178 Defining rights more clearly (such as who is the true
owner of rights, and how those rights will be enforced) may reduce
transaction costs for people who wish to contract those rights. Standards and minimalist decisions make planning more difficult, however, because people cannot know in advance what the law is. 1 79 The

loss in private planning by use of standards may be particularly costly
for the Internet, an area that so heavily involves commercial transactions and decentralized administration.
The most ardent defense of private planning comes from the lawand-economics school, which contends that entitlements should be
clear so that parties can engage in bargaining over those entitlements. 180 Richard Epstein argues, for example, that in our complex
world we should adopt a few simple rules of property ownership and
reject the vagaries of case-by-case adjudication. 81' Likewise, Judge
Frank Easterbrook contends that property rules need to be made
clearer for cyberspace so that "in a Coasean world the affected parties
will by their actions establish what is best."'18 2 Easterbrook believes
176

See SCHAUER, supra note 149, at 137-45; Sullivan, supra note 90, at 62-63.

177 See

SCHAUER,

supra note 149, at 138.

178 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 90, at 1179.
179 Sunstein acknowledges that "[w] hen planning is necessary, minimalism may be
a large mistake." Sunstein, supra note 102, at 29.
180 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 89 (3d ed. 2000)
("[B] argainers are more likely to cooperate when their rights are clear and less likely
to agree when their rights are ambiguous."); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1, 8, 19 (1960); Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerationsin the
Intellectual Property Protection of Software, 24J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 372-73 (1995).
181 See RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RuLEs FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 53-54 (1995); id. at
65 ("What has to be avoided above all is a case-by-case adjudication of a set of complex claims which will leave even the winners (to say nothing of the innocent losers) of
particular suits hobbled by nightmarish legal uncertainty when they wish to deal with
their reacquired property.").
182 Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 210; see id. at 209-13; Trotter Hardy, Property
(and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 236; Robert P. Merges, Of
Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655 (1994). Easter-
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that we need to have more property rules for cyberspace, to enable
more bargaining and efficiency.' 8 3
While I agree that there is much virtue in devising rules to facilitate bargaining, I stop short of an across-the-board embracement of
rules and property rights for cyberspace. To be sure, facilitating private bargaining is an important goal for cyberspace. But so are a host
of other considerations (e.g., protecting the free flow of information,
encouraging technological innovation, developing a public commons
for the exchange of ideas). There is a danger that an emphasis on
clear property rights may obscure the complexities that cyberspace
poses.
Consider, for example, Intel v. Hamidi, a case involving the creation of a clear property right in cyberspace.'8 4 Over the course of
roughly three years, Ron Hamidi, a former employee of Intel, sent a
total of six emails to Intel's employees (some thirty thousand in number). In the emails, Hamidi described what he claimed were demeaning and discriminatory employment practices by Intel. Dismayed by
the content of the emails, Intel went to court to stop Hamidi from
sending any more emails to its employees (even though Intel's policy
permitted employees to receive personal emails at work).185 In granting a preliminary injunction against Hamidi, the trial court concluded
that Hamidi had trespassed on Intel's chattel-namely, its email serv86
ers-by sending emails to Intel's employees.'
The court's recognition of a strong property right for Intel assumes that boundaries of ownership of the Net can be clearly defined.
But that assumption ignores all the complexities of the Net, which in
brook echoes a standard law-and-economics position, developed from Ronald Coase,
that private bargaining over an entitlement is more likely to be efficient if the entitlement is clearly defined ex ante. See Coase, supra note 180, at 8, 19.
183 See Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 212; see also Hardy, supra note 182, at 236-58
(arguing for greater recognition of property rights in cyberspace). For thoughtful
articles disputing the efficiency of using rules, see Burk, supra note 139, in which the
author argues that it may be more efficient to have "muddy" entitlements-which he
likens to standards-for intellectual property in cyberspace because transaction costs
may be high for certain transactions related to cyberspace, id. at 145-79, and Jason
Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256
(1995), in which the author argues that "bargaining may be more efficient under a
blurry balancing test than under a certain rule" when the parties have incomplete
information and the legal balancing test is imperfect in measuring harm versus value.
Id. at 257.
184 See Intel Corp v. Hamidi, No. 98A505067, 1999 WL 450944, at *1 (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 1999), affd, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (Ct. App. 2001), petition
for review granted, No. 5103781, 2002 WL 554737 (Cal. Mar. 27, 2002).

185 Id. at *1.
186

Id. at *1-*2.
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many respects is not "owned" by anyone. 187 Even were we able to define neatly ownership of different aspects of the Net, I am not sure
that establishing clear property rights would necessarily facilitate bargaining as Judge Easterbrook desires. In Intel, it seems to me that the
result will be barring, not bargaining with, Hamidi. The byproduct is
that unpopular speech is squelched. Perhaps a better property analogy-if we must draw one at all-is to treat Intel's email system like
real property and the connection to the Internet like a sidewalk.1 8
Hamidi can use the sidewalk (email), at least for the purposes for
which it was set up (to send messages within reasonable limitations). 18 9 Such a property right is less clear or categorical, but at least
it avoids closing off speech on the Net. 90
The key point to recognize is that private planning is important,
but not necessarily the paramount concern, at least not for all cases.
Sometimes, perhaps often, adopting a rule simply for the sake of facilitating private planning may mask other considerations that deserve
our attention.
C. Five Factors That Support the Use of Rules and the
Broad/DefinitiveApproach
From the foregoing discussion, we should expect the need for
both rules and standards in dealing with cyberspace. My suggested
presumption for the narrow/tentative approach is therefore a modest
one. The presumption can help to decide close cases in which the
187 See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM.
509, 513-14 (1996) (discussing two conceptions of "property" in cyberspace); Carol
M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and
Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 146-55 (1998) (discussing the debate for recognizing
more or less property in cyberspace and the notion of "limited common property" in
cyberspace).
188 I am grateful to Larry Lessig for suggesting this analogy, although in a different
context.
189 For discussions of preserving a public commons in cyberspace, see LAWRENCE
LEssiG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 19-99 (2001); Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons
Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New World Order of InternationalIntellectual
PropertyProtection,6 IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 37-40 (1998); Yochai Benkler, Free
as the Air to Common Use: FirstAmendment Constraintson Enclosure of the PublicDomain, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999) [hereinafter Benkler, PublicDomain]; Yochai Benkler, From
Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons
and UserAccess, 52 FED. COMM. LJ. 561, 567-68 (2000); and Carol Rose, The Comedy of
the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711,
711-23 (1986).
190 Another analogy would be to liken email to a telephone call: a person should
be allowed to make personal, non-commercial calls (emails) to other people as long
as not harassing or prank calls (emails).
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choice between rules and standards is uncertain, but it should not be
viewed to tip the scales in favor of standards or minimalist decisions as
a matter of course. The more crucial inquiry is provided by a close
analysis of the factors that militate in favor of the development of
rules and the broad/definitive approach. I offer a set of five factors to
assist courts in that inquiry. Although other factors could be added to
the list, I believe the five factors provide a good starting point for the
analysis.
1. Waiting for Internet-Specific Legislation
The first factor examines whether the court is applying "old law"
created before the Internet existed or new legislation created specifically for application to the Internet. I will refer to this new legislation
as Internet-specific legislation. If the case involves "old law," courts
need to be more careful before adopting a broad rule or categorical
approach. On the other hand, if the case involves Internet-specific
legislation, courts should feel more comfortable in crafting rules from
a statute that is amenable to such an approach. 19 '
This first factor rests on the belief that we should prefer Congress
to make the first attempt at formulating a rule for cyberspace with
legislation that specifically targets the Internet. 192 The Internet-specific legislation does not necessarily have to create sui generis regulation for cyberspace. Legislators may incorporate regulations of
cyberspace within existing bodies of law, or may develop approaches
that parallel other areas of regulation. The key point is that Congress
191 Of course, judgment calls will sometimes have to be made on what constitutes
Internet-specific legislation and how strongly the factor weighs. A new statute that
expressly applies to the Internet-for example, the Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub.
L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2719 (provided at 47 U.S.C. § 151 n.1 (Supp. V
1999))-presents the strongest case under this factor. An amendment to an existing
statute to extend its application to the Internet should also count as Internet-specific

legislation, although the factor perhaps should weigh less strongly if the amendment
made little or no effort to describe how the statute should apply to the Internet (e.g.,
an amendment that simply said that "this law now applies to the Internet"). A more
difficult case is presented by a new statute that is silent on whether or how it applies to

the Internet. If the language of the statute is ambiguous, perhaps the legislative history could shed greater light on the issue. If doubt still remains, this factor should not

weigh in favor of the broad/definitive approach.
192 Congress itself must consider a threshold question of whether legislation is to
be preferred over self-regulation. From its inception, the Internet has developed with

a certain ethos that it should be allowed to develop free of intrusive government regulation. At the same time, however, Congress has enacted numerous pieces of legislation that relate to the Internet. See Yochai Benkler, Net Regulation: Taking Stock and

Looking Forward, 71 U. COLO. L. Rav. 1203, 1205-32 (2000).
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enacts legislation that specifically contemplates application to cyberspace and that either sets forth a rule or provides a statutory scheme
in which courts or administrative agencies can develop a rule.
Congress should take the lead in developing rules for cyberspace
for several reasons. First, Congress has greater capacity for gathering
information and for developing expertise and institutional memory to
deal with the Internet and technology issues. No decisionmaker
should underestimate the complexity of these issues. The Internet is
fast developing and continues to outpace the law. In "Internet time,"
technological changes tend to be both rapid and dramatic. To deal
with such complexity, deicisionmakers must be able to gather a large
amount of information and develop institutional memory for understanding the Internet and technology-related issues. In this regard,
Congress is much better suited to deal with cyberspace than courts
are. Congress has the authority to commission studies, hold hearings,
and elicit comment from the public. Congressional committees and
staffers may be able to develop expertise by working primarily or even
exclusively on technology issues. 193 Moreover, industry leaders can
(and no doubt do) more readily provide their views to members of
Congress. Given its information-gathering capacity, Congress may be
better able to develop more comprehensive and efficacious rules to
194
regulate behavior.
By contrast, courts are limited to the evidence presented
in a specific case. Although the evidence may at times be extensive, courts
can consider only what the parties offer. Unlike Congress, courts do
not have wide latitude to search for information on their own. Moreover, except for patent appeals, which are heard exclusively by the Federal Circuit, courts typically do not develop expertise or institutional
memory to handle technology cases. Judges must handle a wide variety of cases, and they cannot be reasonably expected to keep abreast
of all the technological changes occurring today. Nor do courts have
staff suited to developing technological expertise and institutional
memory about technology issues. Law clerks typically work for finite
periods of time (generally a year) and do not have the same opportunity to develop technological expertise as congressional staffers.
Another reason to prefer that Congress take the lead in developing rules for cyberspace is that Congress is a democratic body that can
facilitate public debate about proposed regulations of the Internet.
193 See Kaplow, supra note 90, at 608 ("Legislatures may be better equipped to
draw upon technical expertise than courts. Also, through the use of committees and
staffs, legislatures may develop more expertise of their own.").
194 See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 90, at 264.
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These debates are often political and subject to varied, and at times
quite divided, opinion. Courts are ill-equipped to entertain, much
less decide, such debates, particularly if the issues are divisive or political. Because the Internet affects millions of people here and abroad,
major questions about its regulation are better left to democratically
(and perhaps internationally) accountable institutions. For Congress
to assume the responsibility of formulating rules for cyberspace may
further the goals of transparency and accountability in government
95
action.
Finally, significant doctrinal benefits may result if courts refrain
from adopting rules for cyberspace until Internet-specific legislation is
enacted. In such case, courts are less likely to stretch existing doctrines that developed in contexts wholly unrelated to cyberspace. Although applying traditional doctrines to cyberspace may sometimes
be appropriate, there is a danger when courts stretch existing doctrine to fit cyberspace. For example, before Congress enacted the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act,' 9 6 courts attempted to deal
with cybersquatting by applying federal anti-dilution law. 19 7 But this
has greatly expanded the scope of anti-dilution law, in ways that may
not be desirable. Subsequent courts recognized that the Panavision
International,L.P. v. Toeppen'98 decision threatened to make every dispute over a domain name between a trademark holder and a domain

195 See Sunstein, supranote 90, at 976-77; cf. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216
F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2000) (refusing to consider what national policy should be
with respect to open access on the Internet). Notably, the Court stated in Diamond v.
Cliakrabarty,447 U.S. 303 (1980):
The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for resolution
within the legislative process after the kind of investigation, examination,
and study that legislative bodies can provide and courts cannot. That pro-.
cess involves the balancing of competing values and interests, which in our
democratic system is the business of elected representatives.
Id. at 317. Of course, there is always a danger that Congress could enact laws that
mask a particular policy or that are so poorly drafted that courts will have the real
burden of figuring out the statutory scheme.
196 Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-545 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. and 16 U.S.C.).
197 In PanavisionInternationa4 L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998), the
Ninth Circuit held that a cybersquatter had committed trademark dilution because it
had registered domain names containing the trademark of the plaintiff, which reduced the capacity to identify and distinguish the trademark holder's goods and services on the Internet. Id. at 1324-27.
198 Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316.
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name registrant a case of trademark dilution in favor of the trademark
holder.1 99
I do not mean to suggest, however, that courts should never
adopt rules for cyberspace on their own. Some areas of law will involve judge-made law-personal jurisdiction is a good example-for
which courts have the primary responsibility of deciding the law. For
these areas, courts can develop rules, but they still must consider
whether rules are appropriate. Even in an area where Congress has
not yet enacted a regulation for cyberspace, courts can play an important part in exposing gaps in the law and areas that are more suitable
for a legislative response. And, sometimes when there clearly has
been a failure in the democratic process, courts may be the last resort
for the establishment of a rule.
Nor do I wish to suggest that whatever Congress enacts will necessarily be more efficacious or desirable than court-made rules. As it has
proven in the past, Congress is open to all sorts of undesirable activities, including capture, rent seeking, and catering purely to special
interest groups. 20 0 Modem public choice theory would cast doubt on
the notion that consideration of the public good animates Congress
when enacting legislation.2 0 1 However, I believe Congress does have
at least the capacity, if not the inclination, to consider legislation beyond special interests for a larger, public good. 20 2 And, at least from
199 See HQM, Ltd. v. Hatfield, 71 F. Supp. 2d 500, 504-09 (D. Md. 1999); Hasbro,
Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117, 126-37 (D. Mass. 1999); see also
Lemley, supranote 42, at 1698-99 (criticizing the doctrinal creep that has occurred in
federal anti-dilution law, which courts have applied without requiring much, if any,
showing of a "famous" mark); Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of
Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KEN'r L. REV. 1295,
1304-05 (1998) (stating that traditional trademark law is in flux).
200 See LEssIG, supra note 72, at 219; Sunstein, supra note 102, at 29-30.
201 Public choice theory disputes the notion that members of Congress act beyond
self-interest and interest group politics. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHIULP P.
FRcIKY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 36-37, 72 (1991) (stating that the most fundamental
concern about interest group politics is that it corrodes the political system); Gary S.
Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q-.
ECON. 371 (1983) (describing how the government corrects market failures by favoring the politically powerful); Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 90, at 264 (stating that the
nature of the legislative process is such that ordinarily only substantial interest groups
can invoke it); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American PublicLaw, 38 STAN. L. REV.
29 (1985) (stating that much of the dissatisfaction with the American scheme of government has its root in the existence of interest groups and their influence over the
political process).

202

See CAss R.

SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION

3-20 (1993) (elaborating on

the constitutional theory based on civic republicanism and the ideal of a deliberative
democracy); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Reviva4 97 YALE LJ. 1539,
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an institutional perspective, Congress is better situated to gather the
kind of information and develop the level of expertise necessary to
devise rules.
2. Addressing Recurring Problems with Identifiable Common
Elements
The second factor examines whether the proposed rule addresses
a recurring problem that has identifiable common elements. Rules
are particularly useful to address problems that can be expected to
occur with some frequency and that are not so heterogeneous as to
escape categorization. The more frequent the problem and the more
the problem manifests common traits, the greater likelihood that a
rule can be designed to address the problem. On the other hand, if
.the problem is only sporadic or an isolated incident, it may be better
to wait before adopting a rule.2 0 3 Courts may benefit from more con-

crete examples of the problem, and a rule may prove to be unnecessary. Similarly, if the problem is recurring but contains diverse
elements that defy categorization, an open-ended standard or more
minimalist decision may be better suited to address the problem.
The importance of this second factor cannot be overstated. In
his economic analysis of rules and standards, Louis Kaplow described
how rules may reduce both transaction and decisional costs if the
rules address recurring fact scenarios that can be expected to occur
with some frequency. 20 4 In such cases, the use of rules can reduce the
costs for private parties to determine and comply with the law20 5 and

the costs of enforcement for courts to give content to the law.2 0 6 But
where the problem is either sporadic or diverse, the use of rules may
20 7
be costly and inefficient.
The second factor helps to ensure that rules are narrowly tailored
to address a specific problem. The result should be better decisionmaking. Poorly designed rules are often ones that do not address a
recurring problem with identifiable common elements. Instead, the
1548-51 (1988) (describing those aspects of republicanism that have the strongest
claim to contemporary support). Congress may not always (or even often) think
broadly in terms of a national interest, but it has enacted laws, such as anti-discrimination laws, that serve an important national goal.
203 Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 90, at 273 ("At first a problem area may seem
immensely complex and various, but over time elements of commonality will
emerge.").
204 Kaplow, supra note 90, at 577.
205

See id. at 596.

206

See id. at 581-82, 621-22.

207

Id. at 582-83.
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rules are vague or overbroad. 20 8 Such rules can have many unforeseen adverse consequences, such as chilling, overdeterrence, and reduction of socially desirable conduct. By requiring courts to identify
recurring circumstances that underlie a perceived problem, the second factor forces courts to pinpoint what needs to be addressed. The
more precise the rule, the greater the probability that the rule will
deter only that conduct which the rule was intended to prohibit. 20 9 A
more precise rule may also decrease the number of legal disputes and
increase the prospects of settlement, given the likelihood that people
210
can determine the law and how it applies ex ante.
3. Applying General Prohibitions and Regulations of the Internet's
Architecture
The third factor examines the form that the contemplated rule is
to take. Rules may be easier to formulate for cyberspace as either (1)
general prohibitions or (2) regulations of the Internet's code or architecture that are not tied to a regime of entitlements for which a balancing of interests is often necessary.
General prohibitions tend to be more amenable to rules because
prohibitions typically target conduct that is recurring and that is specific and identifiable. Because general prohibitions apply across-theboard to all individuals, they are well-suited to the formulation of
rules of general applicability. 2 11 For example, the proscription against
computer hacking targets certain kinds of unauthorized entry of computer systems. 2 12 Computer hacking is a recurring problem, and, although there are different kinds of hacking, we can-as the federal
statute does-identify recurring traits based on such factors as
whether the conduct was unauthorized and caused damage to the net208 We will see two such examples in Reno and Corley. See infra notes 273-93,
360-96 and accompanying text.
209 Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 90, at 264. A precise rule, however, may have a
greater problem of under-inclusion and may permit the Holmesian "bad man" to
evade the law more so than a vague rule. See Sunstein, supra note 90, at 995. The
problem should be relatively small if most people are risk-averse.
210 Erhlich & Posner, supra note 90, at 264-65; see also Korobkin, supranote 90, at
47 (describing how the "self-serving bias" may cause people to litigate more where
there are standards or unclear rules).
211 This is not to say that all prohibitions are rules. Some prohibitions contain
standards that do not specify the content of the law in advance-the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against "unreasonable" searches and seizures, U.S. CONsT. amend.
IV; the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "excessive fines," U.S. CoNsT.
amend. VIII; and the Federal Trade Commission Act's prohibition against "unfair and
deceptive" acts or practices, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1994), are but a few examples.
212 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994).
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work. I believe it is much easier for courts to give such a prohibition a
categorical sweep, 21 3 than laws that are framed more in terms of entitlements or an affirmative grant of rights, particularly those that require some balancing of interests. It is often easier to tell people what
they are not entitled to do than to tell them what they are entitled to
do.
In addition to prohibitions, regulations of code may also be wellsuited to the development of rules. Lessig has demonstrated how the
code or architecture of cyberspace-meaning all the hardware and
software that comprise the Net and make it run-establish, in essence,
a law of its own.2 1 4 "Code is law," as Lessig puts it,215 and the law of
code may have just as a rule-like effect-perhaps more so than-as
ordinary law. And a law that requires a specific code may operate as a
rule. The reason is that the choice of a specific code or technical
make-up to cyberspace is likely to have a broad reach, given the pressures of interoperability, standardization, and network effects on the
Net. 216 If, for example, we require digital telephony to facilitate wire-

tapping for law enforcement, that technical standard must be implemented for the entire network (at least in the United States).217 Because code itself has a broad reach, regulationsof code may extend just

213 See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 506-09 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding
that the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (5) (A) did not require
proof of an intent to cause damage by computer hacker). True, criminal law presents
a special case in which the Constitution seems to compel the use of rules, or at least

greater ex ante specification of the content of the law. The Due Process Clause prohibits the enforcement of criminal laws that are "'so vague and standardless that it
leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits. ..

.'"

City of Chicago v.

Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (quoting Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399,
402-03 (1966)).
214 LEssIG, supranote 72, at 43; see alsoJoel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and
Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911, 929 (1996) (stating that the overlap of
interests between the Physical world and the virtual world suggests a governance
model that contains distinct rules for the separation of powers); Reidenberg, supra
note 175, at 579-81 (describing how Lex Informatica will allow the creation of customized rules that are more easily enforced).
215 See LEsslo, supra note 72, at 3. This is not to suggest that Lessig advocates the
use of regulations of code as a general strategy. Nor do I. My basic point is that code
regulations are often rule-like in effect. However, as I explain below, some regulations of code may be closely tied to a regime of entitlements for which it is necessary
to engage in a balancing of interests. In such cases, imposing a code regulation with a
strong rule-like effect may not be appropriate.
216 See Lemley, supra note 28, at 1041-53.

217

LEssIG,

supra note 72, at 44-46.

1324

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL- 77:5

as far. Once in place, a regulation of the Internet's architecture essen21 8
tially codifies the "rules" into the code that constitutes the Internet.
General prohibitions and regulations of code should be distinguished from statutory entitlement regimes-such as intellectual
property219-for which some kind of balancing of goals or interests is
necessary or desirable. The position that I wish to advance here is
twofold: (1) before cyberspace existed, many key aspects of intellectual property law had been decided not by rules, but by fact-specific
standards; and (2) cyberspace makes the use of standards and factspecific decisionmaking in this area all the more necessary. Crucial to
both cyberspace and intellectual property is a need to balance the
competing interests-including the public interest-that are at stake.
220
Balancing of interests is the stock-and-trade of standards.
First, copyright, patent, and trademark law all rely heavily on factspecific standards to balance competing interests or goals. The Copy-

218 Id. at 130; see also Lessig, supranote 44, at 514-15 (arguing that the most effective way to regulate behavior in cyberspace will be through the regulation of code).
219 Another example is bankruptcy law. Many issues under bankruptcy law are
decided by standards, not rules. Yet this is understandable since bankruptcy law is an
entitlement regime that attempts to balance the interests of the debtor, the creditors,
and the estate. See, e.g., In re Dill, 731 F.2d 629, 631 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that
determining whether a debtor is "generally not paying his debts" so as to allow a
creditor relief on an involuntary petition requires the court "to balance the interests
of the creditors against those of the debtor"); Peerless Ins. Co. v. Rivera, 208 B.R. 313,
315 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1997) ("Determining whether 'cause' exists [to obtain relief under
automatic stay provision] requires a fact intensive inquiry that must be made on a case
by case basis."). Another example is the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The
UCC is designed to balance the interests of contracting parties in an infinite number
of circumstances. Not surprisingly, many of the key provisions of the UCC contain
standards-for example, the duty of "good faith and fair dealing" and the doctrine of
"unconscionability"-to regulate commercial transactions. See U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-302
(2001); see also KELMAN, supra note 90, at 59 ("Merchants in ongoing commercial
relationships are probably the most frequent users of standards for resolving claims
(both as a result of underlying law, the standard-filled Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), and as a matter of practice, since they so rarely litigate at all)."). This is not to
suggest, however, that bankruptcy or contract law operates without rules. See, e.g., 11
U.S.C. § 523(a) (1994) (listing the exemptions to discharge of debt); U.C.C. § 2-201
(1999) (outlining the Statute of Frauds requirement of a written contract in specified
cases). The point is that, where balancing of interests is necessary for a multiplicity of
parties and circumstances, standards often facilitate a more precise balancing of
interests.
220 See Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 90, at 34; Sullivan, supra
note 90, at 59.
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right and Patent Clause 22 ' grants Congress the authority to enact copyright and patent systems that serve two goals: first, to provide an
economic incentive for authors and inventors to create; second, and
more importantly, to serve the public interest in receiving a wide dissemination of works and inventions.2 22 But deciding how best to
achieve these goals, which are at times competing, is far from easy.
The Copyright and Patent Clause seems to call for something less
than an ironclad exclusive right. Beyond blatant cases of copying,
judgment calls will inevitably have to be made over whether an infringement has occurred and how far the exclusive rights extend.
Accordingly, both patent and copyright law rely on standards to
strike a better balance. In copyright law, the fair use doctrine, 22 3 the

221 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have the Power ...To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
222 See Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) ("The
Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and
the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the 'Progress of Science and useful Arts.'"); Twentieth Century Music Corp.
v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The immediate effect of our copyright law is to
secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good."). But see Lloyd
L. Weinreb, Copyrightfor FunctionalExpression, 111 HAuv. L. REv. 1149, 1211 (1998)
("[T]he instrumental defense of copyright has often been grounded on unproved
premises or abstract theories than on fact, and there has been a steady undercurrent
of dissent from the conclusion that such an incentive is needed or that its overall
effect is salutary.").
223 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (stating that
"fair use" cannot "be simplified with bright-line rules, for the [Copyright] statute, like
the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis"); see also Pierre N. Leval,
Toward aFairUse Standard, 103 HARv.L. REv. 1105, 1107 (1990) (arguing that fair use
decisions seem "to result from intuitive reactions to individual fact patterns"); Lloyd
L. Weinreb, Fair'sFair:A Comment on the FairUse Doctrine,103 HARv. L. REv. 1137, 1138
(1990) ("What is fair is as fact-specific and resistant to generalization in this context as
it is in others."). As Lloyd Weinreb has aptly noted:
For all of its exposure, our understanding of fair use has not progressed
much beyond Justice Story's observation [that the fair use doctrine] ...was
'one of those intricate and embarrassing questions ...in which it is not...
easy to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, or to lay down any general principles applicable to all cases."
Lloyd L. Weinreb, FairUse, 67 FoRDRAMi L. Rrv. 1291, 1291 (1999) [hereinafter Weinreb, Fair Use]. Part of the reason that the fair use doctrine may have developed in
such an unrule-like manner is that copyright holders "typically asked for an injunction, an equitable remedy that directed the court's attention to the particularities of
the case rather than formulation of a general rule." Id. at 1296 & n.41.
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test of infringement, 224 and the idea/expression distinction 225 all require case-by-case determination. In patent law, the test of infringement,2 26 requirement of nonobviousness, 227 and a number of the
statutory bars228 also operate as fact-specific standards. The preva224 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.) (setting
forth the test of infringement based on proof of copying, such as establishing a substantial similarity between the works, and unlawful appropriation determined from
the perspective of the lay audience); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J.
965, 1005 (1990) ("The determination of substantial similarity is largely subjective,
thus permitting the finder of fact to give effect to its intuitive judgment of the perceived equities in a case.").
225 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103-05 (1879); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry
Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) ("The critical distinction between 'idea' and 'expression' is difficult to draw.... The guiding consideration in
drawing the line is the preservation of the balance between competition and protection reflected in the patent and copyright laws."); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin
Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (L. Hand, J.) ("[N]o principle can be
stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed
its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore be inevitably ad hoc.").
226 See Graver Tank v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) ("What constitutes equivalency must be determined against the context of the patent, the prior
art, and the particular circumstances of the case. Equivalence, in the patent law, is
not the prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be considered in a vacuum.").
227 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (Supp. V 1999). As the Supreme Court stated in Graham
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966):
What is obvious is not a question upon which there is likely to be uniformity
of thought in every given factual context. The difficulties ... are comparable to those encountered daily by the courts in such frames of reference as
negligence and scienter, and should be amenable to a case-by-case
development.
Id. at 18.
228 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains
Chem. Co., 103 F.3d 1538, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that for "on sale" bar, "all
of the circumstances surrounding the sale or offer to sell ... must be considered and
weighed against the policies underlying section 102(b)"); Lough v. Brunswick Corp.,
86 F.3d 1113, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that "public use" bar "depends on 'how
the totality of circumstances of the case comports with the policies underlying the
public use bar'" (quoting Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir.
1994)); Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1061-62 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that whether
invention has been "reduced to practice" to satisfy § 102(g) depends on a "reasonableness standard" applied to the "particular facts of each case"); Griffith v. Kanamaru,
816 F.2d 624, 626 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that whether junior party exercised "reasonable diligence" in reducing invention to practice under § 102(g) is determined
under standard of reasonableness, balancing the public interest in earliest possible
disclosure of invention and the interest in rewarding the inventor); In re Hall, 781
F.2d 897, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that the "printed publication" bar depends on
"underlying fact issues, and therefore must be approached on a case-by-case basis");
Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Rich, J., concurring) (hold-
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lence of standards in copyright and patent law means that, in most
cases, we cannot know ex ante whether the copyright or patent
holder's exclusive rights have been violated. 22 9 Save cases of blatant
copying, there will always be some uncertainty to the scope of intellectual property rights. A similar use of standards can be found in trademark law-an area that has been the source of numerous disputes
involving domain names that contain or are similar to existing trademarks. Like copyright and patent law, trademark law confers a right
2 30
that is subject to a balancing of the public interest.
My sense is that cyberspace will require the same, or perhaps even
greater, reliance on standards to adjudicate disputes over intellectual
property. First, as a doctrinal matter, it would be somewhat anomalous to interpose categorical rules for cyberspace in doctrinal areas
that have traditionally been decided by standards. If our intellectual
property law relies heavily on standards, particularly where it is necessary to balance competing interests or goals, then we should not exing that whether inventor has "suppressed" or "concealed" invention to raise § 1 02 (g)
bar is determined under "equitable principles" on a "case-by-case basis" (emphasis
omitted)); Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 360 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that
whether the requirement of corroboration for a reduction to practice has been satisfied is determined under a "rule of reason").
229 Interestingly, Easterbrook agrees that our current intellectual property systems
fail to create clear property rights. Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 208-10. And he
even acknowledges that "we cannot issue prescriptions for applications [of intellectual
property law] to computer networks" until we resolve the unanswered questions that
we have about the goals and effectiveness of our intellectual property systems. Id. at
208. As I explain below, I am not sure why we should expect that we will be able to
answver these questions ex ante and in a categorical manner now if we have not been
able to do so for hundreds of years.
230 As ChiefJudge Posner has described it:
The aim is to strike a balance between, on the one hand, the interest of the
seller of the new product, and of the consuming public, in an arresting,
attractive, and informative name that will enable the new product to compete effectively against existing ones, and, on the other hand, the interest of
existing sellers, and again of the consuming public, in consumers' being
able to know exactly what they are buying without having to incur substantial
costs of investigation or inquiry.
Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Baltimore Football Club, Ltd., 34 F.3d 410, 414 (7th
Cir. 1994) (Posner, CJ.). The seminal work analyzing the connection between trademarks and the public interest is Ralph Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal
Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE LJ. 1165 (1948). Brown's article continues to inspire thoughtful commentary on the subject. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 42, at 1687
(describing changes in trademark law since Brown's articles and advocating a return
to the "common sense" approach promoted by Brown); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with
Batman: The Public Interest in the AdvertisingAge, 108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999) (arguing
against the current trademark doctrine and in favor of Brown's approach).
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pect that such standards can be discarded or replaced by rules simply
because the activity occurs in cyberspace. The same need for balancing of interests to determine intellectual property rights persists when
2
applying those doctrines to cyberspace. 31
Indeed, standards may become even more necessary for cyberspace as a way to balance competing interests. Because the Internet is
international in scope, it intensifies the need for consideration of the
public interest. Any decision that regulates the content of material on
the Net may have not only national but also international consequences that can affect the millions of people who use the Internet
each day. International conflicts over intellectual property rights
make rule-bound determinations less practicable. The Internet's border-transcending nature presents vexing problems for choice of law.
The simple question of deciding what law governs the claim of rights
presents stumbling blocks to categorical determinations. Modern
choice of law analysis has eschewed bright-line rules in favor of the
malleable "interest" analysis. For international intellectual property
232
disputes, choice of law is even less developed and more uncertain.
The upshot of this brief digression on intellectual property law is
that courts must be careful in creating broad rules for intellectual
property rights in cyberspace. The fact-specific standards that underlie our intellectual property law have developed for a reason: to strike
a better balance of the competing goals and interests. That goal is no
less true in cyberspace.
4. Determining That Doctrinal Convergence Does Not Create
Interdoctrinal Tension or Extraterritorial Spillover
The fourth factor examines whether the case involves doctrinal
convergence. If it does not, then courts should consider the other
factors in determining whether a rule is appropriate. However, if
there is doctrinal convergence, courts must examine whether the contemplated rule is difficult to fit within the existing doctrines or laws.
Greater caution should be exercised before creating a rule that is in
tension with or that may substantially alter or undermine established
doctrines. If courts ignore this problem, the result will likely be what I
call interdoctrinal tension: a new doctrine cutting into or diminishing
existing doctrines without analysis of the impact such a curtailment
will have. Courts should proceed cautiously before rendering a deci231 See Aoki, supra note 189, at 27; Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the
Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 32-35 (1996); Rose, supra note 187, at 155.
232 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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sion for cyberspace that threatens to undermine existing doctrines in
other contexts.
For international cases, courts must also be wary of extraterritorial spillover. If possible, courts should avoid broad decisions that extend far beyond the court's jurisdiction. This approach finds support
in the presumption that courts in the United States recognize against
extraterritorial application of U.S. law,233 as well as in principles of

2 34
international law and comity.
The Yahoo! case in France provides a good example of the problem of extraterritorial spillover. The Superior Court of Paris ruled
that Yahool violated French law by allowing Internet users in France
to access Yahoo!'s online auction, which contained the sale of Nazi
memorabilia.23 5 The French court ordered Yahoo! to "render impossib/d' 236 within three months the ability of Internet users in France to
access the sale of such material.23 7 IfYahoo! failed to block such auctions from French users, it would have had to pay a contempt fine of

$13,300 per day.23 8 The French court's decision has elicited numer-

ous reactions, both supportive 23 9 and critical.2 40 Yahool itself took an
233 See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (recognizing
a presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law absent a clear statement
of congressional intent to the contrary).
234 See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1296-97 (3d
Cir. 1979) (recognizing that principles of international law and comity may counsel
against exercise of jurisdiction in case of extraterritorial application of U.S. law);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir.
1977) (same); see also Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993) (assuming without deciding that comity and international law principles could factor
against extraterritorial application of U.S. law even if supported by a clear intent of
Congress for extraterritorial application).
235 La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antis~mitisme v. La Soci~t6 Yahool Inc.,
T.G.I. [App. Ct.] Paris, Nov. 20, 2000.
236 Yahool, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antis6mitisme, 169 F. Supp.
2d 1181, 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (quoting a certified translation of the French court's
decree) (emphasis added).
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 In Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet, 42 JURIMETRICS J. (forthcoming 2002),
Joel Reidenberg offers the most comprehensive defense of the French court's decision. Reidenberg contends that "[t]he positive normative impact of the Yahoo! decision is that the Internet actors will have to recognize varying public values across
national borders." Id. While I agree with the overall goal of accommodating different public values on the Internet, I do not believe that such a goal should be understood to allow national courts to apply their own domestic laws without regard for the
amount of extraterritorial spillover that their decisions might create. Reidenberg is
certainly right that Yahool came within the prescriptive authority of the French authorities based on its conduct in France. Id. He is also right in concluding that the
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ambivalent approach: it brought a lawsuit in the United States to seek
a ruling that the French court decision was not enforceable in the
United States for jurisdictional and First Amendment reasons; at the
same time, Yahoo! announced that it would start barring the sale of
Nazi paraphernalia on its website and begin policing its site more
closely. 2 41 The District Court for the Northern District of California

ruled in favor of Yahoo!, holding that the French court's order was
unenforceable because it was overbroad, vague, and ultimately incon24 2
sistent with the First Amendment under the U.S. Constitution.
Although I do not think that the French court was necessarily
wrong in its application of French law, I believe the court should have
considered more the extraterritorial effects of its ruling and principles
of comity. 243 It would have been better if the court had attempted to

narrow the decision, given the spillover that would have resulted if the
court's decision had ended up banning all Nazi memorabilia on Yahoo!'s website, not just in France. Instead of ordering Yahoo! to
"render impossible" the access to Nazi material on its website, the
remedy ordered by the French court presented the more "interesting question." Id.
But I disagree with his interpretation of the French court's order as allowing merely a
"reasonable level of compliance with French law." Id. The order is quite strict and
does not speak in terms of reasonable compliance: "We order the Company YAHOO!
Inc. to take all necessary measures to dissuade and render impossible any access via
Yahoo.com to the Nazi artifact auction service and to any other site or service that
may be construed as constituting an apology for Nazism or a contesting of Nazi
crimes." Yahoo, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1185 (quoting a certified translation of the French
court's order). At the very least, if reasonableness was the standard, the French court
could have expressly stated so in no uncertain terms, to avoid any confusion in how
other courts and the parties themselves interpreted the order.
240 Carl S. Kaplan, Experts See Online Speech Case as Bellwether, N.Y. TIMES ON THE
WEB, Jan. 5, 2001, at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/05/technology/05CYBER
LAW.html.
241 Id.
242 Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1190-91.
243 My criticism of the French court's ruling should not be read to be an endorsement of the U.S. district court's decision. To declare a foreign judgment unconstitutional and unenforceable in this country is a strong remedy that perhaps is best
reserved as a remedy of last resort, given the concerns for comity and respecting the
individual sovereignty of each country. And it is just as bad for a U.S. court to impose
U.S. First Amendment law on foreign countries as it is for foreign countries to impose
their laws on the United States. Perhaps the U.S. district court should have waited for
the French court's decision on the appeal of the French lower court's decision before
issuing its own ruling. Also, if there was any doubt about the feasibility of implementing the French court's order without having to remove all Nazi paraphernalia from
Yahoo!'s website even outside of France, the U.S. district court could have declined to
grant summary judgment and instead could have chosen to conduct an evidentiary
hearing or trial on the issue.
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court could have, for example, ruled that Yahoo! was in violation of
French law, but only to the extent that it did not make its best efforts,
given the state of the technology, to make unavailable any Nazi paraphernalia to French Yahoo! users. This more fact-specific rulingthat relies on an open-ended standard-attempts to accommodate
the interests of users outside of France and is more sensitive to the
limitations of the technology.244 This ruling would have put pressure
on Yahoo! to implement the best possible filtering software but would
not have completely shut down the sale of Nazi material around the
world.
This is not to suggest that any extraterritorial spillover should
force courts to abdicate applying their country's laws. Certainly,
France has an important interest in enforcing its laws against Nazi paraphernalia. But the case becomes more difficult if it ends up regulating a substantial amount of conduct outside of France. If courts
simply ignore the possibility of extraterritorial spillover, then we may
end up with a race to the bottom of sorts: the most restrictive deci244 The French court could have drawn guidance from the CompuServe case in
Germany, in which a German appellate court eventually reversed the conviction of
Felix Somm, a CompuServe official. See Mark Konkel, Comment, Internet Indeceny,
InternationalCensorship, and Service Providers' Liability, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 453, 454-55 (2000). Somm was convicted for making available to German residents child pornography and violent computer games in newsgroups on the Internet. Id. at 453. The offending materials were accessed through CompuServe's
service. Id. Although the court dealt with German law, the Yahoo! case raises very
similar issues. Because the technology at the time did not allow CompuServe to restrict only German users from accessing these discussion groups, CompuServe
blocked access to all CompuServe users not only in Germany but also elsewhere for a
short period of time. Id. at 454; see also Nathaniel Nash, Holding Compuserve Responsible, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1996, at D4. Because of a public backlash to the blocking,
CompuServe restored full access to the Internet, but made available filtering software
for its users that would enable them to block their own access. See Konkel, supra, at
455-59. German prosecutors eventually indicted and convicted Somm for the alleged
offense, even though during the middle of the proceedings the prosecutors agreed
with Somm that he did not have the technological capability to screen the offending
material and therefore should be acquitted. See id. at 463-64; Edmund L. Andrews,
Germany's Efforts To Police Web Are Upsetting Business, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1997, at Al.
Two years later, however, an appellate court overturned the conviction and acquitted
Somm of the charges. See Ex-Head of Compuserve-Germany Acquitted in Illegal Content
Case, TECH EUR., Dec. 3, 1999, available at 1999 WL 10292203. Invoking a recently
enacted German law that provided a safe harbor for ISPs from liability, the German
appeals court held "that Somm did as much as he possibly could have to prevent the
dissemination of such materials, and that he could not be held responsible." John F.
Delaney & M. Lorrane Ford, The Law of the Internet: A Summary of U.S. Caselaw and
Legal Developments, in REPRESENTING THE Nmv MEDIA CoMPAw 2001, at 31, 233-34
(PLI Intellectual Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G-631, 2001).
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sions in any country would, in essence, rule the Internet. The fourth
factor is meant to reduce the possibility of such doctrinal tension by
indicating a need for greater caution if a ruling results in extraterritorial spillover.
5.

Determining That the Internet Is Not Changing in a Way That
Is Material to the Contemplated Rule

The fifth factor examines whether the rapidly changing nature of
the Internet thwarts or frustrates the formulation or efficacy of a rule.
This factor is a final reminder to courts that cyberspace is fast developing and that their ability to keep pace with all of the changes may be
limited. 24 5 However, general fears about rapidly developing technology should not prevent the formulation of rules as a matter of course.
Technological change should not be a bar to adopting a rule if there
is no sign that such change is imminent or likely, or if there is no
evidence that such change (even if imminent or likely) will affect a
material aspect of the case. In each case, courts must consider evidence of material changes.
If the evidence indicates that change is imminent and will affect a
material aspect of the case, the fifth factor militates strongly against
the adoption of rules. For example, in Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc.,246 the very relief that the plaintiff sought-the addition of

top-level domain names to the Domain Name System (DNS)-was the
24 7
subject of ongoing policy changes by the Clinton administration.
During the course of the Name.Space case, the Commerce Department
recommended that an internationally representative body assume
oversight of the DNS and of the role of deciding what changes, if any,
should be made to the top-level domain names. 248 Such a body was
formed and was named ICANN. With the issue of domain names still
before ICANN, the Second Circuit took a narrow/tentative approach
in upholding the denial of plaintiff's claims. Recognizing that "the
lightning speed development of the Internet poses challenges for the
common-law adjudicative process," the court fashioned a highly factspecific ruling that expressly stated the issues that it was not decid-

245
246
247
248

See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
202 F.3d 573 (2d Cir. 2000).
See id. at 578-79.
Id.
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ing.2 49 This minimalist approach makes a lot of sense given the
25 0
amount of change that was likely to occur.
There is no special formula for deciding how the factors should
be weighed. That will depend on the circumstances of each case.
However, some general observations can be made to assist courts in
that inquiry. First, courts should have less trouble with cases where all

five factors point in one direction, either all for or all against rules. In
cases where the factors are mixed, however, courts will have to evaluate each factor in the particular case. I would suggest, however, that
the first two factors should carry special importance in the final analysis. Internet-specific legislation and identification of recurring elements help to ensure that the court has the necessary information to
formulate a rule that is narrowly tailored. The third, fourth, and fifth
factors, in themselves, almost never will provide a sufficient reason to
adopt a rule. However, these factors assume greater importance if
they militate against a rule, such as if the court is dealing with an entitlement regime, an area of interdoctrinal tension or extraterritorial
spillover, or rapidly changing facts. Chart A summarizes the framework for non-constitutional issues.
ChartA. Frameworkfor Non-ConstitutionalDoctrine

Modest presumption in favor of standards and minimalist decisions (the
narrow/tentative approach)
Factors militating in favor of rules (the broad/definitive approach):
1. Existence of Interet-specific legislation, as opposed to "old law."
2.

Contemplated rule targets a recurring problem with identifiable common
elements, as opposed to a sporadic problem or problem with diverse
elements.

3.

Contemplated rule can be formulated as a general prohibition or a
regulation of the Internet's architecture and does not involve a statutory
entitlement regime for which a balance of competing interests or goals is
often necessary.

4" Contemplated rule does not cause interdoctrinal tension or extraterritorial spillover.
5.

The Internet is not changing in a way material to the contemplated rule.

249 Id. at 584-87.
250 In November 2000, ICANN agreed upon the addition of seven top-level domain names: .aero, .biz, .coop, .info, .museum, .name, and .pro. See Leslie Sorich,
Dishing Up New Domains,PC MAG., Mar. 16, 2001, .availableat 2001 WL 4946053.
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ConstitutionalCases

Deciding constitutional issues presents a special category of cases.
The decision involving a constitutional issue is likely to have several
components that do not fall neatly within a single rule/standard determination. 251 For starters, we more than likely will find a holding
that the state action (whether statute or other conduct) is unconstitutional or not. Such a holding has a rule-like effect: it tells us the statute or conduct is valid or not valid for the case before the court and
other cases. But how broad that rule is depends on the case. For
statutes, facial challenges are broader than as-applied challenges. For
conduct, challenges can target conduct that is fairly idiosyncratic or
that covers a broad range of cases.
In addition to the ultimate decision on the constitutionality of
the state action, we may examine the applicable constitutional doctrine or test for how rule-like or standard-like it is. Some tests are
more open-ended (e.g., the International Shoe test of minimum contacts),252 while others are generally categorical and outcome determi-

native (e.g., the First Amendment's proscription against viewpoint
discrimination) .253 Also, we could examine the rationale and tenor of
the opinion to see whether it suggests a broader application that
would determine the outcome of other cases beyond the issue
presented for review. Finally, we could examine the number of constitutional issues decided. Some cases may decide a host of colorable
challenges (possibly under several constitutional provisions), while
others may decide just one.
All of this is to say that constitutional issues are complex. When
we evaluate the manner question, we may be talking about several different things. I believe the manner question is less interesting with
respect to the basic decision on constitutionality (we will always have
something close to a rule), and more interesting with respect to the
issues of the applicable test or doctrine, the rationale and tenor of the
opinion, and the number of constitutional issues decided. Examining
251 The choice between rules and standards in constitutional cases occurs on at
least three levels:
[F] irst, whether the Court's own constitutional precedents ought to be construed as rules or standards; second, whether the Constitution's provisions
should be interpreted as rules or standards; and third, whether the Court, in
fashioning the operative doctrines (that is, tests and levels of scrutiny that
will guide the lower courts and the Court itself in future cases), ought to
formulate rules or standards.
Sullivan, supra note 90, at 69.
252 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319-20 (1945).
253 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
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this latter group of issues in terms of how tentative and narrow, or
broad and definitive, seems to me to be where the real fight is.
Our framework must therefore be adapted for constitutional issues. Before I propose such an adaptation, I should be explicit that
my framework is not intended to articulate a theory of constitutional
interpretation for cyberspace. That more ambitious enterpriseabout which several prominent scholars have already written 25 4-- goes
well beyond the goal of this Article. Although my framework touches
upon interpretive issues, it focuses on a much more limited inquiry
than a theory of interpretation.
I begin with a presumption for the narrow/tentative approach.
This presumption reflects a basic recognition that constitutional decisions are more serious on the hierarchy of issues and are more difficult to undo. As Ehrlich and Judge Posner have pointed out, "the
costs of changing constitutional rules are very high." 255 Accordingly,

our federal system has several features that attempt to temper the frequency with which constitutional precedent is established. 2 56 The Supreme Court has discretionary review and accepts only a modest
number of cases each Term.2 57 For statutory construction, a well-ac-

cepted canon is to interpret statutes so as to avoid raising constitutional difficulties. 2 58 Like these features, a presumption for
minimalism and the narrow/tentative approach will help to give
courts more time before "constitutionalizing" an issue. The same reasons thatjustify the presumption for a narrow/tentative approach for
254 See, e.g., LEssIG, supra note 72, at 111-21 (describing theory of"translation'-of
reading the Constitution to preserve its original meaning, but in a way that is translated to account for changing circumstances); Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution
in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty Beyond the Electronic Frontier, Address at the First
Conference on Computers, Freedom, and Privacy (Mar. 26, 1991), in Ti HuMAmIsr,
Sept.-Oct., 1991, at 15, 20-21 (advocating that constitutional interpretation ihould
be "technologically neutral" and should attempt to preserve original meaning across

changing technologies).
255 Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 90, at 280.
256 See Sunstein, supra note 102, at 21 ("Agreements on particulars and on
unambitious opinions are the ordinary stuff of constitutional law; it is rare for judges
to invoke first principles."); id. at 50 (discussing the passive virtues of refraining from

assuming jurisdiction).
257 Mark Tushnet, Foreword-TheSupreme Court, 1998 Term: The New Constitutional
Order and the Chastening of ConstitutionalAspiration, 113 HARv. L. REv. 29, 68 (1999)
("At its peak, the Court heard argument in about 170 cases per Term, whereas during
the past five years it has heard argument in fewer than one hundred cases each

year.").
258 See EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); United States ex rel.Att'y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213
U.S. 366, 408 (1909).
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non-constitutional issues-dealing with Internet speed, reducing the
risk of decisional error, and preserving contentious issues for democratic debate-also apply, perhaps even more so, when interpreting
the Constitution.
The factors to rebut the presumption are slightly different for
constitutional issues. I believe the first and third factors for non-constitutional issues-waiting for Internet-specific legislation, and relying
on general prohibitions and regulations of code-become less relevant for constitutional issues. Instead, the decision will depend primarily on the particular constitutional provision at stake as well as the
body of case law that has developed. Therefore, our constitutional
framework should focus more on doctrinal concerns. While one
could imagine a more elaborate framework, I propose three factors
for courts to consider when dealing with constitutional issues. (These
factors are substantially the same as the second, fourth, and fifth factors in our original framework.)
First, we must consider the constitutional provision at stake and
the body of case law interpreting the provision. The basic approach is
to facilitate the development of law to govern cyberspace in a way that
can be harmonized with existing case law. Ideally, the contemplated
doctrine for cyberspace should fit comfortably within existing doctrine. If courts have interpreted the constitutional provision categorically or by use of rules, a court should feel more comfortable in
applying or adopting a similar rule in the Internet context. However,
if the existing doctrine tends to favor standards or some sort of balancing test, then a court should proceed with greater caution before attempting to fashion a categorical rule for cyberspace. This approach
safeguards against creating constitutional doctrine for cyberspace that
is in tension or at odds with existing doctrine (i.e., interdoctrinal
tension).
Also, if there is very little case law that has even considered the
constitutional provision (or the intersection of different provisions),
either in the context of cyberspace or more generally, courts should
be more cautious before ruling broadly or perhaps ruling at all. Particularly where the case law provides little guidance, courts should
consider adopting a minimalist approach and attempt to leave novel
constitutional issues undecided. Far better for courts to gain some
time to understand the complexity of the issue than to decide it on
25 9
the first go-around with little, if any, guidance.
259

See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 102, at 50-51 (discussing how the maximalist

opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was preceded by a long
line of cases testing the constitutionality of the separate-but-equal principle, whereas
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Second, courts must consider whether the contemplated rule addresses a recurring problem with common elements. Courts should
refrain from establishing a broad constitutional rule if the problem is
not recurring or is too diverse to treat by simple categorization. For
example, the district court in American LibrariesAss'n v. Pataki260 held
that the dormant commerce clause prohibits states from imposing any
regulation on the Internet. 26 1 The case involved a New York state statute that attempted to regulate online indecent material2 62 -much
like the federal statute in Reno v. ACLU 263 Instead of ruling on First
Amendment grounds (as it could have), the district court in Pataki
ruled broadly under the dormant commerce clause with three separate holdings. In its broadest holding, the court ruled that "the Commerce Clause ordains that only Congress can legislate in this area,
subject, of course, to whatever limitations other provisions of the Constitution (such as the First Amendment) may require." 264 Subsequent
courts have struggled to determine the scope of this maximalist
rule. 2 65 The rule appears to be quite sweeping in scope. But it is
questionable whether it should apply to all state regulations (e.g., tax,
anti-fraud, anti-gambling, anti-indecency, and consumer protection),
particularly those that do not impose inconsistent or unworkable obligations. 2 66 Moreover, future technologies could facilitate greater geothe maximalist opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford,60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), was the
first of its kind).
260 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
261 Id. at 183-84.
262 Id. at 161.
263 521 U.S. 844, 858 (1997).
264 Patak4 969 F. Supp. at 169.
265 Compare Ford Motor Corp. v. Tex. Dep't. of Transp., 106 F. Supp. 2d 905, 909
(W.D. Tex. 2000) (rejecting argument that Patakishould be interpreted to invalidate
all state regulatory measures that apply to the Internet), Hatch v. Super. Ct., 94 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 453, 471-72 (Ct. App. 2000) (distinguishing Patakiand upholding state statute prohibiting the knowing distribution over the Internet of harmful material to a
minor with the intent of sexually arousing and seducing the minor), and People v.
Foley, 692 N.Y.S.2d 248, 256 (N.Y. 2000) (rejecting dormant commerce clause challenge to state seduction statute), with People v. Barrows, 677 N.Y.S.2d 672, 685 (Sup.
Ct. 1998) (applying Patakito dismiss guilty verdict under state seduction statute to the
extent communications involved interstate transmission).
266 See Ford Motor, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 909 ("Although the [I]nternet is a mighty
powerful tool, it is not so potent as to demolish every state's regulatory schemes as
they apply to the sale of goods and services."). Jack Goldsmith and Alan Sykes provide
a compelling argument for rejecting the broad reading of Patakiand for recognizing
that the dormant commerce clause allows at least some state regulation of the Internet. See generally Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785 (2001).
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graphical filtering or differentiation among individual states to satisfy
any dormant commerce clause concerns. The Pataki court might
have delivered a better decision if it had adopted a minimalist approach and rested its decision on the two narrower holdings of the
case, 2 67 or, perhaps better yet, on First Amendment grounds.
Finally, courts should consider whether the rapidly developing
nature of the Internet militates against the use of a rule or a maximalist approach. Because constitutional rules take more to undo, we
should be wary of establishing a rule that relates to a technology that
is changing. The classic example is electronic surveillance devices, the
use of which the Supreme Court first held did not constitute a search
under the Fourth Amendment but overruled that holding some forty
years later. 268 Instead of deciding one way or the other, the Court

could have left the issue undecided until it (and other courts) had
more time to mull over how the Fourth Amendment should be applied to the developing technology. One might reasonably conjecture
that it would have taken the Court less than forty years to reach the
same result, that electronic eavesdropping is a search, had it not decided the first case so early. Chart B summarizes the framework for
constitutional doctrine.
Chart B. Frameworkfor ConstitutionalDoctrine

Modest presumption in favor of standards and minimalist decisions (the
narrow/tentative approach)
Factors militating in favor of rules (the broad/definitive approach):
1. Existence of case law favoring rule-like or categorical treatment for cases
involving the constitutional provision at stake
a. as opposed to standard-like, fact-specific treatment, or
b. dearth of case law/doctrinal test regarding the constitutional
provision.
2.

The contemplated constitutional rule addresses a recurring problem that
has common elements.

3. The Internet is not changing in a way material to the contemplated rule.

267 The court held that the New York state statute violated the dormant commerce
clause because (1) it regulated conduct wholly outside the state, and (2) it imposed
an undue burden on interstate commerce. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 173-74, 177.
268 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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APPLICATION OF THE FRANmiwoRK

To illustrate how the framework works in practice, I apply it to
four cases: Reno v. ACLU,2 69 United States v. Microsoft Corp.,2 70 Zeran v.
America Online, Inc.,2 71 and UniversalCity Studios, Inc. v. Corley.2 72 I be-

lieve the analysis shows that the courts in Reno and Microsoft were right
to adopt a fact-specific approach, while the court in Zeran was right to
adopt a categorical approach. But I believe that the court in Corley
was wrong to adopt a categorical approach when most factors militated in favor of caution.
A.

Reno v. ACLU

We should begin our discussion with Reno v. ACLU,273 which provides one of the narrow/tentative approach for constitutional doctrine in the cyberspace context. At issue was the constitutionality of
two provisions of the CDA,2 74 which Congress enacted amidst much
furor (some of it overblown) about the amount of pornographic material online. 275 One provision criminalized the knowing transmission
over the Internet of obscene or "indecent" material to any recipient
under eighteen years of age, while the other provision criminalized
the knowing sending or displaying to a person under eighteen years
of age any message "that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs." 276 The Supreme Court
affirmed the lower: court's decision 27 7 and declared the two chal278
lenged provisions unconstitutional.
269 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
270

271
272
273
274

253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).
129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).

273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).

275 SeeANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE INTERNET IS PUTTING INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW 34-39 (1999).

276

47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d) (Supp. V 1999).

277 In the lower court, a three-judge panel concluded that the challenged provisions of the CDA were unconstitutional on their face as violative of the First Amendment. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 828 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The decision was
supported by three separate opinions, each falling at slightly different places on the
rules/standards continuum. Compare id. at 856 (Sloviter, C.J.) (adopting a narrow,
fact-specific approach), and id. at 859 (Buckwalter,J.) (same), with id. at 881 (Dalzell,
J.) (arguing for a First Amendment rule to prohibit any government regulation of
indecent material on the Internet).

278

Reno, 521 U.S. at 885.

1340

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL- 77:5

The Court's opinion, which was written by Justice Stevens, is a
hybrid of rules and standards, but it ultimately strikes a cautious tenor
that is consistent with the minimalist approach. 2 79 The decision articulates two rules: (1) the challenged provisions of the CDA are unconstitutional, and (2) strict scrutiny applies to regulations of indecent
speech on the Internet. 28 0 Yet these rules do not fall too far on the
rules end of the spectrum, for they do not tell us much about the
constitutionality of future indecency statutes. The opinion is fact specific and at least holds out the possibility that a more narrowly tailored
statute could survive constitutional scrutiny.281 The Court's fact-specific approach makes considerable sense when considered under our
framework.
1. Guidance from and Fit with Other Cases
First, the Court's decision fits comfortably within First Amendment doctrine, yet leaves much room to maneuver. Holding that content-based regulations of the Internet are subject to strict scrutiny
essentially treats the Internet the same as the vast majority of cases in
First Amendment law.2 8 2 And, although strict scrutiny does carry a

rule-like bite, the opinion leaves room for further attempts from the
government to regulate indecent online material. The Court chose
not to consider whether the First Amendment prohibits Congress
from regulating protected speech on the Internet at all 28 5 and limited
its decision to the CDA and the state of technology for the Internet as
found by the district court.28 4 Strikingly absent from the Court's and

Justice O'Connor's opinions is any suggestion that regulations of online indecent speech are presumptively unconstitutional. Since the
case was the first in which the Court applied the First Amendment to
279

See Sunstein, supra note 102, at 25.

280 Reno, 521 U.S. at 868-70, 885.
281 Id. at 879. The Court noted the possible alternatives to the CDA,
such as requiring that indecent material be "tagged" in a way that facilitates
parental control of material coming into their homes, making exceptions for
messages with artistic or educational value, providing some tolerance for parental choice, and regulating some portions of the Internet-such as commercial websites-differently than others, such as chat rooms.
Id. The Court's opinion is minimalist also in that the Court declined to consider the
Fifth Amendment vagueness challenge and the issue of whether the CDA was unconstitutional because it had extraterritorial application. See id. at 864, 878 n.45.
282 Id. at 870 (stating that "our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of
First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium").
283 See id. at 863 n.30.
284 See id. at 876-79.
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the Internet, the first factor in our framework cuts against a broad
ruling.
2.

Not a Recurring Problem with Common Elements

Second, Reno was a poor case for the Court to rule broadly because the case failed to present a recurring problem with common
elements. Indeed, part of the problem of the CDA was that it was
overbroad and swept in vast amounts of speech that should be permitted.285 As the Court noted, the CDA's sweeping and undefined proscription against "indecent" material could possibly apply to serious
discussion about "prison rape or safe sexual practices, artistic images
that contain nude subjects, and arguably the card catalogue of the
Carnegie Library."2 86 Moreover, the availability of sexually indecent
material on the Internet is a problem that varies with age. 287 While

the government certainly has a legitimate interest in regulating the
amount of indecent material available to children, the strength of that
interest diminishes as the child (or adolescent) gets closer to maturity.28 8 It was sufficiently clear from the legislative history that Con-

gress failed to do its homework in identifying precisely what the
problem was. 289 As the Court concluded, "Particularly in the light of
the absence of any detailed findings by the Congress, or even hearings
addressing the special problems of the CDA, we are persuaded that
the CDA is not narrowly tailored if that requirement has any meaning
°
at all. '' 29
Because the CDA was so poorly drafted, it presented a poor case
for the Court to rule broadly. The Court did not have chance to consider whether a more narrowly drawn statute might survive constitu285 See id. at 874.
286 Id. at 878; see also id. at 867 ("The GDA's broad categorical prohibitions are not
limited to particular times and are not dependent on any evaluation by an agency
familiar with the unique characteristics of the Internet.").
287 See id. at 878.
288 See id. As the Court concluded:
It is at least clear that the strength of the Government's interest in protecting minors is not equally strong throughout the coverage of this broad statute. Under the GDA, a parent allowing a 17-year-old to use the family
computer to obtain information on the Internet that she, in her parental
judgment, deems appropriate could face a lengthy prison term.
Id.
289 Id. at 857-59 (describing how the GDA provisions "were either added in executive committee after hearings were concluded or as amendments offered during floor
debate" on legislation (the Telecommunications Act of 1996) that "had nothing to do
with the Internet").
290 Id. at 879.
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tional scrutiny. By ruling narrowly, the Court's opinion in essence
says that the CDA is a problem but other statutes may not be. A year
later, Congress did in fact attempt to remedy the constitutional defects of the CDA by enacting the Child Online Protection Act
(COPA), 29 1 a much more carefully drafted statute. Although the constitutionality of COPA is still in doubt,29 2 the Court's decision in Reno
prudently allows (and perhaps invites) further efforts by Congress to
293
regulate indecent online material.
3.

Rapid Changes Possible

Finally, the rapidly changing nature of the Internet militated in
favor of caution. Indeed, perhaps the most perplexing cyber-challenge in Reno was the rapidly changing nature of age-verification technology. The CDA contained a safe-harbor provision, which shielded
from prosecution anyone who restricted online access based on an
age-verification system. 294 If an age-verification system were technologically and economically feasible, the government's contention that
the CDA was narrowly tailored would stand on much stronger
295
footing.
Part of the problem for the Court was that the state of age verification technology had changed-and improved-since the time the
291 47 U.S.C. § 231 (Supp. V 1999). COPA contains two major changes from the
CDA to address the Court's concerns. First, COPA only targets commercial websites
or websites "engaged in the business" of making communications that fall within the
purview of COPA. Id. § 231(e) (2) (A). Second, COPA only targets material that is
"harmful to minors," which the statute carefully defines based on the obscenity definition in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-25 (1973). 47 U.S.C. § 231 (e) (6).
292 See ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming the grant of a preliminary injunction against application of COPA on First Amendment grounds), cert.
granted sub nom. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 532 U.S 1037 (2001).
293 Lawrence Lessig and Paul Resnick have proposed an interesting alternative to
COPA, which they contend is less restrictive and thus "constitutionally preferred." See
Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, Zoning Speech on the Internet: A Legal and Technical
Mode4 98 MIcH. L. REv. 395, 416-22 (1999). Instead of requiring (as under COPA)
that senders of indecent material block transmission of such material except to those
who identified themselves as adults, Lessig and Resnick propose regulation that would
"require senders to block only self-identifying kids" who could be identified if parents
voluntarily choose a "kids-mode-browser" that would identify to the server that the
user is a minor. Id. at 416.
294 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5) (Supp. III 1997).
295 Even had the government shown that an adult-verification system was feasible,
it is not clear that the statute would have been upheld. The Court also took issue with
the reliability of an age-verification system and made much of the fact that the government had "failed to adduce any evidence that these verification techniques actually
preclude minors from posing as adults." Reno, 521 U.S. at 882.
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lower court had made its factual findings. As Stuart Benjamin points
out, several of the key factual findings on which the Court relied were
arguably stale (or, at the very least, in the process of change) by the
time the Court rendered its decision.2 9 6 First, chatrooms, listservs,
and newsgroups had become available on the Web, thereby making
age verification-contrary to the Court's conclusion-technologically
possible for these modes of communication.2 97 Second, there was at
least some indication that the market for age-verification technology
had changed in a way to make age verification much more available
even to noncommercial websites: providers of age-verification services
had begun paying websites to provide them with age-verification services. 298 This development makes less tenable the Court's conclusion
2 99
that age verification was cost-prohibitive on the Net.

The Court responded to these rapid changes by limiting its decision. In the majority opinionJustice Stevens took care to describe the
296 Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly ChangingFacts
and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REv. 269, 290-96 (1999); see also Lawrence Lessig,
What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering,38 JUIMETRXcS J. 629, 648 n.51
(1998) (discussing how several of the findings of fact in Reno did not accurately describe the state of the technology as it had developed).
297 Benjamin, supra note 296, at 291.
298 Id. at 292.
299 Two years after Reno was decided, the cost of an adult-verification system came.
up again in considering the constitutionality of COPA, Congress's second attempt to
regulate indecent online material. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 482 (E.D..Pa.
1999), affd, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. grantedsub nom. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 532
U.S. 1037 (2001). What is interesting to note is that the argument that an adultverification system was cost prohibitive appears to have been all but abandoned. The
plaintiffs' own expert witness testified "that the out-of-pocket costs associated with
complying with COPA did not constitute the real economic burden on content providers, but rather it was the economic harm that would result from loss of traffic to the
site that constituted the problem." Id. at 491. The plaintiffs' main argument was that
an adult-verification system would result in loss of anonymity to customers or more
cumbersome registration requirements, which in turn would deter customers from
accessing the website. Id. at 479. The government argued, with some force, that the
economic costs of complying with COPA's statutory defense and adopting an adult
verification system were not substantial or unreasonable for website operators. Id. at
494. The government offered the testimony of the CEO of Adult Check, a company
that provides free adult-verification services to websites. Id. at 489. The costs of Adult
Check's verification service are imposed not on the website, but on the Internet user,
who must pay $16.95 per year to obtain an adult verification number. Id. at 490. The
district court, although stopping short of making a finding on the issue, noted the
possibility that "most of the plaintiffs would be able to afford the cost of implementing and maintaining their sites if they [the sites] add credit card or adult verification
screens." Id. at 494-95. And, in the end, the court did not mention implementation
costs as one of the burdens imposed by COPA. Id. at 492, 494-95.
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Internet as it "presently" existed-presumably as it existed at the time
of the Court's (or the district court's) decision. 300 Justice Stevens conceded, however, that the Internet is "constantly evolving and difficult
to categorize precisely." 30 1 Likewise,Justice O'Connor in her separate
opinion recognized that "gateway technology" was making age verification feasible for chat rooms and USENET newsgroups and was becoming more available on the Internet. 30 2 Justice O'Connor found
that such technology-although "promising" as a possible way to zone
the Internet-was not yet available throughout the Internet as it existed then in

1997.303

All told, the factors in our constitutional framework support the
Court's narrow, fact-specific approach. Nearly all of the factors in our
framework, particularly the evidence of technological change, signaled the need for caution. For being the very first Supreme Court
decision involving the Internet, the opinion seems to get the manner
question just right. Reno forced Congress to deliberate about the issue
harder, and, within a short amount of time, Congress was able to enact legislation (COPA) that was much more carefully drafted. Even if
COPA does not survive constitutional scrutiny, the minimalist approach taken in Reno has fostered greater deliberation and more considered judgment about an important issue of public concern.

300 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 850-51 (describing the Internet as "presently constituted"); id. at 856 n.22 ("For that reason, at the time of tria credit card verification was
'effectively unavailable to a substantial number of Internet content providers.'" (emphasis added)); id. at 876-77 ("The District Court found that at the time of trialexisting
technology did not include any effective method for a sender to prevent minors from
obtaining access to its communications on the Internet without also denying access to
adults." (emphasis added)).
301 Id. at 851. Justice Stevens drew upon the district court's findings of fact. See
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 828 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("Once one has access to the
Internet, there are a wide variety of different methods of communication and information exchange over the network. These many methods of communication and information retrieval are constantly evolving and are therefore difficult to categorize
concisely."). This finding was reiterated in the subsequent case involving the challenge to COPA. See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 482 ("These many methods of
communication and information retrieval [on the Internet] are constantly evolving
and are therefore difficult to categorize concisely.").
302 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 891 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part).
303 See id. ("Until gateway technology is available throughout cyberspace, and it is
not in 1997, a speaker cannot be reasonably assured that the speech he displays will
reach only adults because it is impossible to confine speech to an 'adult zone.'" (emphasis added)).
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B. United States v. Microsoft Corp.
s°4
The D.C. Circuit's decision in United States v. Microsoft Corp.
provides perhaps the best example of the narrow approach in the statutory context. Although the opinion is partially maximalist in its theorizing about the complexities of the issues it faced,30 5 the key holdings
of the case are minimalist. They focus much more on reviewing factual findings and evidence than on articulating broad rules to govern
future cases. For example, the court of appeals's (partial) affirmance
of the finding of § 2 liability under the Sherman Act for Microsoft's
unlawful maintenance of a monopoly is based on a deferential review
of the lower court's findings of fact.30 6 In addition, the reversal of the
district court's finding of attempted monopolization is based on a very
fact-specific review.30 7 And the D.C. Circuit's reversal of the lower
court's remedy is based in part on the lower court's failure to hold an
evidentiary hearing.3 08 Given the rapidly changing nature of the computer software market, the court of appeals found it highly problematic that the trial court would order a divestiture of Microsoft without
30 9
obtaining more current evidence.
The D.C. Circuit's most explicit use of the narrow/tentative approach can be found in its reversal of Judge Jackson's determination
of unlawful tying under § 1 of the Sherman Act based on Microsoft's
bundling of its Internet browser, Internet Explorer, with its popular
operating system software, Windows.3 10 The court of appeals held
that the fact-specific rule of reason-and not the per se analysis under
the "separate products" test 3 11 applied by the lower court-should apply to determine the legality of tying arrangements involving platform
software.31 2 The court emphasized at the end of its opinion just how
narrow it was, cautioning that "[w]hile our reasoning may at times
appear to have broader force, we do not have confidence to speak to
facts outside the record, which contains scant discussion of software

304

See 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).

305
306

See id. at 48-51.
See id. at 50-80.

307 See id. at 80 ("The determination whether a dangerous probability of success
exists is a particularly fact-intensive inquiry.").
308
309
310

See id. at 101.
See id. at 49.
See id. at 84.

311 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62
(1992) (elaborating the test); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,
12-18 (1984) (same).
312 Microsoft, 253 F.3d. at 84.
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integration generally." 3 13 I would like to focus here because it is the
most interesting part of the opinion for our purposes. When analyzed
under our framework, the D.C. Circuit's ruling on tying makes considerable sense.
1. Old Law
As mentioned before, the statute at issue in the Microsoft case is
an old law (the Sherman Act of 1890314) that developed in the days of

the oil barons and railroads. At the outset of its opinion, the D.C.
Circuit noted the contentious debate "over the extent to which 'old
economy' monopolization doctrines should apply to firms competing
in dynamic technological markets characterized by network effects. '3 15 Under our framework, the fact that the Sherman Act was
written over a hundred years before the advent of the Internet cuts
against a broad ruling applied to the Internet context.
2.

Lack of Information To Identify a Recurring Problem with
Common Elements

The factor that militates most strongly against the broad/definitive approach is the lack of information the court possessed to identify
a recurring problem with common elements. The D.C. Circuit was
acutely aware of the Supreme Court's admonition that "[i]t is only
after considerable experience with certain business relationships that
courts classify them as per se violations. '3 16 The court of appeals had
little trouble in concluding that the Microsoft case presented "entire,
novel categories of dealings" and that it was the "first up-close look at
the technological integration of added functionality into software that
serves as a platform for third-party applications. '3 17 After canvassing
the prior antitrust cases that might speak to the issue, the D.C. Circuit
concluded that (1) "the sort of tying arrangement attacked here is
unlike any the Supreme Court has considered,"' 318 and (2) only four
lower court cases involved antitrust claims of alleged tying arrangements involving software, but none of those cases dealt with the issue
in any depth.3 1 9 Given the "paucity of cases examining software bun313

Id. at 95.

314 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
315 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 49.
316 Id. at 84 (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972))
(emphasis omitted).

317 Id.
318 Id. at 90.
319 Id. at 91-92.
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dling," the D.C. Circuit concluded that there is "a high risk that per se
analysis may produce inaccurate results," even to the extent of
"stunt[ing] valuable innovation."3 20
The D.C. Circuit's opinion provides a model for how courts
should analyze this second factor. The court's awareness of its own
limitations deserves special recognition, particularly in the following
passage:
We cannot comfortably say that bundling in platform software markets has so little "redeeming virtue," and that there would be so
"very little loss to society" from its ban, that "an inquiry into its costs
in the individual case [can be] considered [ ] unnecessary." We do
not have enough empirical evidence regarding the effect of
Microsoft's practice on the amount of consumer surplus created or
consumer choice foreclosed by the integration of added functionality into platform software to exercise sensible judgment regarding
that entire class of behavior. (For some issues we have no data.)
"We need to know more than we do about the actual impact of
these arrangement on competition to decide whether they .. .
32
should be classified as per se violations of the Sherman Act." '
The court's analysis correctly focuses on whether it had sufficient
information to identify a recurring problem to fashion a per se rule
for software bundling. Because the court concluded that it did not, it
was correct in rejecting a per se rule and adopting a more narrow,
322
fact-specific ruling. The risk of error was too high.
3.

General Prohibition with Some Need for Balancing

The third factor also militates against the broad/definitive approach. Although a per se rule against tying might be considered a
general prohibition, that rule applies only to situations where courts
have had considerable experience in identifying tying arrangements
that have so little redeeming value. In a wide range of cases, the factspecific rule of reason applies because of the need for balancing the

320

Id. at 92.

321 Id. at 94 (internal citations omitted).
322 The D.C. Circuit was also right to suggest that the risk of error in adopting a
per se rule could harm innovation by precluding beneficial or productive integration
of software. Id. at 92-93.
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potential benefits of the tying arrangements. 323 As the D.C. Circuit
'3 24
aptly stated, "Not all ties are bad.
4. Interdoctrinal Tension
The fourth factor also cuts against a broad ruling. The court's
decision on tying fits more comfortably within the body of antitrust
case law, in which most tying arrangements are analyzed under the
rule of reason. As the D.C. Circuit repeatedly mentioned, the per se
"separate products" test is reserved for those cases in which courts
have gained "considerable experience" in analyzing the alleged tying
arrangement. It would be surprising if a court could gain such experience in the very first case in which it considered the issue.
5.

Material Changes to the Internet and Technologically Dynamic
Markets

Finally, the D.C. Circuit was right to proceed cautiously in light of
the rapid changes to the Internet browser and platform software markets. Throughout its analysis, the court was sensitive to the fact that it
was dealing with a technologically dynamic area,3 25 "where programs
change very rapidly, '3 26 and "where product development is especially
unlikely to follow an easily foreseen linear pattern. '3 27 Indeed, at the

outset of its opinion, the D.C. Circuit conceded the difficulty of dealing with rapidly changing technology. 328 This factor alone may well

have justified the court's narrow ruling.
C. Zeran v. AOL
3 29
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.
provides a good contrast to the narrow/tentative approach in Reno
and Microsoft. The decision embraces the broad/definitive approach
and establishes a categorical rule protecting Internet Service Providers
from tort liability.

323

Id. at 94 ("That rule more freely permits consideration of the benefits of bun-

dling in software markets, particularly those for OSs [operating systems], and a balancing of these benefits against the costs to consumers whose ability to make direct
price/quality tradeoffs in the tied market may have been impaired.").
324 Id. at 87.
325 See id. at 93-94.
326 Id. at 93.
327 Id. at 94.
328 See id. at 49.
329 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
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In the case, Ken Zeran sued America Online (AOL), his ISP, 330
for failing to take steps to retract several allegedly defamatory
messages that someone posted on AOL's interactive service about
him.3 3 1 The message falsely purported to be from "Ken" (with Zeran's

phone number) and offered for sale T-shirts with offensive slogans
about the bombing of the Oklahoma federal building shortly after the
incident. 33 2 Zeran received numerous phone calls and even death
33 3
threats from people offended by the messages.
In response to Zeran's lawsuit, AOL asserted a defense of immunity based on 47 U.S.C. § 230.334 Section 230 states, "No provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as a publisher
or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider."33 5 In a somewhat roundabout way, this provision gives
ISPs immunity from liability for defamatory comments made by thirdparty users of their Internet service. However, the scope of the immunity conferred by § 230 is not altogether clear. One ambiguity is
whether ISPs can be treated as "distributors" of information and, thus,
be held liable for defamation if they knew or had reason to know of
the allegedly defamatory content.
That issue was decided by the Fourth Circuit in Zeran.336 Chief
Judge Wilkinson wrote an opinion that is emblematic ofjudicial maximalism and a strong rules position. First, the court held that the
"plain language" of § 230 resolved the issue 337 -even though § 230
nowhere mentions "distributors" or states that it is impermissible to
treat ISPs as "distributors. ''3s3 Perhaps recognizing this ambiguity, the
court attempted to bolster its interpretation by relying on general
principles of tort law. According to the court, distributor liability is a
subset of publisher liability because "every repetition of a defamatory
330 AOL is commonly known as an Online Service Provider (OSP) because it provides notjust access to the Internet, but a large amount of its own content to its users.
For purposes of the case, however, the technical distinction does not make a
difference.
331 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329.
332 Id.
333 Id. at 329-30.
334 This part of the CDA was not up for challenge in Reno v. ACLU.
335 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1) (Supp. V 1999).
336 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
337 Id.
338 See Developments in the Law-The Long Arm of Cyber-Reach, 112 HARv. L. REv.
1610, 1613 (1999) (arguing that § 230 "did not explicitly exempt ISPs from distributor liability, and its specific reference to 'publisher or speaker' is evidence that Congress intended to leave distributor liability intact").
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statement is considered a publication," including repetitions made by
3 9
a distributor.
ChiefJudge Wilkinson did not stop there. In another maximalist
move, the court enunciated two broad purposes of § 230 to justify its
interpretation. Put simply, Zeran's lawsuit was anathema to the purposes of § 230-which the court divined from the legislative findings
in the statute-to avoid excessive government regulation of the Internet and to promote self-regulation by industry and private
340
individuals.
The Fourth Circuit's holding has all the hallmarks of a maximalist rule. The holding is categorical and is grounded in a grand theory
of Internet regulation. When faced with the choice between adopting
a clear rule of immunity and a rule subject to a more complex, factspecific exception, the court opted for the clear, categorical rule.
Under § 230, ISPs are immune from all tort liability based on defamatory content on the Internet originating from a third party.3 4 1 There

3 42
is no exception.
The Fourth Circuit's categorical decision is supported by consideration of our framework (for non-constitutional doctrine).

339 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332 (citing PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 36, § 113, at
810).
340 See id. at 331-33.
341 Because the perpetrator of the online prank was not identified, Zeran was left
with no legal remedy for the injuries he suffered. He lost his case against an
Oklahoma radio station that broadcast contents of the false message that resulted in
numerous death threats against him. See Carl S. Kaplan, Another Legal Defeatfor Victim
of Online Hoax, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, Feb. 4, 2000, at http://www.nytimes.com/
library/tech/00/02/cyber/cyberlaw /O4Iaw.html.
342 Subsequent cases have only strengthened the broad sweep of immunity recognized by Zeran. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 53 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that, under § 230, AOL was immune from suit brought by Sydney Blumenthal for
allegedly defamatory material published in Drudge Report, for which AOL had contracted and paid Matt Drudge to provide online); Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore,
104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 776-80 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the city was immune
under § 230 from suit by parent who alleged that her son downloaded sexually explicit photographs from the Internet using the public library's computers); Stoner v.
eBay, Inc., No. 305666, 2000 WL 1705637, at *4-*5 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Nov.
1, 2000) (holding that under § 230 eBay was immune from state claim based on sale
of "bootleg copies" of sound recordings on its auction); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 718
So. 2d 385, 389 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1998) (holding that under § 230 AOL was immune
from suit brought by mother of minor whose address was obtained on the Internet by
pedophile, who made a videotape of himself with the minor).
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1. Internet-Specific Legislation
First, the case involved Internet-specific legislation. Congress enacted § 230 in response to several court decisions that appeared to
create inconsistent standards for determining defamation liability
against ISPs. 3 43 Zeran is not a case in which the court was facing the
old law/new technology problem. The statutory provision is directed
to specific conduct that applies solely to the Internet. Thus, to the
extent that the court ,vas creating new doctrine, it would be fairly
cabined to the Internet context and ISPs.
2.

Recurring Problem with Common Elements

Second, the case involved a recurring problem with common elements: whether ISPs can be held liable for defamation based on content posted by third-party users of their services. 344 The prospect of
liability raised several practical problems for ISPs. Part of the problem
is that it is exceedingly difficult for ISPs to monitor all of the stray
comments that the many users of their services might post on the Internet. If ISPs could be held liable based on how much knowledge
they had of the offending material, then they might have a disincentive to monitor or screen for offensive materials on their own. The
Zeran court had the benefit of two conflicting lines of cases that had
dealt with the problem of ISP liability already as well as Congress's
response to those cases. And, given the increasing number of Internet users, one could reasonably anticipate that the number of defamation lawsuits against ISPs would only grow if they did not have
federal immunity.
Interpreting § 230 to allow distributor liability, as Zeran had
sought, probably would have only compounded this monitoring prob343 Compare Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 142 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (holding that, in a suit for defamation based on content posted on the Internet
by a third party, the ISP should be treated as a "distributor" and thus be subject to
liability only if it knew or had reason to know of the defamatory content), with Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *3 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (holding that an ISP which exercised sufficient "editorial control" over information posted through its services should be treated as a "publisher" of
information and thus be liable for defamation without proof of knowledge of the
defamatory content).
344 If limited to defamation liability, the problem is fairly well-defined. ISP liability
in other areas of law has to be examined in context. She, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)
(Supp. V 1999) (providing a safe-harbor provision for ISPs under copyright law); Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service ProviderLiability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the FirstAmendment, 88 GEo. LJ. 1833 (2000) (examining ISP liability
and the DMCA's safe harbor).
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lem. In essence, an exception to § 230 would have swallowed the rule
of immunity and would have given ISPs every incentive to remove any
material that anyone claimed was defamatory. The Fourth Circuit was
correct in concluding that ISPs "would have a natural incentive simply
to remove messages upon notification, whether the contents were defamatory or not"345-a result that would likely chill the freedom of
speech on the Net.
3.

General Prohibition

Third, § 230 is a general prohibition written in fairly broad terms.
The Fourth Circuit was not dealing with intellectual property or a regime of entitlements for which a balancing of interests is typically necessary. Section 230 applies across the board to anyone who sues an
ISP for tort liability based on the content posted by a third party. On
its face, the section does not contain exceptions or qualifications to its
basic prohibition. 346 Although Congress could have written the provision in a more straightforward manner, the Zeran court's interpretation gives it that quality.
4.

No Interdoctrinal Tension or Extraterritorial Spillover

Moreover, the legal issue presented in Zeran was fairly discrete.
This was not a case in which the court's interpretation of a statute
would be difficult to fit within the existing body of law. To the extent
that § 230's immunity takes away a cause of action under state tort law,
it does so only in a limited instance (and one in which it was not at all
clear that such a cause of action existed in the Internet context). I
think it is safe to assume that defamation doctrine will suffer no major
damage from the Zeran court's ruling. Nor is there any sign that the
decision will result in excessive extraterritorial spillover.
5.

No Material Changes to the Technology

Finally, there was no evidence that future technology would alter
the nature of the problem. Zeran did not contend, for example, that
the burdens imposed on ISPs by distributor liability might diminish in
the future with new technology. If anything, the problem of ISP liability would persist (and perhaps worsen) in the future as the number of
Internet users continued to grow. The basic problem is that people
can say a lot of different things, some of them nasty and malicious.
The Net may in fact embolden people (who are so inclined) to say
345
346

Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.
47 U.S.C. § 230 (Supp. V 1999).
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malicious things about others, given the level of anonymity and indirectness of contact that cyberspace can offer. 347
Putting the factors together presents a fairly strong case in favor
of the Fourth Circuit's categorical approach. This is one case in
which the factors align largely in favor of the broad/definitive approach. Although the plain language of § 230 may not be as plain as
the court suggested, the court's interpretation is a reasonable one.
The court ruled broadly, but sensibly, given all the information it had.
I should acknowledge, however, that contrary views of Zeran do
exist. Susan Freiwald provides the most thorough and trenchant critique of Zeran.3 48 Adopting an approach based on comparative institutional analysis, 349 Freiwald criticizes both Congress's enactment of
§ 230 and the Fourth Circuit's broad interpretation of the provision in
Zeran. Based on the overall assumption that the social policy goal
should be cost-effective defamation reduction, Freiwald concludes
that (1) courts are better suited to achieving that goal, (2) the statute
enacted by Congress was therefore less desirable from the standpoint
of comparative institutional analysis and was also "one-sided" (in failing to recognize the needs of victims of online defamation), and (3)
to achieve the social policy goal of cost-effective defamation reduction, the Zeran court should have taken a more activist approach to
statutory interpretation by recognizing that § 230 does not immunize
3 50
ISPs from distributor liability.
While Freiwald presents a worthy goal of more critically analyzing
and comparing different institutions and the roles they play in crafting the law, I disagree with her particular model and her critique of
347 See Lessig, supra note 146, at 1750 ("The ability to appear invisibly on a network and slander, or harass or assault, certainly will increase the incidence of those on
the network who slander, or harass or assault.").
348 Susan Freiwald, Comparative InstitutionalAnalysis in Cyberspace: The Case of Intermediary Liabilityfor Defamation, 14 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 569 (2001).
349 Freiwald builds on Neil Komesar's participation-centered model. See NEIL K
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND

POLICY (1994). Freiwald describes the process of comparative institutional
analysis as follows:
[T]he comparative institutional analyst first chooses the social policy goal to
be promoted. Then, the analyst determines which groups would be most
affected by a legal change and considers how the costs of participation inherent in each institution compare with the expected benefits of using the institution. Under the participation-centered approach, actors' collective
willingness to participate in a given institution determines that institution's
competence.
Freiwald, supra note 348, at 577.
350 Freiwald, supra note 348, at 572-73.
PUBLIC
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Zeran. None of my response to Freiwald's article should be read, however, as a rejection of the enterprise of comparing institutions. That
enterprise is laudable, and I will be the first to concede that my framework does not go far enough in describing the interrelationships
among the courts, Congress, the Executive, and administrative agencies in establishing law for the Internet. Freiwald's contribution is significant in calling to attention this need.
My major objection to Freiwald's comparative institutional approach is that it is based on an assumption about the "social policy goal
at the outset."3 5 1 By assuming the social policy goal at the outset,

Freiwald's approach seems to slant the analysis. If one assumes a social policy goal that is different from the one actually adopted in a law
or statute, one will more than likely be critical of the particular enactment by Congress and its interpretation by the courts. Freiwald's analysis of § 230's immunity provides a telling example. Freiwald assumes
that the social policy goal is-or should be-"cost-effective defamation reduction." 35 2 But that clearly was not the goal of Congress in
enacting § 230, at least not its overriding goal. The statute itself lists
five findings and five policies, none of which speaks to cost-effective
defamation reduction.3 5 3 Instead, most of the concerns relate to promoting the development of the Internet, minimizing the amount of
governmental regulation of the Internet, and removing disincentives
for ISPs to develop and use filtering technologies. If those are in fact
the goals, then one may view § 230 in a dramatically different and
354
more positive light.

351 Id. at 575.
352 Id. at 597.
353 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a), (b) (Supp. V 1999).
354 Even if the goal is cost-effective defamation reduction, I believe the analysis
should take into account also the availability of defamation liability against the author
of the alleged defamatory message-something that Freiwald does not focus on. See
Freiwald, supra note 348, at 585. A systemic problem may exist if there were a significant number of individuals like Zeran who did not know the identity of the tortfeasor
and were left essentially without remedy. But if the number of such cases is small,
then one might question whether any problem with cost-effective reduction of defamation exists. One should also take into account alternative remedies. If there is a
significant problem with anonymous defamers escaping detection on the Internet,
one could target the problem that allows such anonymous defamation to escape detection, such as by requiring verified identification as a condition for use of an ISP's
service, creating uniform disclosure rules to allow access to the identity of an Internet
user responsible for alleged defamation, and perhaps even the availability of punitive
damages or other stiff sanctions for online defamation that is proven to have occurred
with an attempt by the publisher of the defamatory content to remain anonymous
and escape detection. Arguably, any of these measures might help to achieve costeffective defamation reduction for Internet communications, and each could be
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Moreover, Freiwald gives little explanation for the process by
which one settles on the assumed social policy goal. Though she acknowledges that the choice of a social policy goal "may not be straightforward... because many public policy questions involve pursuit of
several social policy goals, and selection of a single social policy goal
may be deeply contested, 355 Freiwald nevertheless espouses a simplified analysis "by assuming the goal rather than providing a detailed
56

proof."-

And once the assumed social policy goal is settled upon, the analysis isjust as problematic. After determining the assumed social policy
goal, the analyst is apparently supposed to determine which institution would better facilitate the participation of all affected or interested parties in the attainment of that social policy goal. But this, in
the end, is based on pure intuitions, as Freiwald concedes, rather than
3 57
any concrete evidence or data.

Freiwald's approach neither asks nor answers whether one institution is better equipped to make the initial selection of a social policy
goal. This is somewhat surprising because the aim of her article is to
have decisionmakers concentrate more on institutional comparisons.
If that is the aim, then it seems appropriate to analyze whether one
institution or another is better able to handle the selection of what
social policy goal to embrace. For if one institution is, on average,
better at deciding social policy goals, then it may be more suitable for
other institutions to refrain from second-guessing those decisions or
substituting their own decisions, particularly if they are inherently political or contestable. My framework is premised on the view that Congress is more appropriate for policymaking than the courts, in terms
358 I
of both institutional competence and furthering political debate.
adopted along with § 230's immunity for ISPs-if anonymous defamers in fact present
a huge problem for the Internet.
355 Id. at 596.
356 Id. at 597.
357 Id. at 612.
358 Even Freiwald acknowledges the difficulty of settling upon a social policy goal.
Id. at 581 ("Not surprisingly, people cannot agree about what a new law should say
when they cannot agree about what the law should achieve for society."). Given the
potential for divisiveness and the lack of discernible standards for resolving such issues, it strikes me as far preferable to have political bodies decide such issues. My
approach may perhaps lead to the kind of "single institutionalism" that Freiwald criticizes. See id. at 609. But perhaps not. Even if the courts leave to Congress the primary responsibility of selecting social policy goals, that does not mean that the courts
have no role to play in shaping the contours of the law. The courts played a significant part in the development of the law of liability for ISPs before and after the enactment of § 230.
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disagree with Freiwald's suggestion that all institutions should be rapidly responding to rapid changes in cyberspace.3 59 We should not encourage judicial activism in cyberspace cases if the courts lack
sufficient expertise and information to address the rapidly changing
circumstances. In such cases, I believe that courts should favor narrow
responses. My view of Zeran, however, is that the Fourth Circuit had
enough information of the nature of the problem to adopt a rule-like
interpretation of § 230, particularly given that Congress had crafted
Internet-specific legislation for a recurring problem.
D.

Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley

We should round out our discussion by analyzing a case that got
60
the manner question wrong, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley.
Both the district court's decision and the Second Circuit's affirmance
give a broad reading to the DMCA that lies in considerable tension
with existing copyright law. Although the Second Circuit's opinion is
narrower than the district court's, neither opinion adequately considers the scope of its ruling, on either statutory or constitutional
grounds.
Corley involves one of the first applications of the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA.3 6 1 The provision gives copyright holders
legal protection-backed by rather stiff civil and criminal penalties- 62-for technological measures designed to keep others from accessing or copying their copyrighted works. In Corley, the motion
picture industry claimed that the defendants Eric Corley and his magazine violated the DMCA by making available on the Internet a
software program called "DeCSS" that could decrypt-and thus circumvent-the encryption system (the Content Scramble System) on
DVDs that prevents DVDs from being copied.3 63 Corley, whose pen
name is Emmanuel Goldstein,3 64 is a journalist and the publisher of
the magazine, 2600: The Hacker Quarterly.365 Corley did not develop
359 Id. at 628.
360 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
361 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. V 1999).
362 Id §§ 1203, 1204(a).
363 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 306-08. On appeal, the case name changed from
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes to Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley after
Reimerdes and another defendant settled, leaving Eric Corley and his magazine 2600:
The Hackerly Quarterly as the remaining defendants.
364 Id. at 308. Perhaps appropriately, Corley picked the pen name from the character who was the leader of the underground in George Orwell's 1984. Id.
365 Id.
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DeCSS himself,3 66 but instead posted it on his website and provided
links to other websites with DeCSS (as well as criticisms of the anticircumvention provision and the movie industry's lawsuit)-all of
which Corley claimed was protected by the First Amendment and the
36 7
doctrine of fair use.
After a six-day trial, the district court ruled in favor of the motion
picture studios and granted a permanent injunction to enjoin the defendants from posting or linking to DeCSS on the Internet.3 6 8 In its
ruling, the district court adopted a categorical or maximalist approach on nearly all of the statutory and constitutional issues raised.
The court's opinion (some fifty pages in length) is striking in just how
much it decides. By interpreting the anti-circumvention provision in
a strong rule-like manner, the court opened a virtual Pandora's box of
constitutional issues. Indeed, the district court probably took the
course that required resolving the most constitutional issues possible
in the case. When analyzed under our framework, however, the district court's decision appears far too broad and definitive. Even the
Second Circuit's affirmance does not go as far as the district court's
opinion. Although the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, the court of appeals expressed at least some concern about the
scope of the district court's ruling and the desirability of "narrow" decisions in dealing with cyberspace.3 69 Ultimately, however, neither
court narrowed its ruling adequately in light of the factors in our
framework. I will first analyze the district court's ruling, followed by
the Second Circuit's decision.
1. Constitutional Doctrine
The district court's broad reading of the anti-circumvention provision raised numerous constitutional issues under the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause. First, the court held that that the fair
366 In September 1999, a Nonvegian teenager, Jon Johansen, reverse-engineered
CSS and wrote a software program to decrypt GSS, a program he called "DeCSS." Id.
at 311. Johansen posted DeCSS on his website and told members on an Internet
mailing list about his program. Id. Johansen claimed that he developed DeCSS so
that he could play DVDs on his Linux operating system. Id. Once CSS was decrypted,
a person with at least some computer savvy could make digital copies of DVD movies.
Id. Soon, DeCSS began to be posted on numerous websites across the Internet, including the defendants', while other websites provided links to websites where DeCSS
could be found. Id. at 311-12. Johansen was called as a witness at trial by the defense, but was not a defendant himself. Id. at 311.
367 Id. at 321, 325.
368 Id. at 346.
369 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 (2d Cir. 2001).
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use doctrine and the doctrine of contributory infringement established by Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 370 did not apply to the

anti-circumvention provision and that the abrogation of these doctrines by the DMCA was constitutional.37 1 Even further, the court
held that application of the anti-circumvention provision to the posting of computer code was a valid, content-neutral regulation that was
consistent with the First Amendment.3 7 2 In so ruling, the court was
forced to deal with a number of other novel First Amendment issues,
including the level of scrutiny for applications of the DMCA to com374
puter code,3 73 the recognition of a category of "functional" speech,
and the requirement of proof for obtaining an injunction against link3 75
ing to websites on the Internet.

a.

Too Many Constitutional Issues Decided; Lack of Case Law

The first factor cuts sharply against the court's maximalist decision. The court decided a number of constitutional issues. But most,
if not all, of these issues could-and probably should-have been
avoided. A well-accepted canon of construction is for courts to avoid
3 76
interpreting statutes in a way that raises constitutional difficulties.
Here, that canon seems eminently sensible. The court could have decided the case on statutory grounds, such as by ruling that defendants'
conduct was protected by the fair use doctrine or that defendants'
conduct did not violate the anti-circumvention provision absent a
showing that defendants intended DeCSS to be used for copyright infringement.3 77 Alternatively, the court could have held that the defendants did not prove that they engaged in fair use, while assuming
without deciding that the fair use doctrine applies to circumventing
3 78
devices.
370 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
371 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 321-24.
372 See id. at 325-41.
373 See id. at 327-29.
374 See id. at 329.
375 See id. at 341.
376 See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); United States exrel. Att'y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213
U.S. 366, 408 (1909).
377 This interpretation is by no means foreclosed by the language of the statute.
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (c) (1), (2) (Supp. V 1999).
378 This factual finding is very close to what the district court found. See Reimerdes,
111 F. Supp. 2d at 338 & n.246 ("[T]he evidence as to the impact of the anti-trafficking provision of the DMCA on prospective fair users is scanty and fails adequately to
address the issues.").
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The dearth of case law that speaks to these issues militates
strongly against the court's maximalist decision. Courts have barely
considered (and, in some instances, not at all) the limitations imposed on Congress by the Copyright Clause, the proper First Amendment analysis of computer code, the intersection of the First
Amendment and the Copyright Clause, and the constitutional underpinnings of the fair use and Sony doctrines. Courts have been able to
skirt many of these issues based on the assumption that judicial doctrines, such as fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy, keep copyright law from abridging the freedom of speech. This assumption
underlies the Supreme Court's decision in Harper &? Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,which rejected an expansion of the fair use
doctrine (or a First Amendment exception) to permit unauthorized
publication of a copyrighted work on matters of public concern.3 79 A
similar assumption underlies the Court's analysis of the limitations imposed on Congress by the Copyright Clause. The Court has developed judicial doctrines, such as the Sony doctrine, to ensure that
copyright law stays clear of constitutional difficulties-such as may
arise if Congress removed from the public domain devices that are
capable of substantial noninfringing uses.38 0
The district court's decision runs roughshod over these carefully
calibrated balances in our copyright system and raises a host of troubling constitutional questions. First, defendants and amici presented
substantial arguments that the DMCA is unconstitutional to the extent
it denies any fair use.A81 As the court itself acknowledged, fair use acts

"as a safety valve that accommodates the exclusive rights conferred by
copyright with the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First

379 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). As the Court explained:
In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment
traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure exception to
copyright.
Id.
380 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
381 See Defendants' Post-Trial Memorandum of Law at 6-10, Reimerdes, 111 F.
Supp. 2d at 294 (No. 00 Civ. 0277 (LAK)); Brief of Professor Charles R. Nesson as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants Eric Corley, a/k/a "Emmanuel Goldstein,"
and 2600 Enterprises at 2-5, Reimerdes (No. 00 Civ. 0277 (LAK)); Brief Submitted by
Professor Yochai Benkler in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion To Vacate the Preliminary Injunction at 2, 7-9, Reimerdes (No. 00 Civ. 0277 (LAK)).
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Amendment."3 8 2 But to reject fair use as a defense to the anti-circumvention provision jeopardizes that safety valve and threatens to give
copyright holders complete dominion over their works (including fair
uses and uses after first sale)-a result that seems anathema to the
83
goals of both the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment.
Also troubling is the court's rejection of the defendants' argument that, under the Sony doctrine, the use of DeCSS should be permitted because it has a substantial, noninfringing use, namely, to
enable DVDs to be viewed on a Linux operating system. 38 4 To reach
that result, the court not only distinguished Sony but also declared
382

Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 322; see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGH21 (1994) (arguing that fair use "and other safety valves have buffered copyright
from charges that it violates the First Amendment's guarantees of free speech and
press"). In its ruling at the preliminary injunction stage, the court acknowledged
there may be a "tension between free speech and protection of copyright," but concluded that this tension has been accommodated in the past "by traditional fair use
doctrine." Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 220 (S.D.N.Y.
2000). What the court appeared to ignore is that all of this changes if the anti-circumvention provision is interpreted, as the court did, to contain no exemption for fair
use. In effect, the safety valve has been shut off by the court's interpretation.
383 In seminal articles published in 1970, Paul Goldstein and Melville Nimmer
identified the need to balance copyright law with First Amendment concerns. See
Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guaranteesof Free Speech and
Press, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970). While both authors recognized that copyright
law can serve important First Amendment goals by increasing the amount of expression, they also contended that the First Amendment may place further restrictions on
copyright law. See Goldstein, supra, at 990-91, 1001; Nimmer, supra, at 1189-93,
1193-200. Made over thirty years ago, the basic argument of Goldstein and Nimmer-that the First Amendment may impose limitations on copyright law-continues
to have considerable force. See, e.g., Benkler, PublicDomain, supra note 189; Mark A.
Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctionsin Intellectual Property Cases,
48 DuE LJ. 147 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 1057 (2001); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001); Alfred C. Yen, A FirstAmendment Perspective on the
Idea/ExpressionDichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and Feel", 38 EMORY
LJ. 393 (1989).
By rejecting fair use as a doctrine for the DMCA, the district court's opinion
raises significant First Amendment concerns. While the decision in Harper & Row
does not embrace either Nimmer's or Goldstein's suggestion for recognition of a First
Amendment constraint on copyright regarding matters of "public interest," see
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558-59 (1985), the
Court's decision is based on the assumption that copyright law has built-in First
Amendment protections in the idea/expression and fair use doctrines. Id. at 560.
Harper & Row thus presumes a First Amendment element to the fair use doctrinesomething which the district court unnecessarily diminishes.
384 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 319-20, 323-24.
WAY

20021

RULES AND

STANDARDS

FOR CYBERSPACE

that the Supreme Court's decision in Sony is overruled to the extent
that it conflicts with the DMCA.3s 5 Although Congress can "overrule"
Supreme Court precedent to the extent that it is not constitutionally
based, 3 86 the district court seemed to ignore the possibility that the
Sony doctrine has constitutional moorings.3 8 7 And, in any event, an
"overruling" of Supreme Court precedent by Congress is strong
medicine, which should not be imputed to Congress lightly.
Unfortunately, what appears to animate much of the district
court's opinion is the view that "the First Amendment interests served
by the dissemination of DeCSS on the merits are minimal."38 8 However, I am not sure that we want courts evaluating the First Amendment value of computer code or content on the Net. Such a
determination seems too susceptible to personal taste rather than to
principled doctrine. 3 89
385
386

Id.
See generallyWilliam N. Eskridge, Jr., OverridingSupreme Court Statutory Interpreta-

tion Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (analyzing congressional "overrides" of Supreme Court decisions from 1967 to 1990).
387 The Sony opinion begins with a long exposition of the constitutional requirement imposed by the Copyright Clause to consider the public interest when granting
monopoly privileges in copyright and patents. Sony, 464 U.S. at 428-29. That same
concern animates the Court's recognition that an article of commerce that has substantial noninfringing uses may not be deemed to fall within the monopoly granted to
a copyright holder. Id. at 440-41 ("When a charge of contributory infringement is
predicated entirely on the sale of an article of commerce that is used by the purchaser
to infringe a patent, the public interest in access to that article of commerce is necessarily implicated.").
388 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 335.
389 The Supreme Court has long recognized the danger of permitting courts to
evaluate the constitutional or social worth of expression. As Justice Holmes famously
admonished in an early copyright case:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some
works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty
would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language
in which their author spoke.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (Holmes, J.).
And, as Justice Harlan concluded in an equally eloquent passage in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971):
For, while the particular four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps
more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true
that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area
that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the
individual.
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Perhaps the most troubling use of maximalism in the district
court's opinion is the repeated use of negative imagery and analogies
to reject the defendants' arguments. The court invoked the following
imagery: (1) "the assassination of a political figure," 390 (2) "a suicide
pact," 39 1 (3) "the publication of a bank vault combination in a na-

tional newspaper, 3' 92 (4) a propagated outbreak epidemic of a contagious disease, 393 and (5) piracy. 39 4 Judge Kaplan made no bones

about wanting to send a message to others beyond the defendants,
stating in his opinion:
Indeed, the likelihood is that this decision will serve notice on
others that "the strong right arm of equity" may be brought to bear
against them absent a change in their conduct and thus contribute
to a climate of appropriate respect for intellectual property rights in
an age in which the excitement of ready access to untold quantities
of information has blurred in some minds the fact that taking what
95
is not yours and not freely offered to you is stealing.3
b.

Diverse Problem

Also, the district court did not have sufficient information (or evidence) to identify a recurring problem that had common elements.
Indeed, the district court acknowledged as much, conceding that it
did not "have a complete view of whether the interests of the absent
third parties upon whom defendants rely really are substantial and, in
consequence, whether the DMCA as applied here would materially af3 96
fect their ability to make fair use of plaintiffs' copyrighted works."
Yet, despite the absence of such information, the court fashioned a
broad rule that may have a substantial impact on fair uses of copyrighted works.
c.

Rapid Change Possible

The possibility of technological change also militates in favor of
caution. We do not know how future technologies-either to protect
access to copyrighted works or to circumvent those measures-will affect the copyright system and the availability of copyrighted works.
The day of the copyright management system is near but not yet here.
Id. at 25.
390
391
392
393
394
395
396

Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 304.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 315.
Id. at 331-33.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 344-45.
Id. at 337.
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As the court was forced to acknowledge, future access-restricting technology could alter the balance of the copyright system.3 97 It would be
good to knowjust how far that balance might be altered before giving
our constitutional blessing to the anti-circumvention provision.
2.

Statutory Doctrine

The court's decision is just as troubling when considered as a
matter of statutory doctrine. The district court gave a broad, rule-like
sweep to the anti-circumvention provision, ruling that the defendants'
posting of DeCSS and linking to other websites with DeCSS violated
the anti-circumvention provision,3 98 that none of the statutory exemptions applied to their conduct, 399 and that the fair use and Sony doctrines were abrogated (or not recognized) by the DMCA. When
analyzed under our framework, the court's interpretation is far too
broad and categorical.
a.

Internet-Specific Legislation

Perhaps the only thing that can be said in favor of rules is that the
DVD case involves Internet-specific legislation. Congress enacted the
DMCA specifically with the Internet in mind.
This factor probably should not weigh strongly in favor of the
broad/definitive approach, however. As in Reno, the amount of study
Congress devoted to the problems to be addressed by the legislation
was cursory at best. Congress did not commission any studies or have
397 See id. at 322 n.159, 330 n.206. See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 382, at
28-32, 197-236 (analyzing the benefits and tradeoffs in extending copyright protection to facilitate a "celestial jukebox" that can give people immediate access to a plethora of works, including movies, songs, computer programs, and information for a
fee).
On March 21, 2002, Senator Ernest "Fritz" Hollings introduced a bill in the Senate-the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act (CBDTPA), S.
2048, 107th Cong. (2002)-that would require all manufacturers of any "digital media device" to include a government-mandated copyright management system in such
devices. If enacted, the CBDTPA would precipitate a massive amount of access- and
copy-restricting technologies for computers, software, and electronics. Not surprisingly, such legislation is being championed by the entertainment industry and Disney
head Michael Eisner, but is being roundly criticized by developers of technology and
computers, such as Intel chair Andrew Grove, who fear the effect of such restrictions
on innovation. Compare Michael Eisner, Abe Lincoln and the Internet Pirates,FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2002, at 21 (advocating for legislation to require copyright management systems), with Andrew S. Grove, Bad Legislation Could Sabotage the DigitalAge, WAL ST. J.,
Apr. 8, 2002, at A26 (criticizing the CBDTPA).
398 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 316-17.
399 Id. at 319-24.
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prior judicial decisions that indicated that circumvention was a pervasive problem. Although hearings were held, they were short on con40 0
crete examples of circumvention or circumventing technologies.
The paradigmatic example discussed was the "black box, '40 1 the
descrambling device that is used to obtain cable television without authorization and that is already prohibited by federal law.40 2 But the

anti-circumvention targets much more than black boxes; it targets all
technologies, now and in the future.
The statute itself provides indications that Congress acted without
adequate study. The provision delays the effective date of the basic
circumvention provision for two years to allow the Librarian of Congress to conduct rulemaking to examine, among other things, "the
impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of technological
measures applied to copyrighted works has on criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research. '40 3 This provision
was added to allay the concerns of librarians and educators who
feared that the anti-circumvention provision would foreclose fair uses
of copyrighted works. 40 4 Even though Congress was aware that the
provision could negatively affect the availability of copyrighted works
for legitimate uses, it enacted the provision anyway, without close examination of the issue. For legislation of such magnitude, it seems a
bit disturbing that Congress delegated the responsibility of studying
the harmful effects of the legislation. 40 5 By contrast, the last major
revision to the Copyright Act in 1976 was preceded by years of
40 6
study.
400 See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the DigitalEconomy: Why the AntiCircumvention Regulations Need To Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 557-58 &
n.199 (1999).
401 See The WIPO Copyright TreatiesImplementation Act: Hearingon H.R 2281 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommuns., Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the House Comm. on Commerce,

105th Cong. (1998); H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 38 (1998) ("The Committee
believes it is very important to emphasize that Section [1201] (a) (2) is aimed fundamentally at outlawing so-called 'black boxes' that are expressly intended to facilitate
circumvention of technological protection measures for purposes of gaining access to
a work."); H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18 (1998); S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998).
402 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(a) (2), 605(e) (4) (1994).
403 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (iii) (Supp. V 1999).
404 See Samuelson, supra note 400, at 559.
405 One commentator has argued that the DMCA is unconstitutional because delegation to a legislative officer, the Librarian of Congress, violates the doctrine of separation of powers. See JeanAne Marie Jiles, Comment, Copyright Protection in the New
Millennium: Amending the Digital Millennium Copyright Act To Prevent ConstitutionalChal-

lenges, 52
406
PART

ADMIN. L. REV. 443 (2000).
See HousE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION
2: DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON
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Some might argue that the two-year moratorium takes care of the
problem: because Congress delayed the effective date of the circumvention ban for a two-year period of study, it is the same as if Congress
had conducted a study prior to enacting the legislation. Not quite.
Perhaps even more troubling is that the anti-circumvention provision
does not delay the effective date of the two anti-device bans. These
bans-which are the true meat of the anti-circumvention provisiongo into effect right away without any apparatus for the Librarian of
Congress to override or create exemptions to them. 40 7 The statute
used as
expressly states that the Librarian's determinations may not be
40 8
a defense to any claim brought under the anti-device bans.
In sum, although the first factor weighs slightly in favor of a rule,
the amount of attention Congress devoted to addressing the problems
of the DMCA provide at least some reason for pause.
b.

Does Not Target a Recurring Problem with Common
Elements

Neither the anti-circumvention provision nor the district court's
ruling targets a recurring problem with identifiable common elements. As an initial matter, one might question whether there is a
real problem of circumventing technologies, given how little evidence
of circumvention Congress considered. The sheer complexity of the
provision-with its three prohibitions, two of which contain complicated subparts and all of which are riddled with a maze of exemptions-provides tell-tale signs that the provision may be addressing too
many problems (some of which may have been only imagined) at
once.
The anti-circumvention provision is, as one scholar aptly put it,
"fiendishly complicated. '40 9 In fact, the provision contains not one,
but three anti-circumvention prohibitions: a basic provision that
targets the act of circumvention, 4 10 and two anti-device provisions that
target technologies that enable circumvention. 41' Adding to the complexity are seven statutory exemptions, some of which apply only to
the basic provision, others of which apply to the basic provision and
THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW

(Comm. Print 1963); HOUSE

COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON
THE GENERAL REVSION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (Comm. Print 1961).

407
408
409
PA. L.
410
411

17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2), (b) (1); see infra notes 410-11 and accompanying text.
Id. § 1201(a) (1) (E).
David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the DigitalMillennium CopyrightAct, 148 U.
REv. 673, 675 (2000).
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1) (A).
Seeid. § 1201(a)(2), (b).
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one of the anti-device bans, and still others of which apply to all three

bans. 41 2 The anti-circumvention provision is further complicated by
several paragraphs that provide that the anti-circumvention provision
does not affect the fair use defense or enlarge or diminish vicarious or
contributory liability for copyright infringement or free speech
rights. 4 13 Given the breadth and complexity of the anti-circumvention

provision, the court should have been leery of adopting a categorical
approach without more evidence of the precise problem.
Even if we limit the inquiry to the "problem" of DeCSS, 4 14 the
district court's opinion concedes that the nature of the problem is
diverse-indeed, in the court's own words, "remarkably varied" 4 15and may raise different issues depending on the user,4 16 the type of
use, 4 17 and the type of copyright-control technology. 4 18 The district
court even acknowledged that future technology may change the analysis and create additional problems, such as if technology were used to
control access to copyrighted works whose terms of copyright have
expired. 4 19 The district court's admitted difficulty in handling the
heterogeneous nature of the problem should have given it clear warning signs that a categorical approach might not have been appropriate. But the court ignored these warning signs and all but conceded
412
413

See id. § 1201(d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j).
See id. § 1201(c).

414 There was scant evidence in Corey that DeCSS actually facilitated rampant copying of DVDs. The motion picture studios provided less than a dozen incidents. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 314-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2000),

affd sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). Perhaps this is due to the fact that compressing a copied DVD into a manageable form
for a typical computer is time-consuming, complex, and requires the use of another
program-all perhaps beyond the ken of the average computer user. See id. at 313.
415 Id. at 338.
416

See id. (acknowledging that "the anti-trafficking provision of the DMCA may

prevent technologically unsophisticated persons who wish to copy portions of DVD
movies for fair use from obtaining the means of doing so").
417 The district court acknowledged the many different fair uses that could be
affected:
Many of the possible fair uses may be made without circumventing CSS while
others, i.e., those requiring copying, may not. Hence, the question whether
Section 1201 (a) (2) as applied here substantially affects rights, much less
constitutionally protected rights, of members of the 'fair use community'
cannot be decided in bloc, without consideration of the circumstances of
each member or similarly situated groups of members.
Id.
418 See id. at 322 n.159.
419 See id. at 338 & n.245.
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that it had no idea how its categorical reading of the anti-circumvention provision would affect other third parties. 420
c.

Implicates Copyright Law, a Regime of Entitlements
Requiring a Balance of Competing Goals and Interests

Although the court fashioned a prohibition (and architectural
regulation) against the posting of and linking to DeCSS on the Internet, the decision is tied to a regime of individual entitlements-the
copyright system-for which a balancing of interests is often necessary. As the complexity of the anti-circumvention provision attests, it
is not easy to draft a flat prohibition in the area of copyright. Given
the need for balancing of goals and interests under copyright law,
greater caution should be exercised before erecting a categorical prohibition against circumvention in a way that forecloses any balancing
of interests as contemplated by copyright law. The anti-circumvention
provision should serve the goals of our copyright system, not the other
way around. 42 1
d.

Causes Interdoctrinal Tension

The court's decision also causes great tension with the fair use
and Sony doctrines-potentially allowing copyright holders to "end
run" the requirements of both doctrines by installing copyright control technology on their works under the auspices of the DMCA. The
prospects of this "end run" to obtain supra-copyright protection are
great, given the proliferation of digital works and the development of
quite sophisticated copyright-control technologies.
The Corley decision gives too little thought to how its broad reading of the anti-circumvention provision fits within these important
copyright doctrines. The statute itself calls for harmonizing the
DMCA with existing copyright law, stating: "Nothing in tl~is section
shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title.

'422

One way to read

this clause is to recognize that the anti-circumvention provision must
be read in harmony with the fair use doctrine-meaning in a way that
420 See id. at 337.
421 The district court appeared to get the proper order backwards. See id. at 335
("The interest served by prohibiting means that facilitate such piracy-the protection

of the monopoly granted to copyright owners by the Copyright Act-is of constitutional dimension."). The Copyright Clause is aimed ultimately to serve the public's
interest in a wide dissemination of works and inventions, not the copyright holder's
interest in a grant of monopoly. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.

422 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (Supp. V 1999).
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does not alter the rights afforded by the fair use doctrine. 423 A basic
right of the fair use doctrine is that "[a] ny individual may reproduce a
copyrighted work for a 'fair use.' 4 24 But to deny a fair use defense to
the anti-circumvention provision would appear to do precisely what
this section denies: it would "affect" fair use by impairing the ability of
the public to use copyrighted works for fair use if those works are
equipped with access control measures. The statute also contains similar "harmonizing" provisions disclaiming any effect on free speech
rights425 or the doctrine of contributory infringement 426 (of which the

Sony doctrine is a part). These provisions should have signaled to the
district court the need to take into greater account whether its decision would result in excessive doctrinal tension with existing copyright
law. We should be especially cautious before embracing a position
that may undermine copyright doctrines that have existed for many
years.
e.

Rapid Change Possible

Finally, as discussed above, the possibility of changing technology
militates against a broad rule. The anti-circumvention provision applies to all technologies, now and in the future, and to all copyrighted
works. Yet it is not clear that such strong protection is necessary for
every kind of copyrighted work or every kind of access control technology. Given the technological change on the horizon and the likelihood of even stronger copyright control technologies, 42 7 courts
should tread lightly before embracing doctrines that may end up dramatically shifting the balance of copyright law. Adding such strong
statutory protection on top of technological protections for copyright
holders may lead precisely to the parade of horribles that Congress

423
424
425
426

See Samuelson, supra note 400, at 538-39, 546-47.
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984).
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (c) (4).
See id. § 1201 (c) (2).

427 Perhaps it would be better to refrain from extensive intervention until evidence shows the market or technology cannot handle the problem of circumvention.
See Ejan Mackaay, The Economics of Emergent Property Rights on the Internet, in THE Fu13, 21 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed.,
1996); Tom W. Bell, FairUse vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management
on Copyright'sFair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REv. 557, 561-62 (1998); Kenneth W. Dam,
Self-Help in the DigitalJungle,28J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1999); David Friedman, In Defense
of Private Orderings, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1151, 1163-64 (1998).
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every bit of information
hoped to avoid: a pay-per-view society, where4 28
price.
a
at
comes
and
key
is under lock and
To be sure, the district court's categorical reading of the anticircumvention prohibition is not an unreasonable interpretation of
the statute. Indeed, many may agree with the district court that the
statute is "crystal clear" 429 in not recognizing a fair use defense, that
foreclosing a defense of fair use presents no constitutional problem,
that the DMCA overrules the Sony decision to the extent the two are
in conflict, and that barring DeCSS from dissemination does not violate the First Amendment. However, there is always a chance that the
district court got it wrong-in one or several respects. That is why we
should be worried.
Although the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion, the court of appeals's decision is narrower than the lower court's
maximalist opinion in at least a few respects. First, even though the
430
Second Circuit quoted extensively from Judge Kaplan's decision,
noticeably absent from the Second Circuit's opinion is all the negative
imagery invoked by the lower court against the defendants. The appellate decision makes no reference (on its own) to political assassinations, suicide pacts, contagious disease, or piracy. 431 Unlike the trial

court, the court of appeals acknowledged that "hackers" can include
legitimate computer users, including "serious computer-science schol432
ars conducting research on protection techniques."
The Second Circuit's decision is also more self-conscious about
the scope of its ruling. In considering the defendants' First Amendment challenges, the court explicitly recognized the need to proceed
cautiously in dealing with cyberspace, stating:
Last year, in one of our Court's first forays into First Amendment
law in the digital age, we took an "evolutionary" approach to the
task of tailoring familiar constitutional rules to novel technological
circumstances, favoring "narrow" holdings that would permit the
law to mature on a "case-by-case" basis. See Name.Space, Inc. v. Net-

work Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 584 n.11 (2d Cir. 2000). In that
428 See 144 CONG. REC. H7094 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bliley)
("If left unqualified, this new right... could well prove to be the legal foundation for
a society in which information becomes available only on a 'pay-per-use' basis.").
429 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 324 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), affd sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir.
2001).
430 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 451-52 (2d Cir. 2001).
431 The court draws one analogy to the protection from thieves and burglars afforded by security devices. See id. at 452.
432 Id. at 435.
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spirit, we proceed, with appropriate caution, to consider the Appellants' First Amendment challenges... .433
Invoking that same principle, the court declined "to determine
whether a test as rigorous as Judge Kaplan's is required to respond to
First Amendment objections to the linking provision of the injunction
'434
he issued.
Ultimately, however, the Second Circuit's decision is broader and
more maximalist than it should have been. First, the court of appeals
rejected the application of the doctrine of constitutional doubt, concluding that the defendants' argument based on the statutory language, "[n]othing in this section shall affect rights, remedies,
limitations or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use,
under this title," was not plausible and was clearly rejected by legislative history. 43 5 But the court's rejection of the doctrine of constitutional doubt is, at the very least, open to question. The statute itself
does not expressly reject the fair use doctrine. To the contrary, the
statute expressly states that the anti-circumvention provision does not
affect the fair use defense. One plausible reading of this clause is that
an individual is entitled to the same scope of fair use after the enactment of the DMCA as it was before it, so as not to "affect" the fair use
rights. As long as this reading is "fairly possible," the doctrine of con43 6
stitutional doubt should apply.
What appears to underlie the Second Circuit's rejection of the
doctrine of constitutional doubt is its underestimation of the strength
of the defendants' constitutional challenge. Although purporting not
to decide whether the fair use doctrine is constitutionally required
(and thus immune from abridgement by Congress), 437 the Second
Circuit nevertheless made fairly clear how little regard it had for the
defendants' constitutional argument, which it disparaged as "extravagant."438 The court noted "that the Supreme Court has never held
that fair use is constitutionally required, although some isolated statements in its opinions might arguably be enlisted for such a requirement."439 The Second Circuit then asserted that "[w] e know of no
433

Id. at 445.

434 Id. at 457.
435 Id. at 443.
436
437

See Rust V. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991).
See Corley, 273 F.3d at 458-59.

438

Id. at 458.

439

Id.; see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) ("From

the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted
materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose, '[t]
o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts .... ").
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authority for the proposition that fair use, as protected by the Copyright Act, much less the Constitution, guarantees copying by the optimum method or in the identical format of the original." 440
Accordingly, the court held that it would not be an unconstitutional
limitation on fair use for the DMCA to forbid fair uses in digital or
another preferred format.44 1
So much for proceeding cautiously. Even though the court mentioned two procedural bases to decline to consider the constitutional
question, and even though it purported not to decide the issue, the
Second Circuit's opinion goes on at length to reject the constitutional
argument that Congress cannot abridge the fair use doctrine. 4 42 If, as
the court concluded, the record was too scanty to even consider the
issue, the court should have ended its discussion there. But the opinion goes on to conclude that Congress can take away an individual's
right to choose the format of fair use.4 4 3 Ultimately, the court's deci-

sion is based merely on the absence of any authority holding to the
contrary of its decision. But such silence is hardly surprising in a case
of first impression: no court before Corley has ever had occasion to
consider a federal statute that has been interpreted to diminish what
kinds of fair uses can be made. The fair use doctrine was first created
by courts as an equitable rule of reason; its codification into the Copyright Act has always been seen to allow courts "to adapt the doctrine
to particular situations on a case-by-case basis."44 4 It is dubious for the
court to transform the absence of case law on an issue of first impression into an affirmative basis for its decision. If anything, the fact that
Congress has never before in the two-hundred odd years that we have
had copyright laws enacted a provision that has been interpreted to
abridge the fair use doctrine should give a court reason for pause
before embracing such an interpretation.
Courts have scarcely examined the numerous constitutional issues raised by Corley in the context of the Internet or computer
software. And we know appallingly little about how the anti-circumvention provision affects access to copyrighted works because a good
deal of access-control technology is on the horizon. With so little case
law and information to guide us, and with the stakes to the copyright
440 Corley, 273 F.3d at 459.
441 See id.
442 See id. at 458-59.
443 See id. ("Fair use has never been held to be a guarantee of access to copyrighted material in order to copy it by the fair user's preferred technique or in the
format of the original.").
444 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,449 n.31 (quoting H.R.
RE'. No. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976)).
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system and the availability of copyrighted works so high, a minimalist,
fact-specific approach seems to me far preferable to a maximalist,
rule-like approach. By leaving most, if not all, of the constitutional
issues undecided, we gain valuable time to learn more about the effect
of the DMCA and access-control technologies on the availability of
copyrighted works. Should Congress later enact an amendment to
the DMCA clearly stating that fair use is no defense to the anti-circumvention provision, we will likely be in much better position to judge
the constitutionality of the act then rather than now.
CONCLUSION

By identifying circumstances that make the application of rules or
standards more appropriate for cyberspace, this Article has attempted
to sketch out a preliminary framework to assist courts in deciding
whether to take a narrow/tentative or broad/definitive approach for
cyberspace. The framework is meant to illuminate the many issues
that relate to the manner of a court's decision. By focusing on these
issues in the cyberspace context, the framework is designed to help
courts handle the difficulties of applying law to the rapidly changing
technology of the Internet. The framework is based on an underlying
belief that courts need to evaluate more critically the manner in which
they decide cases involving cyberspace. My analysis indicates that that
there is much to applaud in the respective approaches taken in Reno,
Microsoft, and Zeran but much to criticize in the broad/definitive approach taken in Corley. The suggested framework should not be mistaken, however, for a complete, definitive list of factors or the final
word on the merits of a particular case. As the number of cases dealing with cyberspace continues to grow at a swift pace, we can expect
the need for refinements, qualifications, or other modifications to the
framework. And, in the end, the ultimate decision in a case will always
implicate a host of considerations that go well beyond the ambit of the
suggested framework. The framework, in other words, can be only
the beginning, but not the end, of the discussion.

